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Prologue 
Working from 1989 to 1993 as a Third Secretary at the Embassy of the Neth-
erlands in Nairobi, I thought I knew the answers. Kenya, under the leader-
ship of the professor of politics Daniel arap Moi, was completely stuck. The 
economy was in bad shape, corruption was rampant, and the political climate 
could perhaps best be described as intimidating. There was an obvious solu-
tion, so it appeared to me. The state should withdraw from the economy in 
order to let market forces reign, but, most of all, put the necessary political 
checks and balances in place by replacing the one-party state, as was the case 
in Kenya at that time, by a Western style parliamentary democracy as soon as 
possible. In the following years, I slowly discovered that the solution was not 
that straightforward, not in Kenya, nor elsewhere in Africa for that matter.
 Holding different positions at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
be it at headquarters, be it at an embassy in Africa, I was confronted time and 
time again with the complexity of the “good governance” problem in sub-Sa-
haran Africa. From 1989 to 1993, as indicated, I worked for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs at the Netherlands Embassy in Nairobi, subsequently at the 
department for International Organizations at the ministry, and from 1996 
to 2001 at our embassy in Kampala, Uganda. Between 2001 and 2013, I held 
several positions at headquarters in The Hague again: first at the department 
for Human Rights and Peacebuilding and afterwards at the Africa depart-
ment of the ministry. During that period I closely followed the developments 
in the countries that have been the subject of my research. From 2013 on, I 
have been working as Deputy Head of Mission in Ethiopia. 
 I also got involved in a number of research projects that were focusing 
on the same topic, such as the International Cooperation Academy project 
focusing on the characteristics of the African state (a collaboration between 
the African Studies Centre and the Africa department of the Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Tracking Development (implemented on behalf 
of the ministry by the Royal Netherlands Instititute of Southeast Asian and 
Caribbean Studies, and the African Studies Centre of Leiden University), and 
the Africa Power and Politics Program and the Developmental Regimes in 
Africa project (both implemented by the Overseas Development Institute in 
London). Over and over again, I came across the discrepancy between our 
assumptions about the relevance of our “good governance” agenda and the 
African reality. 
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I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to a number of 
experts and colleagues in the Netherlands and abroad, who have contributed 
greatly with their opinions, remarks, and criticism in forming my judgment 
on this subject: David Booth, Research Fellow at the Overseas Development 
Institute and project leader of the Africa Power and Politics Program; Fred 
Golooba Mutebi, political scientist, journalist and Rwanda expert; Leo de 
Haan, former rector of the Institute of Social Studies and former rector of the 
African Studies Centre; David Henley, professor of Contemporary Indone-
sia studies at Leiden University and former project leader of Tracking Devel-
opment; George Kalibbala, former colleague at the Netherlands embassy in 
Kampala; Roel van der Veen, colleague and scientific adviser at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs; Wil Hout, professor of Governance and Political Economy 
at the Institute of Social Studies, and of course my wife Elizabeth, who as a 
Kenyan could offer me insights into Kenyan society, which usually are not 
granted to outsiders.
 The following anecdote might serve as an illustrative example of the 
above. During a visit in 1990 to a Kenyan electoral district, I was told the sto-
ry about the member of parliament of this constituency who was voted out 
at the latest elections. Interesting enough he was as poor at the end as at the 
start of his term. I remarked that at least he was an honest politician, a rather 
unique combination in Kenya. My Kenyan companion explained to me that 
that was exactly the problem: If he could not take care of himself, how could 
he then take care of his supporters? This book, based on my dissertation on 
the same topic (2016), deals with the implications of that remark.1 
Martin Koper
Addis Ababa, 2017
1 I defended my PhD thesis “Helpt democratie Africa?” successfully in September 2016 at the 
University of Amsterdam.
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1 What is this book about?
Most African colonies gained independence in the early 1960s. Independ-
ence went hand-in-hand with the introduction of a multiparty political sys-
tem. However, the institutions and organizations that were created in great 
haste within this context usually did not last long. The new African elite did 
not possess their own sources of income but depended on state resources. 
Political power was a precondition for accessing these resources. Elections 
determined who would gain access. Given the winner takes all nature of the 
political competition, the opposition would be completely sidetracked and 
confronted with two choices: to join the ruling party or be “neutralized.” Most 
African countries, including the countries that are the subject of my research, 
became one-party states. In the second half of the 1980s, however, most Af-
rican countries were financially, economically, but also politically bankrupt. 
The call for social and political change by the population of these countries 
became stronger. The international community as well, in contrast to the pe-
riod of the Cold War, called for not only economic but also political reforms.
The British political scientist and Africa expert Clapham summarized this 
new trend as follows: “In short, ‘political conditionalities’ (as they soon came 
to be called, mirroring the economic conditionalities imposed under struc-
tural adjustment) could be regarded as the program of an alliance, com-
prising international financial institutions, seeking to bring about capitalist 
transformation of African economies; Western governments, flexing their 
diplomatic muscles in the aftermath of the Cold War; Western public opin-
ions, outraged at the brutality and corruption of at least a significant number 
of African regimes; and finally, at least vicariously, the African publics who 
were vociferously demonstrating their own discontent with the existing or-
der, and on whose behalf the Western aid donors could claim (often mislead-
ingly) to speak.”2 
A consensus developed within the Western donor community that interna-
tional aid would only be effective if the government of the receiving country 
could guarantee a minimum level of “good governance.” The term “good gov-
2 C. Clapham, Africa and the international system (Cambridge, 1996), 195.
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ernance” started to appear frequently on the agendas of the multilateral and 
bilateral aid agencies. It came at the right time. The international donor com-
munity was in need of something new. The prescriptions concerning mar-
ket reforms, liberalization, privatization, and deregulation, as initiated by the 
Washington Consensus, did not produce the anticipated results. Slowly more 
attention was given to the importance of governance in boosting economic 
growth and reducing poverty. This paradigm shift was not only understanda-
ble given the disappointing outcomes of the Structural Adjustment Programs 
but also because of its objectives. These are very recognizable and attractive. 
Who can be against the pursuit of such commendable goals like democracy, 
human rights, and separation of powers? Moreover, these are concepts that 
have proven their worth in our own societies and still do. 
Among the members of the donor community, it became widely accepted 
that “good governance” was a precondition for structural economic growth 
and poverty reduction. Donor agencies feel very strongly about “good gov-
ernance.” It influences to a large extent the considerations on the basis of 
which Western donor countries decide whether to provide aid or not. In view 
of the asymmetric relationship between the provider and the receiver, this 
agenda has been particularly visible in Africa. In addition, there is also the 
notion that the pursuit of “good governance” and democracy could well be a 
goal in itself, given its intrinsic value.
Initially the emphasis was on the more technical aspects of governance such 
as improved economic policies and administrative efficiency, but gradually 
the notion of governance took on a more political interpretation (“good gov-
ernance”). More technically oriented institutions like the OECD and World 
Bank, albeit somewhat more cautiously, moved into this direction as well. 
There is no generally accepted definition of “good governance.” Almost every 
self-respecting donor has a unique interpretation of what it contains. These 
definitions differ in terms of specificity. “Governance,” “good governance,” and 
“democratic governance” are sometimes used interchangeably. In addition, the 
same organization sometimes uses different definitions. Some “good govern-
ance” definitions limit themselves to specific policies or outcomes, others to 
specific institutions and political processes. However, a general distinction can 
be made between the more economically and management oriented approach-
es by the international financing institutions and the emphasis on political as-
pects by bilateral Western donors. Moreover, given the wide scope of some of 
these definitions, it is not always clear how these “good governance” definitions 
distinguish themselves from the development process in general. 
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In spite of the differences, these definitions often also have a number of com-
mon features. Most definitions of “good governance” emphasize the normative 
and legitimacy aspects of governance. These are: democracy and representa-
tion, human rights, rule of law, transparency and accountability, and a number 
of specific goals like elections, freedom of expression, property rights, etc. Es-
pecially bilateral donors, such as the EU countries and some UN organizations, 
stress the importance of the rule of law, democracy, and representation. 
In short, one common characteristic in these definitions is that “good gov-
ernance” is primarily defined in a normative and prescriptive manner. Gov-
ernance in a specific country is supposed to comply with the formulated 
standards. In particular, the legitimacy aspects of the “good governance” 
agenda stand out. An important component of this line of reasoning is the 
assumption that development is only possible if citizens are empowered to 
hold their leaders accountable for their actions. Therefore, the advancement 
of a pluralistic political system, and especially free-and-fair elections are an 
integral part of the “good governance” agenda of Western donor countries. 
Supporting these is considered a crucial means of achieving their goal of le-
gitimate and accountable government. 
Donor countries believe that multiparty democracy, and free-and-fair elec-
tions will not only bring about more legitimate governments in the recipient 
countries but also, as a consequence, development and poverty reduction. 
As explained in a number of publications on “good governance” and devel-
opment by OECD countries and – sometimes more indirectly – by interna-
tional financial institutions like the World Bank, the support for multiparty 
politics is a prominent part of their “good governance” repertoire. And so it 
has happened. The reintroduction of multiparty politics in the (early) 1990s 
has been perhaps the most important political change on the continent since 
the struggle for independence.
The conventional donor approach assumes, implicitly or explicitly, that the 
ideal picture in this respect resembles to a large extent the manner in which 
OECD countries have organized their own societies. The task at hand is to 
fix as soon as possible the discrepancy between the actual situation in a spe-
cific developing country and the desired state of affairs. Some development 
organizations have realized, however, that the improvement of the govern-
ance situation in a developing country involves more than simply copying 
institutions, which have proven their worth in Western societies. There is a 
growing interest among donors to use political economy analysis tools to be 
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able to identify and manage risks related to interventions in this area and to 
formulate more realistic implementation strategies. 
Because of ongoing aid dependency, developing countries particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa are confronted with the “good governance” wishes, pref-
erences, and conditions of Western donors. The way these turn out in prac-
tice also depends, of course, on the specific context of the country in ques-
tion, other (strategic) considerations, and the political layout in the donor 
country itself. In the chapters on specific countries, the manner in which the 
“good governance” agenda has been applied in practice will be considered a 
bit more in detail. 
Generally speaking, there appears to be a noticeable gap between the find-
ings of at least a portion of the academic research into the relevancy of the 
Western “good governance” agenda and the opinions of the Western donor 
countries. Quite a lot of research in the last fifteen years emphasizes the con-
tinuity and resilience of the authoritarian and neo-patrimonial dimensions 
of politics in developing countries, all while donor countries during the same 
period were insisting consistently on a rapid implementation of “good gov-
ernance” reforms Western style. Furthermore, there seems to sometimes be 
a discrepancy between the actual demeanour of donor countries and what 
they preach in public.
So far, these discrepancies have not resulted in a (partial) readjustment of 
the “good governance” agenda of the Western donor community. Apart from 
country-specific considerations (see country chapters), the necessity for po-
litical representatives of a donor country to take into account the domestic 
political reality in their political assessment and decision-making with regard 
to the “good governance” situation in aid-receiving countries might explain 
these dilemmas (not to follow academic advice, and the discrepancy between 
policy and practice). As it happens, there appears to be a consensus in parlia-
ments, media, and civil society organizations of most donor countries as to 
the universality of the “good governance” agenda. 
Finally, and worth mentioning in this context, is the increasing number of 
relatively new international players active on the continent, who do not share 
these preoccupations about “good governance.” China, for instance, does not 
attach any “good governance” or human rights conditions to its financial sup-
port, as this is considered interference in internal affairs. In general, China 
is of the opinion that “good governance” issues are the responsibility of Afri-
cans themselves, which cannot be imposed by foreigners.
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1.1 The main question
“Good governance” as a necessary precondition for development. Sounds logi-
cal, but is this statement actually correct? No one would like to dispute that bad 
governance is bad for development, but that does not necessarily mean that 
development is only possible if the “good governance” wishes or even demands 
of the speech-making donor community are accommodated. In countries like 
China or Vietnam, or earlier Indonesia, which witnessed spectacular economic 
growth and substantial poverty reduction, bad governance, as defined by West-
ern countries, has been rampant. It cannot therefore be much of a surprise that 
the supposed causal relationship between, on the one hand, economic growth 
and poverty reduction, and, on the other, “good governance” is increasingly 
called into question. The emergence of “new” players on the African continent, 
who do not care much about this agenda, has undoubtedly contributed to this. 
In short, the question of how important the “good governance” of the West is 
for the development of Africa has become pertinent. 
In academic quarters there appears to be no consensus about the nature of 
the relationship between “good governance” and economic development. 
Different studies establish different causal links. Although economic growth 
has undeniably occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, the structural nature of this 
growth is also called into question. Research that focuses on the develop-
mental history of a specific country, or a comparison among a limited num-
ber of countries, usually provides a more nuanced picture than large scale, 
ahistorical, statistical comparisons between countries. 
According to a number of authors the reintroduction of multiparty democra-
cy and elections, being essential elements of the “good governance” agenda, 
did not in itself contribute positively to economic development and poverty 
reduction. The nature of African politics did not really change. Political set-
tlements in Africa were still characterized by elite politics, patronage, and 
ethnicity. 
Political reality in Africa has a different face than in Western countries. While 
the political process in the West is relatively autonomous and as such a recog-
nizable part of society, this is much less the case in sub-Saharan Africa. Politics 
and power in African countries are primarily informal and personal. Patronage 
still has a strong impact on societal relations. Within this context, an individual 
or group, and a (potential) patron seek a personal relationship, in which the 
supporters provide certain services, among which is political loyalty, to the pa-
tron, and the patron in return favors and protects his supporters. It is against 
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this background that the lack of efficient public institutions and the general 
disregard for formal rules and procedures can be explained. Although in a dif-
ferent manner than in Western countries, in this environment political actors 
also act rationally, albeit in terms of their own political logic. 
The above does not imply that formal, modern democratic institutions are 
not important, but it does mean that they are to a large extent influenced by 
these informal links and corresponding factions and therefore operate in a 
different manner than, for example, in Western countries. Political systems 
in most African countries are in reality a mixture of patrimonial practices 
and modern, Western institutions. That is why too much emphasis on formal 
institutions may obscure our view of the often more relevant informal dis-
tribution of power, which influences very strongly the functioning of these 
formal institutions. The reality behind the official façade of African states 
(and its paraphernalia such as parliaments and the judiciary) should be part 
and parcel of any meaningful analysis. Generally, African societies (but they 
are not the only ones) can be characterized by the continued existence of pre-
modern societal relationships within a seemingly modern, Western, bureau-
cratic context, and the interaction between them both. In addition, impor-
tant historical differences among countries remain, which determine the way 
in which these politics are conducted in the (informal) political arena as well. 
The central question in this book is whether, given this context, the introduc-
tion or reintroduction of a multiparty system, and corresponding elections 
in a number of African countries in the 1990s, contributed to political set-
tlements that were conducive to economic development and transformation. 
In short, the answer is that it has not been particular helpful, in some cases 
irrelevant, and sometimes even counterproductive.
Although multiparty politics and elections are not identical with “good gov-
ernance” or democracy, they are an essential part of this agenda. Elections 
are considered –particularly by Western countries – as the “high mass” of 
democracy. They are an indispensable part of the democratization process. 
In his The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century, Samuel 
Huntington states this opinion in the following concise manner: “Elections, 
open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua 
non.”3 It can hardly be a surprise that promoting and supporting free-and-fair 
elections is an integral part of the “good governance” repertoire of the tradi-
tional donor community.
3 S. Huntington, The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century (London, 1991).
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In order to answer the above question, I will focus on the reaction of the po-
litical elites in a number of African countries to the challenges they faced as 
a consequence of the reintroduction of multiparty politics. In this study, an 
effort will be made “to open the black box of elite decision-making and ex-
amine what is inside.”4 
1.2 How to go about it?
There are quite a number of different circumstances that have an impact on 
economic development or the lack thereof, such as geographic location, de-
mographic developments, social factors, the structure of the economy, the 
nature of the economic policies, etc. In this study, the emphasis is on the 
response of the political elites to the challenges of a pluralistic political sys-
tem and its effects on economic development. It is not assumed that political 
elites necessarily consider the development of their countries as the main pri-
ority of their policies or that development can only take place if these elites 
are held more accountable by the population. Given the “vertical” nature of 
African politics and, as a consequence, the competition for resources in or-
der to be able to fulfill patronage-related obligations, the emphasis will be on 
political elites. In other words, the position and stance of the political elites 
in a specific country do not constitute the only explanation for the level of 
economic progress but are nevertheless very important and crucial elements. 
Within such a context, the fight for and the distribution of political power in 
order to gain access to available resources, take center stage. The systematic 
concentration of political power in the hands of the president constitutes a 
trend in Africa, which could not be altered by the reintroduction of a multi-
party system either. For that reason, especially the reaction of political elites 
to presidential elections will be reviewed. 
Political settlements
In an effort to provide insight into the question of how different forms of co-
operation (or the lack thereof ) by the political elites have influenced the rela-
tionship between multiparty democracy and a political constellation condu-
cive to economic development, I have made use of a typology developed by 
the economist Mushtaq Khan of the School of Oriental and African Studies 
of the University of London concerning political settlements in developing 
4 D. Booth, “Development as a collective action problem,” Africa Power and Politics Program. 
Policy brief no. 9 (London, 2012).
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countries. This typology appears to me as the most appropriate for analyzing 
the settlements in the countries under scrutiny.
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Low opposition from excluded 
factions giving ruling coalition 
stability and long time horizon. 
Limited power of lower level fac-
tional supporters ensures high 
enforcement capability.
(Vulnerable) authoritarian 
 coalition
Initial enforcement capabilities 
likely to be strong but excluded 
factions mean force or legal re-
strictions have to be used making 
coalition vulnerable to violent 
overthrow.
(Weak) dominant party
Enforcement capabilities 
 become weaker as lower-level 
factions get stronger or more 
fragmented. Exluded factions 
also become stronger and 
dissatisfied supporters start 
leaving.
Competitive clientelism
Characterized by competition 
between strong factions. Sta-
bility can be achieved only with 
credible mechanisms for cycling 
factions in power. Low enforce-
ment capabilities in most cases 
and short time horizons.
Figure 1.1
Patron-Client Factions & the Structure of the Ruling Coalition
Source: M. Khan, “Political settlements and the governance of growth- enhancing institutions.” 
2010 Research paper series on growth enhancing governance (London, 2010), p. 65.
According to Khan, the manner in which the ruling coalition is organized is 
of crucial importance. He identifies two dimensions: the position of power of 
the ruling coalition relative to the excluded political elites and the internal dis-
tribution of power within the ruling coalition. The first dimension (horizontal 
distribution of power) spells out the balance of power between the excluded 
factions and those in power. If the excluded factions are weak, the ruling co-
alition will feel relatively secure and might therefore apply a more farsighted 
agenda, which could be advantageous to policies promoting economic growth 
and development. The second dimension (vertical distribution of power) de-
scribes the balance of power between the higher echelons within the ruling 
coalition and the lower levels. The more powerful the higher echelons, the 
stronger the capability to actually implement and enforce policies that benefit 
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economic development. From a development perspective, the potential devel-
opmental coalition is the most conducive constellation. As Khan points out: 
“Here the ruling coalition has a long-term horizon and therefore its interests 
are aligned with development and it has effective implementation capabilities.”5 
Within this context the outcome of elections remain important. Winning elec-
tions does not just mean access to state coffers, crucial to staying in power, but 
it also provides an indication of the balance of power between the competing 
elite factions. In the country chapters, the set-up of the political settlements 
and changes will be reviewed on the basis of this typology. 
Historical
The approach is first and foremost historical. I am particularly interested in the 
questions of what has happened and why. The point of departure is the reality 
as I have encountered it in my research. The developments under review are 
put in their historical context. Such a method of working is, in my opinion, the 
best way to do justice to the complexities of the issue. A historical perspective 
allows one to go beyond establishing rather superficial correlations and to get 
a real insight into the question of why things happened as they happened. A 
historical analysis of experiences in individual countries will provide us with a 
better understanding of what has happened as well as why a certain develop-
ment took place, because it takes into account the specific context and the cor-
relation with other events and processes in the course of time. The focus will 
not only be on specific developments relevant to the subject matter but also 
on more long-term historical developments that have influenced the course of 
events. In this way, the relationship between cause and effect, specific factors 
that were at play, and their interaction can be identified. 
 
Comparative
In addition to a description of the diversity of historical experiences in a 
number of African countries, these experiences will also be compared to 
each other. A historical as well as a comparative perspective will produce the 
best insights relevant to the type of questions raised in this study. A compar-
ative method will help to better understand certain events and developments 
in a specific country, to identify alternative explanations, and to formulate 
(new) generalizations. It is evident that there are also limitations connected 
to this approach. There will always be a certain tension between, on the one 
hand, the effort to do justice to the interpretation of a specific case and, on 
the other, to try to draw more general conclusions. 
5 M. Khan, “Political settlements and the governance of growth-enhancing institutions,” 2010 
Research paper series on growth-enhancing governance (London, 2010), 65.
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Another point of particular interest concerns the choice of the country cas-
es. Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, the Congo, and Ethiopia have been selected on 
the basis of the following considerations. First, they are sufficiently similar 
as well as different to make a comparison meaningful. A common feature 
of the political settlements in these countries is that they are based on pa-
tron-client relationships, but at the same time they vary in the way these rela-
tionships have been given shape and substance. Furthermore, I have selected 
these countries on more practical grounds. I have either lived and worked, or 
followed closely the social and political developments in these countries on 
account of my positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Non-prescriptive
Regardless of the level of development or context, the “good governance” 
agenda of the Western donor community consists of a number of reforms 
aimed at macroeconomic stability, accountability, transparent public finance 
management, clearly defined property rights, rule of law, human rights, and a 
pluralistic political system. The implicit message is that what works in West-
ern democracies will also work in Africa. Given the evidently normative 
character of the notion of “good governance,” it might be useful to emphasize 
here that this study unequivocally aims to find out what has really happened, 
and not the image that is being presented or should be presented. The point 
of departure is reality, not appearance. The layout of our the Western society 
is, after all, also the outcome of a specific historical process, as convincingly 
explained in the standard work Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 
of Barrington Moore (1966).
 
The relevance of his conclusions for this study justifies the length of the fol-
lowing quotation: “The freedoms created through this process [the demo-
cratic route to modern society] display a clear relationship to each other. 
Worked out with the rise of modern capitalism, they display the traits of a 
specific historical epoch. Key elements in the liberal and bourgeois order of 
society are the right to vote, representation in a legislature that makes the 
laws and hence is more than a rubber stamp for the executive, an objective 
system of law that at least in theory confers no special privileges on account 
of birth or inherited status, security for the rights of property and the elimi-
nation of barriers inherited from the past on its use, religious tolerance, free-
dom of speech, and the right to peaceful assembly. Even if practice falls short 
of profession, these are widely recognized marks of modern liberal society.”6
6 B. Moore Jr., Social origins of dictatorship and democracy. Lord and peasant in the making of 
the modern world (Boston, 1966), 429.
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This does not mean that governance is not important for development. Of 
course it is. The question is, however, whether the abovementioned govern-
ance reforms fitted the (historical) phase these countries were in and the con-
crete challenges they faced. This book deals with the implications of multi-
party democracy for development. 
Qualitative
The above implies a mainly qualitative approach. A quantative method of 
working inevitably limits itself to those matters that can be counted and dis-
regards qualitative changes in the way people and groups of people relate 
to each other. Moreover, measuring results (quantitatively) in Africa is of-
ten problematic. In the majority of African countries, reliable, quantative in-
formation is only available to a limited extent. But more important, many 
“transactions” happen in an informal context. A one-sided quantative ap-
proach carries the danger of making us blind to the African reality. To quote 
Albert Einstein: “Everything that can be counted does not necessarily count; 
everything that counts can not necessarily be counted.” This does not pre-
clude that some statistical data can be helpful to gain a basic insight into, for 
example, information relevant for this study concerning economic growth 
and the level of economic transformation over a specific period of time. 
Economic development
The nature of economic development in sub-Saharan Africa requires some 
clarification as well. It is beyond dispute that from the mid-1990s many Af-
rican countries witnessed substantial economic growth, partly thanks to 
economic reforms, adequate macroeconomic policies, a growing demand 
for natural resources, and financial support from donor countries. Yet, ac-
cording to a number of authors structural transformation is the essence of 
the process of economic development. In that respect Africa is still lagging 
behind if one takes a number of other crucial elements of economic transfor-
mation into consideration as well.
By structural economic development is meant here the growth of the econo-
my as well as the extent of its transformation. This book focuses on the ques-
tion of whether the introduction/reintroduction of a multiparty system and 
corresponding elections in a number of African countries in the 1990s con-
tributed to political settlements that are conducive to structurally inclusive 
economic development and not just economic growth as such. Within this 
context, three types of data will be used: Gross National Product per capita, 
the extent of economic transformation as defined by the African Center for 
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Economic Transformation (ACET), and the poverty figures in the selected 
countries.
1.3 Layout
The layout of this book is as follows. As indicated, the subject matter will be 
dealt with from a comparative historical perspective. The proof of the pud-
ding is in the eating. Therefore a major part of this book is dedicated to a 
number of case studies of countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Kenya, Uganda, 
the Congo, Rwanda, and Ethiopia. 
These country chapters, which include developments up to 2015, also have a 
common layout.7 First, developments preceding the introduction/reintroduc-
tion of a multiparty democracy will be reviewed in as far they are relevant to 
the main question of this study. Then there will be a short and concise descrip-
tion of the most important events in relation to the (presidential) elections, 
followed by a limited overview of relevant economic development during the 
period in question. Subsequently, the reactions by the political elites to the 
challenges with which they were confronted as a consequence of the introduc-
tion/reintroduction of multiparty politics will be reviewed. In particular, I will 
look into the following factors that influenced the nature of the political set-
tlements in the selected countries: the political cohesion of the political elites 
(or the lack thereof), the ethnic/regional dimensions, the extent of political 
instrumentalization of violence, and political corruption. In addition, I will 
also briefly pay attention to the attitude of the international donor commu-
nity. Some country specific conclusions will round off these chapters. On the 
basis of these conclusions and of relevant literature in this context, I will try 
to identify a number of common lines and patterns. These then will form the 
“building blocks” for the formulation of a number of general conclusions and 
observations with regard to the agenda propagated by the OECD members in 
Africa about multiparty democracy as a necessary precondition for develop-
ment and the implications of this agenda. Finally, since this study also has the 
pretense to have some policy relevance, a number of general policy recom-
mendations regarding “good governance” will be formulated. 
7 In 2016 the political landscape in Ethiopia changed considerably. Therefore, I added a post 
scriptum to the chapter on Ethiopia.
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2 Kenya
2.1 What preceded
To appreciate what happened in Kenya during the reintroduction of multi-
party politics in 1992 and why, it might be useful to review a number of de-
velopments within Kenyan society that were set in motion long before that. 
After independence, the political system in Kenya under the leadership of 
President Kenyatta became rapidly dominated by the presidency, as in so 
many African countries. Political stability characterized the first years after 
independence. This stability rested on the policy by the president to create 
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a strong bond with a large part of the political elites, to secure “the fruits of 
independence,” and of course on the personality and reputation of Kenyat-
ta himself as father of the nation. He exploited the patronage-based ethnic 
networks within and outside his own ethnic group along with his command 
of the civil service and in particular the provincial administration. The pur-
suit of inclusivity was facilitated after the Kenya African Democratic Un-
ion (KADU), the party that represented the interests of the smaller ethnic 
groups, joined the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU), the biggest and 
nationalist party under the leadership of Kenyatta.
Illustration 2.1
Jomo Kenyatta
That did not mean that every ethnic group, and more particularly the local 
Big Men, could share in equal measure in the spoils (political) power provid-
ed. First of all, Kenyatta saw to it that he consolidated the support of his own 
ethnic group, the Kikuyu, which in fact was not a homogeneous group ei-
ther. Although his kitchen cabinet mainly consisted of people from his native 
area, the Kiambu mafia, he ensured the support from other Kikuyu factions 
as well. An instructive example of this was the establishment of the Gikuyu 
Embu Meru Association (GEMA) in 1973, a collaboration of Kikuyu and re-
lated ethnic groups, the Embu and Meru, in an effort to strengthen the eth-
nic base of his regime. He accepted that by doing so the dominant position 
of his ethnic supporters in the political and government structures became 
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rather obvious. Still, in order to maintain as much as possible the bond with 
other ethnic groups and strengthen the legitimacy of his government, he saw 
to it that these groups were also part and parcel of this patronage system. He 
supported local political leaders who owed him personal loyalty. At the same 
time he systematically isolated his opponents and their protégés. They were 
not only deprived of any patronage but their freedom of action was restricted 
as well. The treatment suffered by the opposition party, the Kenya People’s 
Union (KPU), under the leadership of Oginga Odinga (the father of the for-
mer prime minister, Raila Odinga, who championed more leftist policies), 
might serve as an example.
During the second half of the 1970s, Kenyatta, who was in his eighties, lost 
the ability to steer the Kenyan ship of state as he had done in the past. Com-
peting factions tried to fill this power vacuum. A number of Kikuyu politi-
cians made an effort to prevent, after the demise of Kenyatta, Vice-president 
Daniel arap Moi would take over the presidency for a period of ninety days, 
as stipulated in the constitution. However, this initiative to change the consti-
tution failed with the help of other Kikuyu leaders, such as the then minister 
of Finance Mwai Kibaki and the powerful Attorney General Charles Njonjo 
and probably Kenyatta himself. Partly thanks to the increased value of im-
portant export commodities like coffee and tea, and the tourist industry, the 
economy was doing well during this period in spite of the political uncer-
tainty. 
As a result of the disagreement among the several Kikuyu factions about who 
should be the next president and the underestimation of his political capa-
bilities by his rivals, Daniel arap Moi managed to succeed Kenyatta after his 
death in 1978. Initially Moi consolidated his position, on the one hand, by 
forming an alliance with Kibaki and Njonjo (who did not belong to the Ken-
yatta coterie, which originated primarily from Kiambu) and, on the other, by 
strengthening his homebase, the Kalenjin in the Rift Valley. Moi exploited the 
tensions between the several Kikuyu factions. Slowly but surely, he started to 
dismantle their power, for example, by banning tribal organizations, with the 
main objective being to eliminate the powerful Kikuyu organization GEMA. 
Gradually, Kikuyu working in the civil service, parastatals, army, and police 
were replaced by representatives of other ethnic groups. Contrary to Kenyat-
ta, who only intervened in case of economic and political necessity, political 
and economic power became more centralized. Whereas Kenyatta, firmly in 
the saddle, could afford to operate as a “benevolent dictator” and be in charge 
from a distance, the new president was less sure of himself.
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After the economic prosperity in the time of Kenyatta, the Moi regime had 
to cope with a number of economic setbacks: increasing oil prices, lower 
prices for export products like coffee and tea, decline in tourism, and, most 
importantly, scarcity of farmland as a result of increasing demographic pres-
sures as well as land grabbing by political elites. Against this background, the 
reorganization of the “political economy” had its price. The Kikuyu were the 
most productive and best-educated section of the Kenyan population. The 
stable patronage networks established under Kenyatta were dismantled. The 
coffee areas, primarily situated in Kikuyu territory, were neglected, and the 
parastatals active in this sector eroded, as they were considered an econom-
ic powerbase and therefore politically dangerous. After all, the Kikuyu were 
the most important opponents of the regime. In spite of all the opposition, 
they still constituted a key economic factor, albeit now often with a “layer of 
varnish” of Kalenjin (and Asian) business people. The regime could count 
less and less on the support of the most important economic regions: Central 
Province (the homebase of the Kikuyu) and Nairobi. 
Moreover, Moi lacked the charisma Kenyatta had at his disposal. Against the 
background of political uncertainty as a consequence of the failed military 
coup in 1982 and the abovementioned declining availability of resources for 
patronage purposes, Moi had no option but to resort to a divide-and-rule 
policy: Different groups were played against each other. But in order to hand 
out, he first had to take away. Apart from a number of “regular friends” of the 
president, rotation among political elites became the benchmark of the po-
litical system the president had in mind, the general trend being the replace-
ment of Kikuyu in important government and semi-government positions by 
fellow, often underqualified Kalenjin. The same happened in the economic 
domain. During the time of Kenyatta, Kenya was already a de facto one-par-
ty state. This was formalized by Moi in 1982: KANU became the only legal 
political party. Repression and corruption increased. The disappearance of 
consensus among the elites reinforced the call for political liberalization and 
the removal of the one-party state. 
In addition to these long-term developments, a number of specific events 
triggered more overt political protests: the mass demonstrations in Eastern 
Europe against communist dictatorship, the irregularities during the 1988 
elections, and the suspension of international aid. Initially efforts were made 
to suppress these protests by force. The author of this study had the doubtful 
pleasure of closely witnessing the mass protests (in Kenya known as Saba 
Saba) after the arrest of the main opposition leaders at that time, Matiba 
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and Rubia. In 1991, Moi yielded to the internal and external pressure and 
announced the reintroduction of a multiparty system. 
2.2 The elections
1992 
Within the context of a multiparty system, winning the presidential elections 
is the most important prize. Part of the KANU tactics to decide these in its 
favor was based on a readjustment of the relevant procedures by the Kenyan 
parliament (consisting only of KANU MPs): a ban on a coalition government 
and, apart from a majority of the overall vote, a minimum of at least 25 per-
cent of the votes in at least five of the eight provinces. The reasons behind 
these provisions were rather obvious: taking into account the discord among 
the political oppsition, KANU felt confident that it would win the presiden-
tial elections but was not so sure about the outcome of the elections for the 
legislative. The first provision allowed Moi to form a minority government. 
Since the support of the opposition was concentrated in a limited number 
of provinces, and KANU possessed a well-organized countrywide network 
(which the political opposition did not have) and was in command of the pro-
vincial administration, the second provision was clearly meant to give KANU 
the advantage. 
Put in a simplistic way, Moi was capable of remaining in charge for 24 years 
thanks to a combination of repression and the consolidated support of a 
number, often smaller ethnic groups, held together by a strong anti-Kikuyu 
sentiment. Towards the end of the 1980s, the representatives of those ethnic 
groups, which once constituted KADU, called the shots within the KANU 
hierarchy and government. These groups became known under the name of 
KAMATUSA, an alliance of ethnic factions, primarily from the Rift Valley, 
that supported the regime: the Kalenjin, the Maasai, the Turkana, and the 
Samburu.
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Illustration 2.2
Daniel arap Moi
One of the preparations by KANU for the 1992 elections concerned the or-
ganization of KANU youth as the “security organ” of the party. Youth for 
Kanu and Operation Moi Win became important instruments in the election 
campaign. Supported by the provincial administration (one of the mainstays 
of the regime), KANU used these organizations to win votes for KANU and 
to intimidate the opposition. The leader of Youth for KANU, Cyrus Jirongo, 
had considerable financial resources at his disposal to “convince” constitu-
ents to vote for KANU. The Ksh. 500 notes, introduced at the time of the 
election campaign, were nicknamed “jirongos” after him. In addition, these 
youth militias were used to intimidating the political opposition physically 
(once the elections were over and the job was done, these organizations were 
quickly disbanded). Furthermore, life was made difficult for the opposition 
by withholding licences for meetings, prohibiting gatherings at the very last 
minute, and by arbitrary detention of opposition leaders. 
Simultaneously, a violent campaign began, aimed at ethnically cleansing the 
Rift Valley – a crucial province from an election perspective and the home-
base of the Kalenjin ethnic group – of Kikuyu (opposition supporters) and 
to a lesser extent of other ethnic groups in order to turn this region into an 
exclusive KANU zone. Although many Kikuyu had been living in this prov-
ince for 30 or 40 years, they were still considered as “outsiders” who had no 
place in this region. The author of this study was able to personally witness 
the results: More than 1500 people were killed and more than 300,000 dis-
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placed, the majority of whom were Kikuyu. Within this context there was the 
notorious statement of the Maasai leader and close ally of Moi, Ntimama, 
who advised Kikuyu “to lie low like envelopes.” The result was that the oppo-
sition found it impossible to campaign in at least a third of the country. The 
divisions among the opposition did the rest. 
The result of the presidential elections confirmed the important role pa-
tronage and ethnicity played in Kenyan politics. Opposition parties became 
ethnic vehicles. Already before the elections, the main opposition party, the 
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), a collaboration between a 
number of ethnic groups, had split into two competing parties, each with 
their own specific ethnic constituency. The future president Mwai Kibaki 
also established his own party: the Democratic Party (DP). In addition, quite 
a number of other small parties came into existence, sometimes facilitated 
by the government. The most striking feature of the result of the presidential 
elections was perhaps the fact that the incumbent and his party failed to get 
a clear majority of the votes in spite of all the intimidation, ethnic violence, 
corruption, and divisions among the opposition. Precisely because of the 
election tactics of KANU and indirectly the president, events were triggered 
that Moi had warned against: The introduction of political pluralism resulted 
in intensified competition, ethnicity-based political parties, and a near bank-
ruptcy of the economy. At the same time, the Kenyan population participated 
in the elections with great enthusiasm. For the first time in a long while, Ken-
yans had something of a real choice.8
Table 2.1
Results 1992 presidential elections in Kenya
Candidate (Party) Number of Votes  % of Votes
Daniel arap Moi (KANU) 1,962,866 36.35%
Kenneth Matiba (FORD-A) 1,404,266 26.00%
Mwai Kibaki (DP) 1,050,617 19.45%
Oginga Odinga (FORD-K) 944,197 17.48%
George Anyona (KSC) 14,273 0.26%
Chibule wa Tsuma (KNC) 10,221 0.19%
Harun Mwau (PICK) 8,118 0.15%
Mukaru Ng’ang’a (KENDA) 5,766 0.11%
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
8 My own experience as an election observer in the district of Kajiado in 1992.
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1997
After the elections of 1992, the opposition remained very much divided 
along ethnic lines. Furthermore, they were unable to reach a consensus on 
the strategy and tactics to be followed against Moi and others. KANU man-
aged to win a number of by-elections and to weaken the opposition further. 
In a sense, the elections in 1997 were a repetition, albeit on a smaller scale, of 
the events in 1992, and they led to the same result. Once again ethnicity took 
center stage. In the run up to the elections of 1997, the same tactics by KANU 
as before were applied: intimidation and physical violence against political 
opponents and their supporters. This time KANU selected a youth militia, 
other than the one in 1992, to do the dirty work, Jeshi la Mzee, which pre-
sented themselves as the informal presidential militia. While assisted by the 
police and financed by wealthy KANU politicians, the group focused on dis-
rupting election meetings of the opposition. In response, the opposition cre-
ated its own militias, albeit less well organized and financed. Ethnic cleans-
ing was also part of the 1997 elections, although less extensive than in 1992. 
Once again the objective was to chase out opposition supporters, not only in 
the Rift Valley and in the adjoining areas of Nyanza and Western province 
but also this time on the coast. The Luo, Kikuyu, and Kamba living in these 
areas were considered potential supporters of the opposition and an impor-
tant swing factor. The result of the elections was hardly a surprise. 
Table 2.2
Results 1997 presidential elections in Kenya
Candidate (Party) Number of Votes  % of Votes
Daniel arap Moi (KANU) 2,445,801 40.12%
Mwai Kibaki (DP) 1,895,527 31.09%
Raila Odinga (NDP) 665,725 10.92%
Michael Wamalwa (FORD-K) 505,542 8.29%
Charity Ngilu (SDP) 469,807 7.71%
Martin Shikuku (FORD-A) 36,302 0.60%
Katama Mkangi (KNC) 23,484 0.39%
George Anyona (KSC) 16,294 0.27%
Kimani wa Nyoike (FORD-P) 8,564 0.14%
Koigi wa Wamwere (KENDA) 7,463 0.12%
Munyua Waiyaki (UPPK) 6,103 0.10%
Godfrey M’ Mwereria (GAP) 4,555 0.07%
Wangari Maathai (LPK) 4,133 0.07%
Stephen Oludhe (EIP) 3,653 0.06%
David Waweru Ng’ethe (UMMA) 3,526 0.06%
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
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2002
In the run-up to the elections of 2002, Moi tried to create a broad-based 
ethnic coalition of KANU supporters. KANU and the party of Raila Odinga 
(NDP), who could count, as always, on the full support of the Luo, merged. 
However, the internal power struggle about who should succeed Moi, retir-
ing after 24 years, was the final nail in the coffin of KANU. To the dismay 
of many KANU heavy weights, Moi personally appointed as his successor 
Uhuru Kenyatta, son of the first president. Next, he travelled with Uhuru 
around the country to introduce him to KANU party officials (“project Uhu-
ru”), all this very much against the will of other KANU contenders, among 
whom Odinga, who of course considered himself as the best candidate. A 
bitter power struggle ensued between “project Uhuru” (Moi and Kenyatta) 
and the Rainbow Alliance (a number of KANU big shots and Odinga). Slowly 
KANU imploded. Eventually Moi managed to push through the appointment 
of Kenyatta as the official presidential candidate of KANU. As a consequence, 
a number of prominent party leaders (among whom Odinga) left KANU 
and joined the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) under the leadership of 
Kibaki. During the 1992 and 1997 elections, KANU had been very effective 
in mobilizing their supporters, undermining the opposition, and manipulat-
ing the vote in crucial constituencies. In 2002, that was not longer the case. 
Furthermore, contrary to the previous elections, the opposition was, at least 
initially, capable of maintaining a sense of unity. 
The elections in 2002 were much less prone to violence than those in 1992 
and 1997. Although some violent incidents did occur, in which youth mili-
tias were often involved, Kenya was able to avoid ethnic cleansing this time 
around. This might be explained by the similar ethnic background of the two 
most important presidential candidates: both were Kikuyu. Therefore, an-
ti-Kikuyu sentiments could not be exploited to incite (political) violence. Sec-
ond, contrary to the previous elections, the opposition formed a strong pow-
er bloc, while KANU was divided and weakened. The efforts of civil society to 
avoid election violence must have contributed as well. Kibaki and NARC de-
feated Uhuru Kenyatta, the KANU presidential candidate, by a wide margin. 
Initially there was great optimism among the Kenyan population. The Moi 
era of repression and economic stagnation had been overcome. The econo-
my was picking up. The paraphernalia of a democratic political system were 
reinstated. The reality behind this façade was somewhat different, however.
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Table 2.3
Results 2002 presidential elections in Kenya
Candidate (Party) [Coalition] Number of Votes  % of Votes
Mwai Kibaki (DP) [NARC] 3,646,277 62.20%
Uhuru Kenyatta (KANU) 1,835,890 31.32%
Simeon Nyachae (FORD-P) 345,152 5.89%
James Orengo (SDP) 24,524 0.42%
David Waweru Ng’ethe (CCU) 10,061 0.17%
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
 
2007 
In accordance with the recycling nature of African politics, a substantial 
number of the elected NARC parliamentarians were ex-KANU members. 
The NARC anti-KANU coalition was, however, short-lived and disintegrat-
ed rapidly. After the initial unity and optimism as a result of the convincing 
election victory, the elite consensus came swiftly to an end. The long absence 
of Kibaki due to a traffic accident (during the campaign), combined with his 
style of leadership (based on delegation of powers to his ministers) made it 
possible for a small circle of confidants of the president to in fact partly take 
over power. This group of people became known as the Mount Kenya Mafia; 
many came from the area around Mount Kenya, also the home region of the 
president.
The failure to honor an agreement between Kibaki and Odinga made prior 
to the elections about the distribution of the cabinet and other important 
positions – in particular the position of prime minister (for Odinga) – as well 
as the opposition by the Kibaki camp to the constitutional reform process 
constituted important reasons for the collapse of the coalition. The basis for 
the inter-ethnic coalition, that is, decision-making by consensus, had ceased 
to exist. The referendum on the constitution in 2005 resulted in further frag-
mentation among the political elite. Under the leadership of Odinga, a mas-
sive campaign was conducted against the draft constitution proposed by the 
government. The “no-camp” consisted of a very mixed bunch of people: Fa-
natical majimboists (see below) from the Rift Valley were campaigning side 
by side with civil society activists, who hoped for a curtailment of the execu-
tive powers of the president and the enhancement of local government. The 
constitutional proposals by the government were rejected. Undoubtedly, a 
number of substantive issues like the constitutional powers of the president 
and the wish for devolution played an important role. However, the main 
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reason appeared to be that the draft constitution was seen as a recipe for 
continued Kikuyu domination. 
As a follow-up to the referendum, a new political party was established in the 
build-up to the elections of 2007: the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). 
At the heart of this new party was a coalition between Raila Odinga and Wil-
liam Ruto, a well-known Kalenjin politician from the Rift Valley. The ODM 
built on the anti-Kikuyu rhetoric, which had proved so successful while cam-
paigning against the new constitution. Quite a number of politicians from 
the Rift Valley, who joined ODM, were known as militant supporters of the 
efforts, during the Moi presidency, to rid the province of Kikuyu. Many res-
idents of the Rift Valley interpreted the collaboration between Odinga and 
these local politicians from the Rift Valley as an encouragement to expel “for-
eigners.” 
In the field, the campaign partly degenerated into a fight between forty-one 
tribes against one, in which the perceived over-representation of the Kikuyu 
in trade, the banking sector, and civil service was emphasized. It was point-
ed out that the predominance of Kikuyu was the main cause of the margin-
alization of other ethnic groups in the national political arena. Of course, 
attention was also paid to other issues such a fairer distribution of wealth, 
the fight against corruption, and the need to improve infrastructure. Still, 
the ethnic dimension, implicitly or explicitly, loomed large. The other side 
also kept up its end, when it came to stereotyping opponents. Appeals were 
made to the ethnic prejudices among Kikuyu themselves. In August 2007, 
Kenyatta announced that KANU would support Kibaki. Moi also spoke out 
in favor of the incumbent, something for which he was not exactly thanked 
by the majority of his own Kalenjin. Many interpreted this support as an ef-
fort to secure his own personal interests and that of his family. The response 
of the Kalenjin was grounded in perceptions of marginalization in the past as 
well as in the present. The British historian Gabriela Lynch, who studied the 
sentiments among the Kalenjin that led to such an attitude, concludes: “This 
strongly ethnicized discourse of current ‘prosecutions’ and ‘bias’ was strong-
ly interwoven with those of past and potential ‘injustices’ and how these ex-
panded discursive threads encouraged a popular rejection of PNU [Kibaki’s 
party] and strong support for ODM’s manifesto pledges of redistribution, 
devolution and correction of historical injustices.”9 
9 G. Lynch, “Courting the Kalenjin: the failure of dynasticism and the strength of the ODM 
wave in Kenya’s Rift Valley province,” African Affairs, 107 (2008), 429, 544.
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The 2007 elections were primarily a contest between the incumbent Kiba-
ki and his Party of National Unity (PNU) and Raila Odinga of the Orange 
Democratic Movement. By Kenyan standards, the ODM campaign was well 
organized and lively, while the performance of the party of Kibaki was rather 
lacklustre. However, the government could point to positive economic re-
sults, an important fact after so many lean years. While the ODM clearly won 
the parliamentary elections, the outcome of the presidential elections, the 
main prize, turned out to be a neck-and-neck race. It was far from clear who 
had won the presidential elections. Nevertheless Kibaki declared himself to 
be the winner and was hastily sworn in as president under strong protests by 
the opposition 
Illustration 2.3
Election violence in Kisumu 2007/8
Although the elections themselves went peacefully enough, riots subse-
quently broke out on a massive scale in Kisumu (the homebase of Odinga) 
and in the ethnically mixed slums of Nairobi. Violence spread across other, 
ethnically diverse parts of the country. On New Year’s Day 2008, 39 people, 
mainly women, children, and handicapped, who sought refuge in a church 
near Eldoret (in the Rift Valley), died after ODM supporters set the church 
on fire. This tragedy evoked memories in Kenya of the events during the gen-
ocide in Rwanda in 1994. It nevertheless gave the go-ahead to Kalenjin youth 
militias to attack their Kikuyu neigbours in big numbers, to chase them away 
or, worse, kill them and burn their properties. 
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Once again, the largest number of casualties was to be found in the Rift Val-
ley. The trigger this time was the suspicion that the representatives of the 
Kikuyu had stolen the elections. The General Service Unit (GSU) put down 
demonstrations in support of the opposition in a brutal manner in a number 
of cities. In response to violence against their fellow tribesmen, Kikuyu mi-
litias and Mungiki vigilantes carried out reprisals in Nairobi and other cities 
like Naivasha and Nakuru in the Rift Valley. All this violence resulted in hun-
dreds of casualties and more than 100,000 displaced. Finally, with the assis-
tance of mediator Kofi Annan, a government of national unity was formed, 
which put an end to the violence. Following further international pressure, 
the warring parties came to an agreement in 2008 about the distribution of 
power among the parties. 
The scale, intensity, and nature of the violence came as a surprise to many Ken-
yans as well as foreigners. More than was the case in other African countries, it 
appeared that in Kenya conditions had gradually been put in place for a peace-
ful democratic process. By African standards, Kenya had a relative large middle 
class, which is considered to be the mainstay of a successful democratic pro-
cess. Furthermore, there was the presence of a sizeable, active, and politically 
aware civil society, a serious, free, and independent press, and a continuous 
lively political debate. However, all this did not compensate for the ethnic di-
vide-and-rule politics by a segment of the Kenyan political elite. There was ini-
tially a deafening silence on the part of Kenyan civil society, eloquent and active 
as they might be. Traditionally the church had been an important and socially 
engaged factor in Kenyan society. Yet, ethnically inspired violence prevailed 
over religion, usually a strong unifying force for most Kenyans. 
Table 2.4
Results 2007 presidential elections in Kenya
Candidate (Party) [Coalition] Number of Votes  % of Votes
Mwai Kibaki (DP) [PNU] 4,584,721 46.42%
Raila Odinga (ODM) 4,352,993 44.07%
Kalonzo Musyoka (ODM-K) 879,903 8.91%
Joseph Karani (KPTP) 21,171 0.21%
Pius Muiru (KPP) 9,667 0.10%
Nazlin Omar (WCP) 8,624 0.09%
Kenneth Matiba (SSA) 8,046 0.08%
David Waweru Ng’ethe (CCU) 5,976 0.06%
Nixon Kukubo (RPK) 5,927 0.06%
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
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2013
The elections of 2013 passed remarkably peacefully for the following reasons. 
On account of their perceived roles during the violent aftermath of the 2007 
elections, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, the political leaders of the Ki-
kuyu and Kalenjin, respectively, were indicted for crimes against humanity by 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). These indictments were followed by 
a striking political realignment. Kenyatta and Ruto, fierce political opponents 
during the previous elections, decided to work together. It would be far more 
difficult for the ICC to pursue these indictments, were the suspects to hold 
political power. 
The ICC indictments dominated the election campaign. They offered the 
Kenyatta/Ruto campaign the opportunity to manipulate nationalist senti-
ments to their advantage and mobilize their supporters. They were able to 
pose as victims of a neo-colonialist, Western conspiracy, whose objective was 
to undermine the sovereignty of the country. The ICC indictments saw to it 
that both ethnic groups, Kikuyu and Kalenjin, closed ranks. An important 
cause of ethnic tensions was removed. It made possible a temporary recon-
ciliation between Kalenjin and Kikuyu, in particular in the Rift Valley, the 
epicenter of so much election violence in the past. 
Illustration 2.4
2013 elections in Kenya
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In response to the dramatic events after previous elections, political activities 
that could lead to political instability were considered off limits. With elec-
tion violence still fresh in their memory, peace and stability were of greater 
priority to many Kenyans than unrestricted political competition. Opposi-
tion leader Odinga was depicted as a troublemaker who refused to accept 
the results of the 2007 elections. In addition, political reforms provided new 
legitimacy to the electoral and political system. Devolution, introduced un-
der the new Constitution, made it possible for the losers in the presidential 
elections to still gain a substantial number of seats in the local elections. 
Illustration 2.5
Uhuru Kenyatta
The “coalition of the accused” changed the dynamics of the elections com-
pletely. Only some locally based violence occurred, and it happened prior 
to and not after the elections, as was the case in 2007/8. The Jubilee Alliance 
clearly won the presidential as well the parliamentary elections in the first 
round. Although it was questionable whether the election victory was big 
enough, so that a second round was not needed, Kenyatta was declared the 
winner of the presidential elections. 
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Table 2.5
Results 2013 presidential elections in Kenya
Candidate Party Votes % Votes
Uhuru Kenyatta The National Alliance (TNA) 6,173,433 50.51%
Raila Odinga Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) 5,340,546 43.70%
Musalia Mudavadi United Democratic Forum Party (UDFP) 483,981 3.96%
Peter Kenneth Kenya National Congress (KNC) 72,786 0.60%
Mohamed Abduba Dida Alliance For Real Change (ARK) 52,848 0.43%
Martha Wangari Karua Narc - Kenya (NARC-K) 43,881 0.36%
James Legilisho Kiyiapi Restore And Build Kenya (RBK) 40,998 0.34%
Paul Kibugi Muite Safina (SAFINA) 12,580 0.10%
Source: http://eisa.org.za
2.3 Short overview of economic developments
In comparison to other African countries, Kenya witnessed rather successful 
economic growth and development in the 1960s and 1970s. The following 
decades were characterized by stagnation. These periods coincide roughly 
with the governments of Kenyatta and Moi. This difference reflects partly the 
choices each made and the elites they represented. The interests of the Ki-
kuyu elite and their allies, as became apparent during the Kenyatta era, partly 
involved the export of cash crops and were best served by a market economy. 
In terms of education and expertise, the members of this elite were ahead of 
the others, and this enabled them to use state resources to accumulate pri-
vate capital. In short, economic policies were market-oriented and conducive 
to economic growth, a negative side effect being increased regional disparity. 
On the other hand, Moi represented the interests of those elites who bene-
fitted less from the economic prosperity during the time of Kenyatta. These 
groups tried to catch up by a redistribution of available resources, extract-
ing funds from productive economic sectors, and outright plunder. The eco-
nomic circumstances deteriorated further as a consequence of a number of 
“exogenous” shocks, for example, the failed military coup in 1982, drought in 
1983/4, the rise in oil prices due to the First Gulf War, reduction of interna-
tional aid in the early 1990s, again drought in 1991/2, and the ethnic cleans-
ing in 1992 and 1997. In a collection of articles on economic growth in Africa 
by the African Economic Research Consortium economists, Mwega and Nd-
ung’u came to the following conclusion in their contribution on the Kenyan 
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economy: “The introduction of competitive politics in early 1990s, however, 
provoked ethnic tensions revolving around land ownership and control of 
the state. This tended to create uncertainty and to add to poor growth per-
formance. Kenya suffered from a regime shift towards political expediency, 
destroying the policy environment and the incentive structure for economic 
agents and leading to the poor growth performance and rising poverty in the 
1980’s and 1990’s.”10 
Although there are, of course, numerous factors that have an impact on the 
development of the economy, the factual observation can be made that the 
reintroduction of a more pluralist political system in Kenya, at the very least, 
did not contribute to improved economic growth and poverty reduction. 
The Kenyan economy suffered in particular around the election years. Elec-
tion years and their immediate aftermath produced the lowest growth fig-
ures. Growth in non-election years amounted, on average, to 3.9 percent, in 
post-election years 2.7 percent, and during election years 2.4 percent. 2007 
constituted an exception, as Kenya benefitted from the macroeconomc poli-
cies initiated in the years before. Of the last six elections (2013 not included), 
three were followed by periods of relatively low growth, especially in 2008, 
when post-election violence abruptly ended a period of steady growth. 
The first term of President Kibaki (2003-2007) showed a clear recovery of 
the economy. Economic growth increased from 3.7 percent in 2003 to 7 per-
cent in 2007. GDP per capita was growing again. The government maintained 
macroeconomic stability, reduced the budget deficit, raised tax returns, and 
improved the investment climate. New foreign investments and increased 
aid flows followed. This trend continued during the second term of Kibaki.11 
However, the Kenyan government was far less successful in reducing poverty. 
Kenya is ranked sixth (of 21 African countries) on the African transformation 
index of the African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET). The rel-
atively strong aspects of the Kenyan economy were the diversification of the 
economy, competitiveness, and technological innovation. However, industry 
and agriculture stalled. ACET identifies the following obstacles that delayed 
the transformation of the Kenyan economy: institutional weaknesses, poor 
10 F. Mwega and N. Ndung’u, “Explaining African economic growth performance: the case of 
Kenya,” in J. W. Gunning, B. Ndulu, S. O’Connell, and J. Azam (eds.), The political economy of 
economic growth in Africa, 1960-2000 (New York, 2008), 326.
11 Not only Kenya but also many African countries witnessed economic growth during this 
period due to better prices for their exports on the world market. 
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infrastructure, lack of finance, and low productivity in the public as well as 
the private sector.
2.4 The response of the political elite
Political cohesion
Right to this day, Kenyan politicians employ tactics based on ethnic calcula-
tions and clientelism in their struggle for power. Principles and programmat-
ic choices are less relevant. The leader as an individual, along with ethnicity, 
constitute the main points of reference. Politics are interpreted as a winner 
takes all, zero sum ethnic game: “The national cake is the prize. Various eth-
nic groups argue openly it is their turn to eat.”12 Political parties are primarily 
personal vehicles for ambitious politicians. In a number of cases parties only 
consist of a name. During election time Kenyan politicians use these parties 
to be able to participate in the elections. Political parties come and go. Politi-
cians switch parties with great ease and sometimes form the most surprising 
alliances. 
The political career of former Prime Minister Raila Odinga might be a case 
in point. He was put under house arrest in 1982 for a period of seven months 
under suspicion of complicity in the failed coup against President Moi. Dur-
ing the following years, he was arrested several times and detained. In 1992, 
he joined the opposition movement FORD led by his father Oginga Odin-
ga. He followed his father and joined FORD-Kenya, when FORD split into 
two parties. After the death of his father, he lost the fight for the political 
leadership of FORD-Kenya. Subsequently he joined another party, National 
Democratic Party (NDP), and took over the leadership. After the elections in 
1997, Odinga had his party merge with KANU, and he became minister in 
the government of Daniel arap Moi, the man who had detained him so many 
times. When in the run-up to the elections of 2002 Uhuru Kenyatta and not 
Odinga emerged as the successor of Moi, he left KANU again and joined an-
other party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This party in turn became a 
part of the National Rainbow Coalition under the leadership of Mwai Kibaki, 
beating KANU convincingly in the 2002 elections. 
This collaboration was also short-lived. Soon major disagreements arose 
within the coalition about the distribution of governmental and other im-
12  S. Mueller, “The political economy of Kenya’s crisis,” Journal of Eastern African 
Studies, 2:2 (2008), 200.
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portant positions. Together with other parties, Odinga inflicted a heavy de-
feat on the President during the referendum in 2005 on a new constitution. 
For obvious reasons, the LDP was expelled from the government. In 2006, 
Odinga established the Orange Democratic Movement, which participated 
in the 2007 elections and eventually became a member of the government of 
national unity after the political crisis of 2007/8. After the elections in 2013, 
he became the opposition leader again. 
Illustration 2.6
Raila Odinga
The lack of unity among the opposition was one of the main features of the 
1992 and 1997 elections. During the elections of 2002, the opposition was for 
once united (afterwards that changed rapidly), while the ruling coalition was 
very much divided. In the 2007 elections, two clearly defined ethnic power 
blocks competed for political power. The negative consequences of a political 
system characterized by competitive clientelism kicked in this time after the 
elections. Because of the special circumstances, under which the 2013 elec-
tions were held, violence could be largely avoided. 
The Afrobarometer reports are an important source for gaining an insight 
into the opinions of ordinary Kenyans (and not the elites) about their polit-
ical system.13 Its first Kenya report took a closer look at the political mood 
just after the overwhelming victory by the opposition in 2002. People felt eu-
phoric, which was clearly reflected in the positive assessment by a majority 
13 See: www.afrobarometer.org
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of Kenyans of the situation in their country, the economy, the government, 
and the political system. Eighty percent of those who were interviewed were 
of the opinion that democracy was the only acceptable political system, 89 
percent considered elections as the best way to elect a government, and 74 
percent were in favor of a multiparty system. According to the Afrobarom-
eter, the Kenyan population took a more positive view than in most other 
African countries. Undoubtedly the aforesaid euphoria had something to do 
with this. Similar research was carried out two and a half years later, which 
showed a more mixed picture. While support for a multiparty democracy 
as such remained high (80 percent), the quality was assessed more critically. 
In 2005, only 53 percent considered Kenya to be a real democracy, while in 
2003 this view was still held by 79 percent of the population. The benefits 
that Kenyans expect from a democratic system are very recognizable: a more 
equal distribution of chances and resources, honest and competent leaders, 
less corruption, a stronger economy, and better security. Noteworthy is the 
existing discrepancy between the importance that people attach to a pluralist 
political system and the considerations on which they base the way they cast 
their vote: ethnicity and tangible reciprocity.
Ethnic and regional dimensions
Kikuyu 
(15%)
Luhya
(14%)
Luo
(13%)Kalenijn
(12%)
Kamba
(11%)
Kisii
(6%)
Meru
(6%)
Others
(Afrikaans)
(15%)
(1%)
Figure 2.1
Ethnic groups Kenya
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In all the elections cited, ethnicity was a key factor. Ethnic identity took defi-
nite shape during the colonial period. The policies of the colonial authorities 
vis-à-vis the different ethnic groups in Kenya saw to it that they became more 
clearly defined than before. After the reintroduction of a multiparty system, 
the KANU leadership made the choice of using ethnically motivated violence 
to mobilize their supporters and intimidate political opponents in order to 
remain in power. The ethnic conflicts that preceded the elections in 1992 and 
1997 gave new momentum to the use of ethnic violence for political purpos-
es. This development contributed greatly to the violence that followed the 
elections of 2007, which brought Kenya to the brink of civil war. In a coun-
try of ethnic minorities, winning multiparty elections revolves around ethnic 
coalitions. On the one hand, efforts were undertaken to forge collaboration 
between ethnically related tribes (for example, Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu) or 
sub-groups (the term Kalenjin refers to a collection of a number of smaller, 
ethnically related groups). On the other, multi-ethnic coalitions were created 
around one or more of the major ethnic groups (Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya). 
Kenyatta, Moi, and Kibaki all came to power on the basis of such a coalition.
In day-to-day-reality, ethnicity constitutes a frame of reference that offers 
possibilities as well as imposes limitations, and influences to a large extent 
the social and political perceptions of Kenyans (like elsewhere in Africa): 
“Kenyans talk or think about tribalism as a regular experience of their every-
day life, in its many enabling capacities, its incapacitating impediments on 
the hopes of individuals and its blocking of opportunities. They use tribalism 
as a practical vocabulary of politics and social movements. Thus tribalism is 
a term of everyday acknowledgement, of contextual practices and political 
fact. In the context of a sharply conflicted and volatile political arena it has 
often and recurrently become a dependable focus for the articulation of le-
gitimate interests.”14 
As the events in Kenya showed, ethnic distinctions became a major problem 
when leaders misused these in order to secure their economic and political 
interests. Elections were often the trigger. An election victory meant access 
to (political) power and resources. Why did the Kenyan voter lend himself 
so easily for this type of politics? It appears that at least three interrelated 
considerations played an import part. First, the expectation that the polit-
ical leader in question would transfer a part of the resources, which would 
14 E. Atieno Odhiambo, “Hegemonic Enterprises & instrumentalities of survival: ethnicity and 
democracy in Kenya,” in B. Berman, D. Eyoh, and W. Kymlika (eds.), Ethnicity & democracy in 
Africa, 172.
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become available in case of an election victory, to his native area and in par-
tular to his own ethnic group: in other words, political support along ethnic 
lines as a rational decision by the voter. Second, ethnic politics appealed to 
historical perceptions about which ethnic groups benefitted more than oth-
ers from political patronage and the hope that, by supporting their own eth-
nic candidate, this would be corrected. The Kalenjin versus the Kikuyu are a 
case in point. A third consideration was the uncertainty about the intentions 
of other ethnic groups. Support for his or her own ethnic candidate offered 
protection: in other words, identity voting as a strategy to prevent other eth-
nic groups from seizing power at their expense. Kenyans did not consider 
themselves ethnically biased but feared that others were, and would organize 
themselves along ethnic lines. As a counterbalance and defensive measure, 
they voted along ethnic lines as well. 
During election time, ethnicity might have been the most important but of 
course not the only point of reference. In the elections of 2007, for exam-
ple, other considerations like socioeconomic hardship, corruption, etc., also 
played a part in making up one’s mind about who to vote for. Yet, when af-
ter the elections the situation got completely out of hand, the ethnic ranks 
closed. When insecure and threatened, other points of reference like religion 
or station in life were pushed aside. In 2013, the ICC indictments resulted in 
a political realignment but still along ethnic lines. 
Political instrumentalisation of violence 
Violence along ethnic lines for political purposes characterized the multipar-
ty elections in 1992, 1997, and 2007. In particular, the 1992 elections were 
a classic example of political instrumentalization of disorder. Violence was 
used on a large scale to influence the outcome of the elections. Different tac-
tics were applied: physical intimidation of the political opposition but more 
seriously, the violent mass expulsion of people from especially the Rift Val-
ley, suspected of siding with the opposition in order to turn the province 
into a KANU zone. Something similar happened on a smaller scale in 1997. 
The same problem surfaced after the elections in 2007 but in a much more 
chaotic manner. The political violence in 1992 and 1997 was primarily of a 
“preventive” nature: to prevent the opposition from winning the elections. 
In 2007, violence was used to “correct” the alleged manipulated and falsified 
election results, followed by the use of force to stop this. 
The use of violence during an election period often lasted a limited period of 
time and was carried out to a certain extent in a “controlled” way, in case of a 
one-sided balance of power between the political opposition and the ruling 
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coalition, in favor of the latter. The purpose of violence and intimidation was 
to secure the election victory. When the ruling coalition and the excluded 
political factions were more or less equal in strength, as was the case during 
the 2007 elections, the situation could get easily out of hand with dire conse-
quences for the population and the stability of the country. 
Apart from weakened government institutions and the ethnic and clientelist 
character of most political parties, the loss of the monopoly on the use of 
force by the state constituted an important reason for the violent events after 
the controversial result of the 2007 elections. Within this context the fol-
lowing sources of “private” violence, originating from the Moi regime, can 
be distinguished: politically connected vigilantes, youth militias involved in 
ethnic cleansing, youth gangs in the slums of Nairobi and other cities (the 
Mungiki being the most notorious), and the enormous increase in “regular” 
crime.15 Given the unique character of the ethnic political coalition between 
Kikuyu and Kalenjin the 2013 elections were largely peaceful. 
Political corruption
Corruption to enrich oneself or to achieve certain political objectives was 
and is not unusual in Kenya. Prior to the reintroduction of a multiparty sys-
tem the level of large-scale corruption increased dramatically. Quite a num-
ber of prominent Moi supporters shifted into the highest gear – before it 
might be too late – to become (even more) rich as fast as possible. The Kenya 
Commercial Bank (KCB) became known as the Kalenjin Cash Box for a rea-
son. Land grabbing was no longer an exception but common practice. Para-
statals were a favorite target. In addition, in order to meet the challenges of 
multiparty politics, new sources of revenue had to be mobilized. Campaign-
ing does not come cheap in Kenya. Given the clientelist nature of Kenyan 
politics winning elections requires most of the time considerable financial 
resources. The introduction of a multiparty system resulted in an intensified 
competition for votes. The demand for funds for this purpose increased ac-
cordingly. It led to mega-corruption scandals like the Goldenberg case in the 
early 1990s and the Anglo Leasing scandal ten years later. Both cases provide 
a rather sobering insight in how election campaigns were financed. 
Essentially the Goldenberg case came down to generating export subsidies 
for fictitious gold and diamond transactions. The alleged export of these pre-
15 In the period prior to the 2002 elections, the Mungiki became initially known as a group 
of Kikuyu thugs, who were used to disrupting meetings of KANU members who opposed the 
candidature of Uhuru Kenyatta.
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cious metals by Goldenberg International, the directors being former jew-
eller Kamlesh Pattni and former director of the Directorate of Security In-
telligence James Kanyotu, yielded a profit of hundreds of millions of dollars, 
paid by the Central Bank of Kenya by way of compensation for the export of 
non-existing gold and diamonds to fictitious companies in Dubai and Swit-
zerland. All compensation payments were transferred to Goldenberg, the 
only company allowed to carry out these transactions. So-called political 
banks connected to important KANU politicians were responsible for “pro-
cessing” this money. A large part of these funds was used to finance the 1992 
KANU election campaign. Moreover, it led to a massive expansion of the 
money supply and serious macroeconomic instability. Witnesses heard by a 
commission of inquiry established by President Kibaki, in 2003, stated that 
the Central Bank made compensation payments to an amount of around 850 
million US dollars. In spite of a number of court cases, no one was convict-
ed. Although being the largest corruption scandal in Kenyan history, no one 
went to jail.
Political corruption was not the privilege of just the Moi regime. Something 
similar (albeit on a smaller scale) took place prior to the elections in 2007: the 
Anglo Leasing scandal. This time, it concerned awarding government con-
tracts to a ghost company that was supposed to make large purchases on 
behalf of a number of security-related projects like equipment for forensic 
laboratories, the manufacture of passports, the renovation of naval vessels, 
and information and surveillance systems for the Kenyan police. A fictitious 
company, Anglo Leasing & Financing, was used to receive the allocated funds 
and to channel the money to a third party. In short, it amounted to payments 
by the government, without any services rendered in return, while the secu-
rity aspects of these transactions could be used as an excuse for not putting it 
out to tender. The funds generated in this manner were supposed to fund the 
election campaign of President Kibaki. John Githongo, Permanent Secretary 
in the Office of the President at the time and known as the “anti-corruption 
tsar” of the Kibaki government, uncovered the scandal. He was then afraid 
for his life and had to temporarily flee abroad. Those directly involved were 
forced to resign. But that was all.
The use of financial incentives during election time is widespread in Kenya. 
An Afrobarometer report, published in 2009, gives an idea why voters are 
susceptible to these practices. Voters approached in this manner went out to 
vote in bigger numbers than those who were not, by 15 percent, and voted 
predominantly for the politician on whose behalf they were approached. For 
obvious reasons lower-educated voters gave in to the temptation more easily. 
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The report provides two types of explanations: on the one hand, the belief in 
the capacity of the politician or party to monitor and punish if the voter in 
question voted for someone else, while, on the other, the increased credibili-
ty of the politician involved in this practice. Voters, who were encouraged in 
this manner, gave more credence to the election promises made than those 
who were not. In other words, the readiness to “buy” votes indicated the will-
ingness of politicians to be generous to supporters at a later stage. A clearer 
illustration of the clientelist nature of Kenyan politics is hardly possible. 
Majimbo 
In a situation as described above, mainstream political concepts could take 
on a different and specific meaning. Majimbo (regionalism or federalism) 
might serve as a good example of this. The use and misuse of this concept 
by especially Kalenjin politicians constituted an inextricable part of the po-
litical jousting and ethnic violence during the 1992, 1997, and 2007 election 
campaigns, especially in the Rift Valley. Majimbo was introduced for the first 
time during the negotiations about independence as the basis for a decentral-
ized federal political system, which would protect the autonomy of the small-
er ethnic groups. KADU (of which Moi was one of the leaders), comprised of 
a number of smaller ethnic groups, and loyal to and supported by the colonial 
authorities, strongly advocated majimbo. On the other hand, KANU, primar-
ily a collaboration between Kikuyu and Luo, committed itself to a nationalist 
and anti-colonialist agenda. 
KANU won the 1963 elections (the run-up to independence) by a big major-
ity. Deprived of political power and resources, KADU made the best out of a 
bad situation by joining KANU after independence. Majimbo was no longer 
on the table. However, the notion returned in full force in the early 1990s, 
this time as a defensive response by KANU to the increasing pressure on the 
government to reestablish political freedoms. A small group of Kalenjin MPs 
and ministers, all of them allies of the president, took the lead. The violence 
during the 1992 and 1997 election campaigns was closely linked to the call 
for majimbo. Admittedly, President Moi never publicly supported the ma-
jimbo campaign but did not take any action either to stop the violent actions 
in the name of majimbo initiated by members of his government and even by 
his own President’s Office.
Majimbo played an important role during the 2007 election campaign and 
featured prominently on the agenda of the main opposition party ODM. Al-
though its leader, Raila Odinga never advocated ethnic cleansing, during the 
campaign he remained vague about what, according to ODM, the term ex-
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actly implied. The same went for his political allies in the Rift Valley and their 
leader William Ruto. Their cooperation in the past, with staunch and militant 
majimboists, easily led to the assumption that ODM also supported a rather 
radical interpretation of the majimbo agenda. That is what happened. Many 
considered the support of Odinga for majimbo as an endorsement to expel 
“foreigners” from the Rift Valley. 
The content of majimbo had changed. Initially, during the run-up to inde-
pendence, it meant the pursuit of a federal political system, since the 1990s 
majimbo implied more control over land in the Rift Valley by and more polit-
ical power for the Kalenjin at the expense primarily of the Kikuyu. Majimbo 
defined in this way held out the prospect of concrete advantages to Moi’s 
Kalenjin supporters, and meant a real threat to the economic interests and 
physical safety of the Kikuyu living in the Rift Valley, who were considered 
opponents to the Moi regime. Two types of grievances were at the bottom of 
these sentiments, cultivated and manipulated by local politicians: a general 
feeling among Kalenjin that, in spite of a tenure of twenty years by their “own” 
president, they had benefitted less from the spoils of power than the Kikuyu. 
More important, however, was the notion among the Kalenjin that they 
were victims of a historical injustice: The Kalenjin, the original inhabitants of 
the Rift valley, were supposed to have suffered in particular during colonial 
times. This notion was confirmed in the Akiwumi report, named after the 
chairman of the commission that was tasked by the government in 2002 to 
investigate the ethnic clashes in the 1990s. According to the report, majimbo 
was interpreted in the Rift Valley not so much as federalism or devolution 
but as an arrangement whereby each ethnic community would have to return 
to the region of their “ancestors” voluntarily or, if need be, by force.
Rift Valley
Apart from ethnic preoccupations and majimbo considerations, the discon-
tent among Kalenjin over the allocation of land in the past constituted a third 
factor that lent itself to inciting violence for political purposes. Every once 
in a while these three factors became a deadly combination in the Rift Val-
ley. This province was hit hardest by political violence and was the center of 
election violence in 1992, 1997, and 2007/8. The Rift Valley was of particular 
concern to national politics as it was a multi-ethnic region, the most popu-
lous province, and had the biggest number of constituencies. Moreover, the 
White Highlands were part of the province. The manner in which, before and 
after independence, this fertile land was dealt with played an import role in 
the election violence. 
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Illustration 2.7
Ethnic violence in the Rift Valley 
Partly in response to the Mau Mau rebellion (primarily a Kikuyu affair), the 
colonial authorities formulated a policy partly geared towards a partial re-Af-
ricanization of these highlands. Containment of the discontent among Ki-
kuyu peasants and the threat this posed to the European immigrants was one 
of the main reasons for this policy. On a modest scale, settlement schemes 
were identified to satisfy to some extent the need for land among the Kikuyu. 
This approach was continued on a larger scale after independence. The gov-
ernment introduced new settlement and land-purchasing schemes. Kikuyu, 
more than other ethnic groups, profited. At the same time, the Kalenjin be-
lieved they were entitled to this land, which they considered theirs having 
settled there long before colonial times. Initially this created hardly any prob-
lems. Inclusion of KADU into the government limited the danger of violent 
ethnic competition for land. Different elite factions benefitted from the land 
purchase programs. Rich Kikuyu as well as Kalenjin acquired large parcels of 
land. In addition, the availability of these highlands offered the opportunity 
to political Big Men to satisfy the need for land by their own ethnic support-
ers and consolidate their clientelist relationship. 
After the reintroduction of a multiparty system in 1992 a number of local 
Kalenjin politicians allied to the president used the perceived unfair distribu-
tion of land in the Rift Valley in favor of the Kikuyu as an excuse to chase the 
political opposition out of the province. As a matter of fact, quite a number 
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of politically well-connected Kalenjin politicians had themselves acquired 
huge stretches of farmland after independence. Yet, they mobilized their 
poor landless supporters against the Kikuyu living in the Rift Valley, claiming 
that during the Kenyatta regime the Kikuyu were given preferential treat-
ment when it came to the distribution of land at the expense of the Kalenjin. 
That land had to be taken away again from the Kikuyu, who were considered 
outsiders in a region that belonged to the Kalenjin. As was to be expected, 
Kikuyu small holders especially fell victim to the ethnic cleansing during the 
election campaigns of 1992, 1997, and 2007.
2.5 The role of the international community 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Paris Club, which most of the major do-
nors belonged to, stepped up the pressure on the Moi regime by withholding 
budget support and making resumption contingent on the implementation 
of political reforms. Earlier, donors had already reduced their support to the 
country because of the high levels of corruption, insufficient financial trans-
parency, and the lack of “good governance” in general. The Netherlands, for 
example, decided to stop the payment of substantial sums of budget support, 
which had been provided to Kenya for a number of years, and to use these 
funds to provide assistance to the victims of the ethnic clashes prior to the 
elections in 1992, as well as food aid to drought stricken areas in Kenya.16 In 
fact, the introduction of multiparty democracy became a prerequisite for the 
resumption of financial aid to the government. 
At same time, the donor countries wanted to keep Kenya from slipping into 
political and economic instability. The consequence was a rather ambivalent 
attitude towards the election process in 1992. Initially in the run-up to the 
elections, they increased the pressure on the Moi government to take the 
necessary measures to guarantee free-and-fair elections, and a level playing 
field for the opposition.  Although that was hardly the case during the elec-
tion campaign in 1992, the international donor community still accepted the 
outcome of the elections and resumed their financial support. Something 
similar happened in 1997.
In 2007/8, the international donor community was confronted once more 
by the tension between its call for free-and-fair elections, and the need for 
16 During that period it was an important part of my responsiblities while working at the Neth-
erlands Embassy in Nairobi. 
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peace and stability. By promoting a power-sharing agreement between the 
warring parties, priority was given to the second consideration. The build-up 
to the 2013 elections was dominated by the ICC indictments against pres-
idential candidate Kenyatta and his running mate Ruto. On the one hand, 
Western donor countries expressed their support for the ICC and appealed 
to the Kenyan authorities to cooperate wholeheartedly with the ICC. On the 
other, this stance was used as evidence by the Jubilee Alliance that the West 
was intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. The position of 
the Western donor countries became an important subject for debate during 
the election campaign. As a consequence, the international donor communi-
ty exercised restraint and confined itself to avoiding “non-essential” contacts, 
especially in the case of Kenyatta and Ruto. No doubt, the strategic role Ken-
ya played in military operations in Somalia and the fight against terrorism 
contributed to this reticence.
2.6 Conclusions
Whereas the government in Kenya during the heyday of Kenyatta could be 
considered as a potential developmental coalition, this was no longer the case 
during his final days in power and in particular during the Moi regime. In-
itially the Moi regime could be characterized as a vulnerable authoritarian 
coalition. However, after the reintroduction of political pluralism, competi-
tion among the political elites for power intensified with all this entailed.17 
The centrifugal forces in Kenyan politics added greatly to a further weaken-
ing of the Kenyan state. As a consequence of the gradual exclusion of parts of 
the elite, the powerbase of the government narrowed to such an extent that 
President Moi was forced to accept a multiparty system. More fragmentation 
among the political elite followed. After the reintroduction of pluralist poli-
tics, the political balance of power definitely fell into the category of compet-
itive clientelism. Step by step, the decline of KANU as the dominant political 
force in Kenya became apparent. Initially KANU managed to remain in pow-
er in 1992 and 1997 thanks to the use of force, intimidation, and the divisions 
within the political opposition. 
In the 1990s, the international donor community put the Moi government 
under pressure to introduce multiparty politics, and allow for free-and-fair 
elections. Although the elections were far from free and fair, the outcome was 
accepted and financial aid was resumed for fear of political and economic in-
stability. The economic slowdown of the country, which had already started 
17 See also typology of Khan in the introductory chapter. 
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before the reintroduction of political pluralism, continued. The intensified 
struggle for political power and increasing ethnic tensions resulted in rather 
uneven economic development. Periods of economic growth alternated with 
those overshadowed by political unrest, inadequate economic policies, and 
economic stagnation. Obviously such a context was not very conducive to 
a structural transformation of the Kenyan economy. In particular, election 
years were bad for (economic) business. 
After the change in political system, the political settlement also remained 
under the strong influence of a combination of patronage practices, ethnic 
considerations, and the use of violence for political purposes. Political parties 
scarcely mattered. They were conduits, often temporary, for the ambitions 
of ethnic and regional power brokers. In the face of the ICC indictments, a 
rearrangement of ethnic coalitions followed and softened the ethnic tensions 
in trouble spots during previous elections, like the Rift Valley. Ethnicity re-
mained an important organizing principle in Kenyan politics. Moreover, the 
introduction of multiparty politics resulted in an intensified competition for 
votes. The need for funds increased accordingly. 
Within this context political liberalization posed a serious risk. The conver-
gence of elite fragmentation, the loss of the monopoly on the use of force by 
the state along with political liberalization created a highly inflammable mix-
ture. The elections in 1992, 1997, and 2007 sparked off this mixture. The elec-
toral process in 2002 and 2013 proceeded peacefully, partly due to the implo-
sion of KANU, and the unity among the political opposition in 2002 and the 
unique ethnic coalition in 2013. Ironically the ICC indictments against the 
alleged main instigators of the political violence in 2008 saw to it that these 
political opponents were forced to cooperate and, in doing so, laid the foun-
dation for a generally peaceful election process in 2013. 
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3 Uganda
3.1 What preceded
After gaining independence in 1962, Uganda went through a very turbu-
lent and violent period. Successive governments were unable or unwilling 
to bridge the existing ethnic, regional, and religious divisions in Ugandan 
society. As a matter of fact, they intensified in the first twenty years after in-
dependence. A number of these divisions originated in colonial times. The 
manner in which the British colonial authorities exercised their authority in-
fluenced to a large extent inter-ethnic relations, ethnic perceptions, and the 
nature of the political process after independence. First, there was the divi-
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sive issue of the relationship between the Buganda kingdom and other parts 
of the country. British colonial power was first established in Buganda and 
gradually extended to the whole country. The Baganda constituted the big-
gest group in Uganda (17 percent of the population). In the eyes of the British 
authorities, the Baganda were superior to other ethnic groups and therefore 
were given preferential treatment. 
As Christianity and corresponding missionary activities were first introduced 
in Buganda, the Baganda were more educated than other groups. The colo-
nial authorities deployed Baganda to administer other regions in a manner 
that was customary in Buganda. Luganda, the Buganda language, became the 
official language in terms of administration, education, and religion. Buganda 
not only enjoyed greater autonomy than other kingdoms and regions but was 
also, as the center of colonial power, more prosperous. This inequality cre-
ated a sense of discrimination, distrust and resentment among other ethnic 
groups towards the Buganda kingdom and the Baganda in general. 
The colonial administration also decided to divide the countries into four 
regions: central, north, east, and south, whereby each region was assigned a 
specific “task.” For example, army recruitment was supposed to take place in 
particular in the north with unforeseen consequences after independence. 
To this day, the Ugandan population uses this regional division as a frame 
of reference. A third distinction highlighted by colonial interventions con-
cerned the relations between religious groups. There were just as many Prot-
estants as Catholics in Uganda. However, predominantly Protestant leaders 
had privileged access to political power: Before independence, they were 
closely linked to the colonial establishment and afterwards to the Uganda 
People’s Congress (UPC) of Uganda’s first Prime Minister Milton Obote.
Uganda gained independence in 1962 against a background of growing in-
ternal divisions. The first government after independence was a “coalition 
of convenience” between the UPC, the party of the protestant elite, and the 
Kabaka Yekka, the party that represented the interests of the Buganda king-
dom. The leader of the UPC, Milton Obote, became the first prime minister 
of independent Uganda, with the king of Buganda, Mutesa, the first presi-
dent (basically a ceremonial position). An important objective of this coa-
lition was to exclude the Catholic Democratic Party (DP) from power. The 
position of Buganda within the overall governmental structure of Uganda 
developed rapidly, however, into a major cause of friction. The first constitu-
tion of the country guaranteed the Buganda kingdom autonomy, with more 
rights and privileges than other parts of the country. The kabaka (king) and 
Koper ASC.indd   54 28-11-18   16:26
526893-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 3-12-2018 PDF page: 55
55
the political leaders of Buganda defended as much as possible the special sta-
tus of the kingdom, while Obote and the leaders of other ethnic groups, es-
pecially from the north, endeavoured to undo the privileged position of Bu-
ganda. Obote’s aggressive approach towards Buganda was an effort to break 
the dominance of Buganda in Ugandan society. The referendum on the Lost 
Counties heightened the tensions further between the kingdom and the na-
tional government. The Lost Counties were an area that was originally part of 
another kingdom, Bunyoro. The colonial authorities had transferred the area 
to the Buganda kingdom. The result of the referendum was a clear majority in 
favor of rejoining Bunyoro. However, the Buganda authorities refused to ac-
cept this outcome and requested the national government to withdraw from 
Buganda. In response, Obote ordered the army to occupy the royal palace. 
The first intervention of the army in national politics was a fact. Obote went 
on to abolish the Buganda kingdom and other monarchies, appointed him-
self as president with far-reaching powers, and instructed parliament, under 
the supervision of the army, to ratify a new constitution, which confirmed his 
actions. Uganda became a one-party state. But the wish for autonomy by an 
important part of the Buganda political elite remained a constant in Ugandan 
politics. 
After the exclusion of the Baganda from political power, Obote consolidat-
ed his own power by putting representatives of his own ethnic group, the 
Langi, and of other related ethnic groups like the Acholi, in important politi-
cal positions. The army, which had become a powerful player, was consulted 
about every important political decision. Although most key positions within 
the armed forces were already held by northerners, Obote further strength-
ened the dominance of his own specific ethnic group at the expense of other 
groups from the north. This process of building up ethnic factions within the 
army, on the one hand, and the exclusion from power of a substantial part of 
the political elite outside and inside the UPC, on the other, created the con-
ditions for the military coup in 1971 by Idi Amin, a protégé of the president. 
Under his military responsibility, the army invaded Buganda in 1966. 
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Illustration 3.1
Milton Obote
Uganda became one of the most brutal dictatorships in Africa. Obote jailed 
his opponents without trial; during the rule of Amin (1971-1978), they were 
murdered. Political elites became even more fragmented. New divisions 
arose, this time between ethnic groups from the north. Obote’s allies in the 
army were eliminated without mercy and replaced by members of Amin’s 
own tribe, the Kakwa (from the West Nile region) and other related ethnic 
groups. The Baganda were in for even harsher treatment than during Obote’s 
government. The economy collapsed as a consequence of administrative ig-
norance, unrelenting corruption, and the forced departure of the Asian com-
munity. 
After he had invaded Tanzanian territory, Amin was ousted with the assis-
tance of Tanzanian troops in 1978 and had to flee the country. The post-
Amin coalition did not last long. The divisions and polarization among the 
Ugandan political elites were as big as in the past. After the hardly free-and-
fair 1980 elections, Obote became president of Uganda for the second time. 
The fragmentation of the political elites among ethnic and regional lines con-
tinued. Once again population groups from the north dominated the govern-
ment and the army. The Baganda were still excluded from power. The result 
was a new civil war. A number of rebel groups took up arms against the Obote 
regime, of which the National Resistance Army (NRA) under the leadership 
of Yoweri Museveni rapidly posed the biggest threat to the Obote regime. 
Responding to the strong anti-Obote sentiments and indignation about the 
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behavior of the army, Museveni decided to make the Buganda countryside 
the base for his guerilla. The inability of the Obote regime to deal with the re-
bellion increased the pressure on the army and resulted in a further fragmen-
tation of the army leadership along ethnic lines. Acholi officers complained 
that Obote’s own ethnic group, the Langi, was given privileged treatment and 
benefitted more than other groups from all kind of privileges and promo-
tions, while the fighting against the guerillas of Museveni was left to them. 
The new ethnic infighting culminated in 1985 in a new military coup by frus-
trated Acholi officers led by Tito and Bazilio Okello. In the following year the 
NRA of Museveni defeated the military junta. Until 1986 the battle for polit-
ical power between competing groups of an already highly fragmented elite 
was primarily pursued by force of arms. The Ugandan political scientist Sabi-
ti Makara summarizes as follows: “Since 1966 when former President Obote 
used the gun to overthrow Mutesa II (the then king of Buganda and the first 
president of Uganda) the gun has become a permanent feature in changing 
political leadership in the country. In 1971 Amin used the gun in a coup to 
overthrow Obote and declare himself President; and he was also chased by a 
combined military force of Ugandan exiles and Tanzanian Peoples Defence 
Forces in 1979. Between 1981 and 1986, the National Resistance Movement/
Army guerillas used violent means to dislodge Obote II and Okello regimes 
and subsequently came to power in January 1986.”18 
Illustration 3.2
NRA leader Yoweri Museveni on his way to Kampala 1986
18 S. Makara, G. Tuhakebwa, and F. Byarugaba (eds.), Voting for democracy in Uganda: issues 
in recent elections (Kampala, 2003), 1.
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When Museveni’s NRA marched into Kampala, much to the surprise of the 
population, the soldiers did not loot as happened in the years before. The 
NRA was a disciplined army. Museveni promised a fundamental break with 
the past. A general amnesty was promulgated and former rebels were inte-
grated into the national army. To boost its legitimacy and support among the 
population across the country, the National Resistance Movement (the polit-
ical arm of the NRA) formed a government of national unity, which included 
former political and military opponents. The new government restricted the 
activities of political parties and introduced a no-party or Movement system, 
which according to the NRM would do justice to the ethnic diversity of the 
country and in which the different political strands of political opinion would 
be represented. A system of decentralized and layered local government had 
been introduced during the guerilla war against Obote and was now extend-
ed to the whole country. Mindful of the Movement ideology, elections were 
held on the basis of individual merit. 
The NRM restored peace and order in large parts of the country, maintained 
sound macroeconomic policies and free market forces were unleashed on 
the economy. It reduced the army in size, implemented civil service reforms, 
enhanced women’s rights, and removed the taboos that surrounded HIV/
AIDS. The possessions confiscated during Amin’s rule were returned to the 
former Asian owners. In comparison to the previous regimes, the human 
rights situation improved considerably. The international donor community 
held Uganda up as a model to other African developing countries. Museveni 
was highly popular inside as well as outside the country. American President 
Clinton praised Museveni as one of the “new” leaders in Africa. He won the 
1996 elections by a landslide. In 2001 it was not that easy. Former military 
companion and prominent NRM member Besigye presented himself as a ri-
val candidate for the presidency and criticized heavily not only the NRM but 
also Museveni personally. He got nearly 30 percent of the votes. 
Table 3.1
Results 1996 presidential elections in Uganda
Candidate Number of Votes  % of Votes
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni 4,458,195 74.33%
Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere  1,416,140 23.61%
Muhammad Kibirige Mayanja 123,291 2.06%
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
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Table 3.2
Results 2001 presidential elections in Uganda
Candidate (Party) Number of Votes  % of Votes
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni 5,123,360 69.33%
Kizza Besigye 2,055,795 27.82%
Aggrey Awori 103,915 1.41%
Muhammad Kibirige Mayanja 73,790 1.00%
Francis Bwengye 22,751 0.31%
Karuhanga Chapaa 10,080 0.14%
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
Until 2003, the NRM promoted the Movement system, which did not prohib-
it political parties but imposed so many restrictions on them that they could 
barely function. The recent past of Uganda served as a justification. The NRM 
blamed political parties for the prevailng “sectarism” (meaning exclusion on 
the basis of religion, ethnicity, or region) and the subsequent chaos and vi-
olence during the previous regimes. Multiparty democracy was deemed in-
appropriate for Africa in general and Uganda in particular. This type of de-
mocracy was considered the cause and not a solution to the abovementioned 
problems. Open competition between political parties might be an impor-
tant and useful part of the political process in the developed countries but 
not in Uganda. The Movement system was based on the assumption that an 
underdeveloped country like Uganda was not yet ready for such a political 
system, since the population would still vote along ethnic or religious lines, 
and not because of socioeconomic considerations or differences in political 
approach. For that reason the NRM opted for a “non-party” democracy. 
The main purpose of this alternative to a Western liberal democracy was to 
foster inclusive politics and consensus instead of competition and confron-
tation. Elections therefore should be held on the basis of personal merit and 
not on membership of “divisive” political parties. The NRM did not devel-
op the Movement concept much further. Because of the negative experience 
with political parties after independence, most Ugandans were willing to give 
this political system the benefit of the doubt. 
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Illustration 3.3
Presidential candidate Kizza Besigye (2001, 2006, 2011)
3.2 Elections
In 2001, the government organized a referendum on the reintroduction of a 
multiparty system in Uganda. During the campaign prior to the referendum 
three political positions could be distinguished. First of all, as could be expect-
ed, President Museveni and the NRM campaigned actively in favor of main-
taining the Movement system. The traditional political parties like the UPC 
and DP boycotted the referendum on the grounds that the freedom of politi-
cal parties is a fundamental political right and therefore should not be subject 
to a referendum. Third, a loose coalition of new and older, smaller parties did 
participate and campaigned for the restoration of a multiparty system. 
Many voters interpreted the referendum as a vote against or for Museveni. 
He was highly respected by large parts of the rural population. It was not just 
Museveni who associated political pluralism and political parties with the 
instability and violence of the past. Especially in densely populated central 
Uganda, these memories were still fresh. There was a genuine fear that mul-
tiparty politics would revive this past. The Luwero triangle, the area that was 
the epicenter of the political violence during the Obote II government, was 
part of this region. Although there was some occasional political intimida-
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tion and a relative low turnout, a clear majority voted in favor of continuation 
of the Movement system. Most “no” voters were to be found in the north of 
the country and in the urban areas. 
Gradually a clear divide in Ugandan society manifested itself again. The pres-
ident and the NRM could count on the support of the population living in the 
west, center, and east of the country. Those who lived in the northern part of 
the country, however, felt excluded and marginalized. They overwhelmingly 
identified with the political opposition. The country was (once again) politi-
cally divided between the north and the rest of the country, and in particular 
the west, which was the homebase of the president. 
Uganda was more successful in keeping out the reintroduction of a multi-
party system than neighboring countries. But after 2001, a chain of events 
was set in motion that eventually resulted in the introduction of a multipar-
ty democracy. To the surprise of many, Museveni decided in 2003 to con-
vene the National Executive Committee and the National Conference of the 
Movement to debate the return to a more pluralist political system. And that 
is what happened. In a new referendum, a clear majority voted this time for 
the introduction of a multiparty system. In addition, parliament agreed to 
a change in the constitution that removed the restriction of a maximum of 
two presidential terms and allowed Museveni to stand again as a candidate 
in the elections. The main candidates in the first elections after the abolition 
of the Movement system in 2006 were once more Museveni and former colo-
nel Besigye on behalf of the Forum for Democratic Change. And once again 
Museveni prevailed, albeit less convincing than in the past: 59 percent voted 
for the president and 37 percent for Besigye. As could be expected, the west 
voted overwhelmingly for Museveni and the north in favor of the opposition. 
In other parts of the country, Museveni got a majority of the votes as well but 
by smaller margins than before.
Table 3.3
Results 2006 presidential elections in Uganda
Candidate (Party) Number of Votes  % of Votes
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (NRM) 4,109,449 59.26%
Kizza Besigye (FDC) 2,592,954 37.39%
John Ssebaana Kizito (DP) 109,583 1.58%
Abed Bwanika 65,874 0.95%
Miria Obote (UPC) 57,071 0.82%
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
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The opposition thought they were in a good position to embarass Museveni 
in the 2011 elections. During each of the previous three presidential elec-
tions, Museveni received fewer votes. The friction between the president and 
the Buganda political elite had intensified. Moreover, the opposition believed 
to have very popular candidates at its disposal this time. Actually, the oppo-
site was the case. 
Museveni won the elections by a big majority, 68 percent, while his main 
political rival Besigye got 26 percent of the votes. He even succeeded in get-
ting a majority of the votes in the north, a region that in the past had always 
voted for the opposition. For the first time Museveni managed to win in all 
four regions. According to the Afrobarometer, this remarkable victory can be 
attributed to the following factors: sustained economic growth, continued 
support for Museveni among the rural population in Buganda, satisfaction 
among the population in the north with the end to the violence by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, and the (organizational) weakness of the opposition candi-
dates and parties.
Table 3.4
Results 2011 presidential elections in Uganda
Candidate (Party) [Coalition] Number of Votes  % of Votes
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (NRM) 5,428,369 68.38%
Kizza Besigye (FDC) [IPC] 2,064,963 26.01%
Norbert Mao (DP) 147,917 1.86%
Olara Otunnu (UPC) 125,059 1.58%
Beti Kamya (UFA) 52,782 0.66%
Abed Bwanika (PDP) 51,708 0.65%
Jaberi Bidandi Ssali (PPP) 34,688 0.44%
Samuel Lubega 32,726 0.41%
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
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Illustration 3.4
2011 elections in Uganda
3.3 Short overview of economic developments
When Museveni and the NRM came to power in 1986, the Ugandan econo-
my was in ruins as a result of twenty years of political mismanagement and 
civil war. Against this background, Uganda became a success story. The NRM 
government adopted a policy focused on macroeconomic stability and im-
plemented a number of structural economic reforms. Uganda witnessed a 
period of unprecedented economic growth. Poverty was reduced considera-
bly under Museveni. In the 1990s, economic growth amounted to 7 percent, 
on average, and, between 2001 and 2008, it even surpassed 8 percent. 
From 2009 onwards, economic growth slowed down somewhat. Initially, 
post-conflict recovery and reconstruction drove economic growth. In the 
opinion of the World Bank, a modest transformation of the economy took 
place due to the service sector and the export of cash crops. This transforma-
tion did not continue. In particular, the agricultural sector lagged behind. As 
more than two-thirds of the Ugandan population was still engaged in agri-
culture, the development of the economy as a whole remained closely linked 
to the transformation of agriculture. Low productivity, underdeveloped mar-
kets, and limited private and public investment still characterized this sector. 
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Merely 50 percent of the agricultural production in the country was market-
ed in 2010. 
Illustration 3.5
Transport in Kampala
Partition of the country into more and more districts, and the establishment, 
as a by-product of the privatization effort, of a great number of semi-autono-
mous authorities resulted intentionally or not in institutional fragmentation 
that hampered effective government policies. Apart from the changing char-
acter of the ruling coalition, the related patronage costs and institutional pro-
liferation might have been the reason that the NRM was capable admittedly 
of maintaining macroeconomic stability and boosting economic growth but 
unable to bring about structural transformation. 
Uganda is ranked fifth on the ACET African transformation index, thanks 
to sustained economic growth, technological innovations, and relative high 
productivity in the industrial sector (which is questioned by ACET). In spite 
of impressive economic growth, low productivity was still an important fea-
ture of the economy. In as far there was a change in economic structure, 
this involved a relative decline in agriculture, a sector characterized by low 
productivity, in favor of the service sector, still dominated, however, by small 
companies and low productivity as well. 
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3.4 Response of the political elite
Political cohesion
Since the arrival in power of the NRM in 1986, its efforts to consolidate pow-
er can be divided roughly into two phases. During the first ten years, the 
NRM opted for a relatively inclusive and conciliatory approach. The NRM 
tried as much as possible to accommodate the representatives of the various 
political forces, provide space for different political opinions, and allow for 
public debate on important political issues. Such a policy was consistent with 
the Movement philosophy. It offered the NRM the opportunity, in tandem 
with the extension of the NRM version of local government to the whole 
country, to commit other parts of Uganda than the west and Buganda to the 
government and achieve political legitimacy in the whole country. Part of 
this “inclusive” approach was the restoration of several monarchies, in par-
ticular the Buganda kingdom, on the condition that the “monarchs” agreed 
to be cultural and not political leaders.  
In the build-up to the referendum on the reintroduction of a multiparty sys-
tem and the elections in 2001, the policy changed. Inclusivity was considered 
less important than in the past. The tolerance of dissident opinions within 
the NRM clearly waned. The most contentious issue concerned the contin-
uation of the Movement system. Gradually advocates of a multiparty system 
were removed from government and other key positions. 
Once the decision was taken to abandon the Movement system after all in fa-
vor of a multiparty system, the NRM strategy focused on minimizing the risk 
of losing power in a number of ways. The NRM saw to it that the restriction 
of a maximum of two presidential terms was removed from the constitution 
in order to allow Museveni, as the most popular NRM politician, to run again 
for president. The president and his allies feared that the NRM would run 
the risk of losing the 2006 elections if Museveni were no longer able to be its 
presidential candidate. 
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Illustration 3.6
Yoweri Museveni
Since the Movement system remained in force until the elections in 2006, 
the NRM benefitted from continued financial support by the government. 
The NRM registered as a political party before other political parties were 
allowed to do the same and gratefully exploited the presence of the existing 
Movement structure in the country. In the run-up to the elections, the NRM 
made full use of its government status, changed the election rules and regu-
lations to its advantage, and then, during the actual campaign, used its domi-
nant position to prevent a level playing field. Criticism of the degeneration of 
the Movement into an one-party state, the corruption, the military strategy 
against the LRA in the north, and the lack of democracy within the NRM it-
self first led to the departure of Besigye and his supporters. The tacit quid pro 
quo, by which a part of the NRM seemed to link a restoration of political plu-
ralism to a removal of the limitation of the maximum number of presiden-
tial terms, resulted in the exodus and marginalization of a number of other 
important NRM leaders in the government, army, and intelligence services.
The announcement by Museveni after the 2001 elections that the reintro-
duction of a multiparty system would be up for discussion again came as 
a surprise to the outside world. The National Executive Committee of the 
NRM gave four reasons why this time the introduction of a more pluralist 
political system should be considered positively. First of all, the transforma-
tion of the Movement into a political party would make it possible to get rid of 
those supposedly disloyal to the NRM. Second, the supporters of a multipar-
ty system would no longer be able to argue that the NRM was undemocratic. 
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Moreover, it would improve the relationship with donor countries. Finally, 
Uganda could no longer afford to go against the global trend, which clearly 
pointed in the direction of political pluralism.
The reason for this fundamental policy change was not so much dictated by 
demands from Ugandan society for more political freedom or from exter-
nal pressure. Donor countries were impressed by the achievements of the 
NRM government and of Museveni as president: political stability, economic 
reforms, improvement of human rights, etc.19 It appears that this remark-
able policy change had more to do with an effort to secure the dominant 
position of the NRM and of Museveni in Ugandan politics in the long run. 
The assessment was made that a multiparty system in the long term would 
give the NRM a stronger position to remain in power than continuation of 
the Movement system. The relatively strong performance by former NRM 
bigshot Besigye and the internal conflicts prior and after the 2001 elections 
prompted serious reflection among the NRM leadership on the approach to 
follow. The fact that many of Museveni’s most important opponents came 
from the army must have unsettled the NRM leadership. The increasing dis-
agreements within the NRM as to which political direction to take tipped 
the balance towards a multiparty system. It would provide an opportunity 
for the Movement to change into a party completely loyal to Museveni. Being 
a regular political party, the NRM would no longer have to accommmodate 
dissidents, as was the case under the Movement system. The NRM would be 
able to boost its internal cohesion and effectiveness.
The Movement recipe appeared to be past its sell-by-date. Within the NRM 
the following groups could be distinguished: the army, the Historicals, and 
the younger generation of NRM politicians. Strong ties existed between the 
Ugandan army (to a large extent a continuation of the National Resistance 
Army) and the NRM, and Museveni personally. Many important political 
questions were first discussed within a small tight-knit group consisting of 
Museveni and the military leadership, popularly known as the Movement Po-
litical High Command. The announcement in 2001 that retired colonel Besi-
gye, a former companion of Museveni, would run for president, demonstrat-
ed that there was political disagreement within the army. The Historicals, a 
clearly defined group of NRM founder members, constituted another im-
portant group within the NRM. Several members were increasingly critical 
of the dominant position of Museveni and the small circle around him, and 
19 This was my experience while working at the Netherlands Embassy in Kampala from 1996 
to 2001.
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demanded more political diversity. Third, there were the so-called Young 
Parliamentarians: A group of relatively young NRM Members of Parliament, 
which was distinct from the NRM veterans but also opposed the growing 
power of the Executive.
The NRM regime suffered from internal divisions as to the future political 
direction and the concentration of power within the NRM, and not so much 
from political threats coming from the outside. The NRM consolidated, at a 
price, its power by getting rid of the opposition within the organization itself.
Ethnic and regional dimensions
Baganda
(23%)
Karamojong
(16%)
Basogo
(10%)
Iseto
(10%)
Langi
(8%)
Rwanda
(8%)
Bagisu
(6%)
Acholi
(5%)
Lugbara
(5%)
Bunyoro
(4%)
Batobo
(4%)
Anders
(1%)
Figure 3.1
Ethnic groups Uganda
In Uganda, ethnic or regional background also plays an important role in 
politics, voting behavior, and in everyday life for that matter. Ethnicity shapes 
the thoughts and acts of the different communities in Uganda. Opinions dif-
fer on the extent of ethnic in- or exclusivity of the NRM in the first years after 
coming to power. 
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The population in west and south/central Uganda initially constituted the 
ethnic powerbase of Museveni. Representatives of these regions held many 
of the most important positions in the government and the army. That was 
quite understandable: The NRM guerilla in 1981-1986 relied mainly on an 
alliance between Museveni’s own ethnic group, the Ankole living in the west 
of the country, and the Baganda, living in the southern and central parts of 
Uganda. It was not without good reason that the NRM was considered the 
first “non-northern” government of Uganda. The so-called westerners were 
the main beneficiaries. The Buganda ethnic group gradually lost influence. 
The really important postions ended up in the hands of westerners and in 
particular Ankole. The Buganda ministers, who still held powerful positions, 
were at loggerheads with the Kabaka. In other words, the interests of a sub-
stantial part of the elite, who sympathized with the Buganda kingdom and 
were still very influential, were barely represented in the ruling coalition any-
more. Representatives of the population living in the west and to a less extent 
in the east held the main positions in the successive NRM governments. 
The changing power relationships became apparent in the army and in par-
ticular at the top level. After independence, 80 percent of the officers orig-
inated from the north and partly the east of the country. Given the history 
of Uganda it was not surprising that the NRM considered the loyalty of the 
army crucial to the consolidation of its power. After 1986, the majority of the 
senior commanders came from the west of the country. The intelligence ser-
vices were firmly under the control of “westerners,” among whom a certain 
Paul Kagame. 
At the same time these ethnic preoccupations need to be qualified. Political 
power in Uganda is also considered and analyzed primarily from an ethnic 
perspective. The “ethnic equation” therefore has a big impact on the political 
decision-making process. Nevertheless, other considerations could also play 
a significant role in the voting decisions of different groups. During the 2006 
elections, presidential candidate Besigye, from the west of the country and 
main rival of Museveni, collected many votes in the north in spite of the fact 
that a candidate from the north was available, the daughter of Obote. In the 
same elections, Museveni won the majority of the votes not only in the west 
of the country (not a surprise) but also in Buganda (with the exception of 
Kampala), while a Buganda candidate was participating as well. The Afroba-
rometer explained the huge victory of Museveni in the 2011 elections, includ-
ing the north, by the sustained economic growth and the “peace dividend” 
in the north. After having lost the north to the opposition in 2001 and 2006, 
Museveni got the majority of the votes in the north in the 2011 elections. 
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Still, the nature of the regime can be best explained in terms of ethnicity. The 
ruling elites originated primarily from the southwest of the country, the na-
tive region of Museveni. This applied to the army to an even greater extent. 
Initially, a large part of the Buganda political elite (the biggest and richest eth-
nic group) was a part of the ruling coalition, but its relevance eroded gradu-
ally. The main political threats did not come from outside the ruling coalition 
but from within. The political opposition was incapable of posing a serious 
threat to Museveni and the NRM, partly because of the internal divisions and 
the inability to mobilize support in the rural areas. Although representatives 
of its natural homebase occupied most of the important military and political 
positions, it was not the northerners or Buganda that posed the main threat 
to the NRM leadership but westerners themselves and in particular from the 
higher echelons of the army. 
Political instrumentalization of violence 
In spite of the reconciliation efforts by the NRM, the change of government 
in 1986 triggered a new exodus of political exiles and newly armed rebels. 
Several armed groups, often with a regional, ethnic, and/or religious back-
ground, tried, in turn, to oust the NRM regime by force of arms. To cope 
with these rebellions, the NRM, in contrast with previous regimes, applied a 
two-track policy: on the one hand, a military approach through its army and 
local militias and, on the other, negotiations and co-optation of local leaders 
from insurgent areas. In a number of cases this approach was successful: Re-
bel leaders were given political positions in the government and their troops 
were integrated into the national army. Another reason for Museveni’s suc-
cess in consolidating peace in the country (apart from areas in the north) was 
the establishment of a disciplined army, which partly reversed the tradition 
of ethnic recruitment (especially in the lower ranks) and the assurance of a 
regular, albeit low, income.
Although the NRM regime brought peace and stability to most of Uganda, it 
still had to get rid of no less than eleven armed rebel groups that refused to ne-
gotiate an agreement. The most important hailed from the north of the coun-
try and in particular from the Acholi region: the Uganda People’s Democratic 
Army (UPDA) in 1986-1988, the Holy Spirit Movement in 1986-1987, and the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 1987-2006. The LRA especially spread death 
and destruction in the northern part of Uganda over a period of twenty years 
with devastating consequences for the population. During that period, the 
north of the country was unable to benefit from the economic growth and 
poverty reduction, as was the case in the rest of the country. After Operation 
Lightning Thunder in 2008, carried out together with South-Sudanese troops 
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and with the support of the USA, the LRA was expelled from the north for 
good and peace finally returned. 
Illustration 3.7
UPDF at the Congolese border
The military adventures of Uganda in the Congo gave rise to another type 
of instrumentalization of violence. Senior Ugandan military officers became 
involved in smuggling diamonds, gold, coffee, and timber out of the Con-
go. During the military operations against the LRA military officers already 
gained experience in utilizing war situations for personal gain. In reports by 
the Group of Experts of the United Nations, a number of them were accused 
in 2002 of plundering the Congo’s natural resources, among whom Salim 
Saleh, the brother of the president, and James Kazini, head of military opera-
tions in east Congo.20 The activities of these military “entrepreneurs” and the 
networks they controlled not only served as a means of self-enrichment but 
also formed an integral part of the consolidation of Uganda’s political elite 
system and as such were closely linked to the regime.
During the first Ugandan military intervention in the Congo in 1996, these 
activities were still a relative side issue and used for supporting the military 
20 Final report of the Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other 
forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, s2002/1146 (New York, 2002).
Koper ASC.indd   71 28-11-18   16:26
526893-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 3-12-2018 PDF page: 72
72
operation financially. At the time of the second intervention in 1998, the eco-
nomic dimension developed into a crucial part of the dynamic of the conflict. 
The sad climax came with the heavy fighting between Uganda and Rwanda in 
and around Kisangani over who would be allowed to appropriate the natural 
resources in that area. A number of key figures within the Ugandan regime 
played an important role in the economic exploitation of the Congo’s natu-
ral resources. The “careers” of the earlier mentioned James Kazini and Salim 
Saleh were symbolic of the rise of a very influential group of “entrepreneurs 
of insecurity.” The key to success of these militarized economic activities was 
the already existing cross-border economic (and social) networks, gratefully 
exploited by new coalitions consisting of army commanders, rebel leaders, 
traders, and local authorities. Although these economic adventures of the 
Ugandan army caused friction  among Historicals, on the one hand, and be-
tween the Historicals and younger officers, on the other, it is hard to imagine 
that these networks could have been exploited without the knowledge and 
involvement of the political center of the Ugandan regime. After they re-
turned, most of the commanders involved took their place again in the state 
machinery. Apart from a few arrests and discharges, these leaders, in spite 
of their involvement in the economic shadow networks, as mentioned, re-
mained part of the ruling political elite. James Kazini was the main exception. 
He was discharged as army commander, sentenced, and jailed. There is the 
suspicion that this treatment had to do more with his alleged political ambi-
tions than his role in the Congo.
Political corruption
Museveni had succeeded in committing a substantial part of the national 
and local elite to himself personally. Gradually the regime became more and 
more personalistic. As in so many developing countries, this also went hand-
in-hand in Uganda with the expansion of patronage networks, making full 
use of the opportunities the restructuring of the economy offered. Liberali-
zation of the economy through privatization of state enterprises was an es-
sential part of this restructuring. Most of these enterprises were running at a 
loss, were managed inefficiently, and were a permanent drain on the treasury. 
Privatization would reduce the number of state enterprises and limit the pos-
sibilities for using them for patronage purposes. As part of the Washington 
consensus this prescription was applied in the 1990s to the whole of sub-Sa-
haran Africa. As to be expected, many African leaders were rather hesitant in 
implementing these reforms that curtailed their opportunities to use public 
means to consolidate their power. 
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However, the pressure of the international financing institutions and West-
ern donor countries gave them no other choice. They made a virtue of neces-
sity. These and similar reforms were manipulated in such a manner that they 
still could serve their political purposes. The privatized companies could no 
longer be used for patronage, but one could see to it that these enterprises 
would end up at a low price in the hands of political allies. As the sale of a 
number of national “crown jewels” to foreign investors appeared to be a po-
litically sensitive matter, this offered the opportunity to hand over these com-
panies to “politically correct” indigeneous entrepreneurs. This also happened 
in Uganda. In the 1990s, almost a hundred privatizations were finalized. The 
NRM regime used the privatizations of these state enterprises to its advan-
tage as well as the establishment of semi-autonomous agencies that were to 
supervise the liberalized economic sectors such as the Uganda Revenue Au-
thority, the Uganda Investment Authority and the Privatization Unit, includ-
ing the lucrative positions that came with it. As expected, the political elite 
close to Museveni especially benefitted. 
Gradually the delegation of powers to local government, very much support-
ed by Western donor countries, became also part of the NRM “patronage 
machine.” Initially the local administration bodies established in the country 
after 1986, first Resistance Councils and later Local Councils, were at least in 
part an expression of the intention to give the population the opportunity to 
have a say in local administration and hold local leaders to account. Slow-
ly another aspect started to prevail. Increasingly the NRM used decentral-
ization as a means to achieve other political objectives. The Local Council 
structure became an important instrument for the NRM to exert political 
influence at a local level. The number of districts proliferated. In 1986, Ugan-
da counted 22 districts, in 2012, 112 districts. Such a high number of admin-
istrative units relative to the size of the population was rather exceptional.
The government justified this spectacular expansion of districts on the 
grounds that it would improve local participation in the political desci-
sion-making process, accountability, and, as a result, service delivery. How-
ever, it appears that, above all else, political considerations underlied this pro-
cess. The NRM hoped that in this way it could mobilize political support all 
over the country. The potential benefits were twofold. A new district would 
provide the opportunity for the local elite to gain access to government re-
sources, political power, and government jobs in the district. In addition, in 
a country, where the majority of the people still lived in the countryside, the 
promise of a separate district and all the benefits that went with it was politi-
cally very attractive. During several election campaigns, Museveni gratefully 
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exploited this opportunity. New districts were created just before elections 
or were promised, provided that the local population concerned would vote 
for the president. This tactic proved to be rather successful. New districts 
delivered votes. They were considered presidential handouts. Moreover, lo-
cal patronage networks were used to muster votes by influencing district ap-
pointments, the selective use of government resources, and manipulation in 
awarding government contracts. The World Bank also noticed this. The Bank 
concluded that after abolishing the graduate tax in 2005, until then collected 
by the districts themselves, the districts became financially almost complete-
ly dependent on the central government. By establishing ever more districts, 
the amount of money spent on salaries and administration increased signifi-
cantly at the expense of the resources meant for basic service delivery.21 
Museveni and the NRM had a lot more funds at their disposal to “convince” 
voters than the opposition. According to some, that is why Museveni won 
the elections. Government resources funded a number of NRM election ac-
tivities, for example, an extensive publicity campaign, and the use of public 
funds to obtain the support of local power brokers and individual voters. 
Afrobarometer looked into this matter within the context of the 2011 elec-
tions. In its opinion, the available data do not suggest that the large amounts 
of money spent by the NRM on the campaign trail had a big impact on the 
outcome of the presidential elections. Possibly the establishment of new dis-
tricts might have resulted in a limited number of additional votes: “Money 
might have flowed freely, but it certainly did not play the decisive role in the 
outcome critics suggest, and in fact might have had relatively little effect on 
the final outcome, at least at the presidential level.”22 
Buganda 
The division between the established Buganda elite and aspiring elites with a 
different ethnic/regional background repeatedly stood in the way of a unified 
political elite after independence. The Buganda monarchy relied on strong, 
well-established institutions deeply rooted in society, which exerted a strong 
attraction over many rich as well poor Baganda, and served as an alternative 
source of legitimacy to national government institutions. The NRM was the 
first government that succeeded in reaching a (albeit temporary) settlement 
by reinstating the monarchy and accommodating Buganda as well as other 
parts of the country within the existing political framework. Museveni’s al-
liance with the Buganda and the representatives of the kingdom was forged 
21 “Uganda Country Assistance Strategy 2011-2015,” World Bank (Washington, 2010), 7.
22 Afrobarometer, “Museveni and the 2011 Uganda election: did money matter,” 13.
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during the struggle against the Obote II regime, but his efforts to secure a 
more lasting cooperation between the central government and Buganda were 
in the end less successful. First, the NRM alliance with the Baganda came un-
der pressure because of the refusal by the central government to return the 
land taken away from the kingdom by Obote in 1966. Therefore, the Kabaka 
was less able to generate the funds needed to accommodate the expectations 
of his supporters. The coronation of Kabaka as king (without implementing 
powers) offered a temporary but not a permanent solution. Buganda mon-
archists not only strove for a complete restoration of the monarchy but also 
for a federal structure of the Ugandan state (federo), of which the kingdom 
would be a part but would have far-reaching powers regarding, for instance, 
taxation, and land policy.
Illustration 3.8
Kabaka Ronald Muwenda Mutebi II
Museveni, however, was strongly in favor of a state structure consisting of a 
large number of districts (which remained financially dependent on the cen-
tral government). He could count on the support of Ugandans living outside 
Buganda, who were not prepared to accept a privileged position for Buganda 
within the Ugandan state. In 2001, the Kabaka started to develop a certain 
interest in working with the opposition. In response, Museveni and the NRM 
tried to weaken the position of the king in a number of ways but without 
much success. For instance, an effort was made to reduce the area over which 
the Kabaka could exercise his “cultural authority” by supporting other cul-
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tural leaders within the kingdom and introducing legislation to thwart the 
involvement of traditional leaders in party politics. 
In addition, the NRM government attempted to limit the political influ-
ence of rich Buganda landowners (an important mainstay of the Kabaka) by 
strengthening the land rights of small farmers in Buganda. Although sensible 
in itself, this rapidly became a part of the political battle between Buganda 
and the government. The government claimed that it wanted to put an end to 
the widespread practice of depriving farmers of their land, while represent-
atives of the kingdom accused the government of wanting to lay its hands 
on land that belonged to the kingdom and to deny the Kabaka the right to 
have a say in the distribution of land in the kingdom. Simultaneously, the 
government proposed the establishment of a new regional administration 
consisting of elected members in order to undermine the wish for federo by 
representatives of the kingdom. This resulted in serious riots in 2009. The ef-
forts of Museveni to reduce the influence of the Kabaka among the Baganda 
failed. Museveni had to backtrack. It has to be noted that the protests were 
primarily taking place in the urban areas of Buganda and much less so in 
the countryside. Here the alliance remained in tact, especially in those areas 
where the NRM started its guerilla movement. In the 2011 elections, the ma-
jority of Buganda voted again for Museveni (even by a slightly bigger margin 
than in 2006).
Museveni appeared to be more capable than his predecessors in “managing” 
the Buganda question, but his options for solving the fundamental issue of 
the (privileged) position of the kingdom within Uganda were limited.  Al-
though in the course of time the NRM lost the support of an important part 
of the political elite of Buganda, it could continue to count on the support of 
the rural population of Buganda. 
The army
The army and the security services formed an important basis of the power 
of Museveni. He made his position on this matter quite clear. Repeatedly he 
reminded Uganda that the UPDF was his army and that it would never ac-
cept a candidate of the political opposition as president or as its command-
er-in-chief, responding to the still existing fear among many Ugandans of 
a return to the pre-NRM period of chaos and violence. Probably, the High 
Command of the NRA constituted the real center of power in the country. 
Initially the Historicals, the twenty-six men who, together with Museveni, 
started the guerilla against Obote in 1981, occupied the key positions in the 
army. At a later stage the leadership of the Uganda People’s Defense Forces 
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(the new name for the army) gradually ended up in the hands of a well-ed-
ucated, professional military. After a number of (former) officers, predomi-
nantly from the west of the country including some Historicals, joined oppo-
sition candidate Besigye, Museveni, and others, made sure that the loyalty of 
the higher military echelons to the NRM was beyond suspicion. A number of 
important military positions were held by close family members of Musev-
eni. His son was appointed head of the Special Elite Forces, his brother held 
a number of high military positions, after which he became a presidential 
adviser, and a cousin became the commander of the Presidential Guard, of 
which the members were primarily recruited from the same ethnic group as 
the president. Museveni dealt personally with important military appoint-
ments and promotions. In short, Museveni could count on the support of 
the army. In turn the army benefitted from his patronage and was offered 
the opportunity to make personal profits from military operations such as in 
eastern Congo. 
The military leadership and their business relations also took their cut from 
lucrative military tenders. During the second half of the 1990s the government 
started to purchase larger quantities of military material than before, often 
through intermediaries. It resulted in a number of corruption scandals such as 
the purchase of MI-24 helicopters, MIG fighter planes, anti-aircraft guns and 
T55 tanks, but also the acquisition of food and uniforms. As revealed by the 
press, bribes, kickbacks, and inflated prices were usually part of these transac-
tions, of which the main beneficiaries were military officers, government of-
ficials and shadowy intermediaries. The revelations in the media led to much 
indignation among the public, as was the case with Kiiza Besigye. As head of 
logistics within the UPDF Besigye was well informed about what was going on 
and became more and more disillusioned by the behavior of a number of his 
NRM colleagues. After initially having kept his criticism indoors, he sent in 
1999 an article to the press in which he accused the NRM leadership of corrup-
tion, dishonesty, opportunism and undemocratic behavior. 
3.5 The role of the international community 
Because of primarily internal political considerations Museveni and the 
NRM decided to part with the Movement system and reintroduce multipar-
ty politics in Uganda. Western donor countries, which supported the NRM 
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government financially, scarcely exerted any pressure in this matter,23 as op-
posed neighboring country Kenya, where they made the introduction of a 
multiparty system a condition for the continuation of aid. Why? The follow-
ing factors may explain the difference in approach. Uganda was still recover-
ing from a long period of civil war. The NRM government introduced a wide 
range of political reforms that meant a substantial improvement in compari-
son to the past. Moreover, the international donor community including the 
World Bank was in need of an African success story. Uganda was a suitable 
candidate. Uganda implemented a more or less successful economic liberal-
ization program, as recommended by multilateral and bilateral donors, and 
the economy was growing at a fast pace. Moreover, Museveni was a reliable 
partner of the West in the region. Uganda stood out as an island of stability 
surrounded by countries hit by civil war and anarchy. Although the econ-
omy kept growing, Uganda afterwards became increasingly the subject of 
criticism by Western donor countries because of endemic corruption, the 
increasing authoritarian and personalistic nature of the regime, and intoler-
ance towards sexual minorities. 
3.6 Conclusions
The stability of the regime was not so much endangered by political threats 
from the outside as it was from the inside. The NRM developed slowly but 
surely into a weak dominant party. By introducing a multiparty system, the 
NRM managed to restore its internal cohesion. The NRM leadership had 
come to the conclusion that a more pluralist political system would make it 
easier to remain in power, as there would be no need anymore to accommo-
date dissidents within the framework of the Movement. This turned out to be 
a successful strategy. Outside the NRM, the opposition did not stand much 
of a chance. In short: multiparty democracy and elections as a means of ad-
dressing the problem of internal cohesion. 
Although the political system in a formal sense offered more political space 
for dissident opinions, the Executive actually became more powerful. Para-
doxically the Movement system, introduced by the NRM, allowed more po-
litical space and influence in practice than the introduction of a multiparty 
system. The stability in the country became increasingly linked to the current 
president. Although Museveni showed greater capacity than his predecessors 
23 This was my experience while working at the Netherlands embassy Embassy in Kampala 
from 1996 to 2001. 
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for managing the tensions between Buganda and the central government, he 
was not able to come up with a long-term and workable solution. The fac-
tions outside the regime did not represent a serious threat to the regime. 
For the past twenty years, Uganda has witnessed continuous growth. How-
ever, low productivity still characterizes the economy. The changing nature 
of the ruling coalition, the related patronage costs, and institutional political 
and economic proliferation might provide an explanation why the NRM was 
admittedly able to maintain macroeconomic stability and boost economic 
growth, but not to bring about economic transformation. 
Initially political inclusivity was a main feature of a political settlement, hous-
ing different political interests and population groups. Later this settlement 
developed slowly and surely into a regime that was less broadly based than 
in the past. Representatives from the region of the president held the most 
important positions in the government and even more so in the army. At the 
same time, Museveni and the NRM managed, with the help of well-tried pa-
tronage practices, to commit a substantial part of the national political elite, 
local elites, and the higher echelons of the army to the regime. This had its 
price. 
In comparison to the other countries under scrutiny, the NRM scarcely had 
to use much violence to remain in power. Restoration of peace and stability 
after so many years of civil war in large parts of Uganda was an important 
asset of the NRM regime. In the words of Ugandan journalist and research-
er Fred Golooba-Mutebi: “Indeed, a major reason for Museveni’s continu-
ing popular support, especially in rural areas, is because he ‘brought peace’, 
which allows people to sleep peacefully in their beds, something that under 
previous regimes and their undisciplined armies, could not be guaranteed.”24 
The striking 2011 election victory of Museveni in the north of the country 
might serve as an example. 
In spite of the absence of a multiparty democracy, the NRM could initially 
count on support by the donor community on account of the economic and 
political reforms implemented by the NRM and the restoration of peace and 
stability.
24 F. Golooba-Mutebi, ‘Collapse, war and reconstruction in Uganda. An analytical narrative 
on state-making’. Working paper no. 27 (series no.2) Crisis States Research Centre (London, 
2008), 21.
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4 The Congo
4.1 What preceded
The many name changes that the Congo experienced are perhaps indicative 
of the turbulent history of the country. In 1895 the famous explorer Hen-
ry Morton Stanley claimed the area on behalf of the Belgian king Leopold 
II as his private property, which was given the name of Congo Free State. 
Subsequently, it became formally part of the Belgian colonial empire. After 
independence, it was given the name of the Republic of the Congo, Mobutu 
changed it to Zaire and the country is known nowadays as the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. Among the Congolese, the colonial state was also 
known as Bula Matari: he who crushes stones. Originally this epitheton or-
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nans was the nickname of Stanley, who at the request of the king vigorously 
forced himself from the east to the west of the country, and frequently used 
dynamite to crush rocks while constructing the first roads in the country. 
Bula Matari became a symbol for colonial power, which crushed all opposi-
tion. Colonial authority was absolute and primarily used to make money: first 
ivory and rubber, later minerals. Gradually an uniform colonial bureaucratic 
structure was imposed on the whole country. To quote the American Congo 
expert Crawford Young: “None... could escape the overarching uniformities 
imposed by the nature of the state, its vocation of total control of the subject 
population, and its productionist orientation.”25 
Illustration 4.1
Henry Morton Stanley (seated, center), Serpa Pinto, (right of center), Africa, circa 
1877
The colonial authorities established a highly centralized government struc-
ture in combination with a system of indirect rule at the lower levels on the 
basis of clearly defined ethnic identities. The main focus of the colonial au-
thorities was on maintaining power, taxation, and mobilizing labor to be em-
ployed on plantations and in mines, and on the construction of infrastruc-
ture. The provision of basic services like education and health was left to the 
25 C. Young and T. Turner, The rise of and decline of the Zairian state (Madison, 1985), 36.
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Catholic mission. Congolese were only allowed to organize themselves along 
ethnic lines, which determined to a large extent the political landscape after 
independence in 1960. The large number of political parties, which emerged 
around that time, were primarily ethnic and/or region based. 
During the first years after independence, the omnipotent state disintegrat-
ed fast. The country fell apart as the former instruments of colonial rule, 
government bureaucracy and army, imploded after a hasty, improvised de-
colonization. Within a week after the declaration of independence the army 
began a mutiny demanding higher pay and the appointment of Congolese 
officers. Then a number of “rich” provinces (Katanga, Kasai, and Kivu) seced-
ed. The anarchy and the ethnic character of the political strife were not only 
the antithesis of the colonial state but also saw to it that political pluralism 
and federalism were discredited in the eyes of the population. The first five 
years after the independence were characterized by chaos: a combination of 
mutinies, secessions, rebellions, and failed UN interventions. Mobutu put an 
end to this chaos. He could count on support from the population as well as 
donor countries when he, in his capacity of army commander, without much 
resistance, seized power in 1965. 
Mobutu set up the model of a highly centralized state and corresponding 
authority versus the chaos during the first years of the republic. Gradual-
ly Kinshasa gained control again over the whole country. He consolidated 
his power by initially co-opting a large part of the existing political elites, 
granting himself extensive powers and restricting activities by political par-
ties. In addition to co-optation, intimidation and worse were, of course, also 
important attributes of the new regime. In order to serve as an example, a 
number of political opponents were arrested, convicted, and hanged. Politics 
became the monopoly of a new political party established by the regime: the 
Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR). Towards the end of 1967, the 
new regime had co-opted, marginalized, or jailed most of the political heavy 
weights of the first years after independence. In the following years, an ex-
treme personalization of the power of the state took place. Political leaders, 
who had an autonomous powerbase, were replaced by those entirely depend-
ent on the president.
His power assured, Mobutu could afford to give free reign to his ambitions. 
He used the state to provide the Congo and its leader (or the other way 
around) of the necessary grandeur. Abroad, African leadership was actively 
pursued. In the Congo itself, large-scale projects were launched, facilitated 
by generous loans provided by Western countries. A “moral reorientation” 
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was furthered by vigorously promoting the ideology of authenticité. The 
sphere of influence of the government party MPR was extended to church 
and army. As part of the proclaimed Zairianization, major foreign compa-
nies were nationalized. However, the new Congolese management was un-
able to run these companies adequately. Copper mines, the main source of 
income for the Congo, went downhill rapidly. 
Illustration 4.2
Mobutu Sese Seko with Prince Bernhard
Mobutu was more interested in immediate access to funds to support his pa-
tronage networks and to secure his position than in the development of the 
Congolese economy. Nationalization boiled down to a transfer of property 
from colonial to post-colonial elites and in particular to allies of Mobutu. 
Yet, Zairianization and the promotion of authenticité contributed positive-
ly to the development of a common national identity after the chaotic years 
following independence. Personalized power culminated in the adoption in 
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1974 of a new official state ideology: Mobutuism. That was asking for trou-
ble. At the same time, the economic problems of the regime grew. The price 
of copper, the main source of income for the Congo, dropped on the world 
market, while oil prices increased. The negative consequences, in combina-
tion with Zairianization of the economy, started to kick in. 
In April 1990, President Mobutu announced the end of the one-party system 
and a transition to multiparty democracy. During the transition period, he 
made good use of the opportunity offered by promoting further divisions 
among the political opposition in order to secure his own position. Manip-
ulation of ethnic sentiments once again became an important instrument in 
the political arena. Mobutu managed to block the Sovereign National Confer-
ence (composed of political opposition parties and civil society) by creating a 
competing government and co-opting a number of moderate representatives 
of the opposition. Thanks to the internal divisions among the opposition, 
Mobutu succeeded in staying in power. Although he remained president, this 
period meant another nail in his coffin. The transition itself was doomed to 
failure. Hundreds of political parties were established, most of them personal 
vehicles for the ambitions of members of the political elites. The Sovereign 
National Conference, which had announced a new constitution and elec-
tions, disintegrated slowly but surely. 
The presidential as well as the opposition camps were hopelessly divided, 
continuously changed composition, and held a stranglehold on each other, 
resulting in a paralysis of state and government. Behind the façade of the 
never ending political skirmishes between Mobutu and the political opposi-
tion under the leadership of Étienne Tshisekedi, a more fundamental change 
took place. The elite no longer focused exclusively on securing access to gov-
ernment resources but increasingly looked for opportunities to accumulate 
wealth, and to legitimize its position at the regional and local level. Mobutu 
was no longer the spider in the center of the web. The creation of autono-
mous patronage networks undermined the position of Mobutu even further. 
Still, he managed to stay in power for the time being, mainly because of his 
control over the diamond industry, the central bank and support by segments 
of the security sector.
The genocide in 1994 in Rwanda had enormous consequences for the Congo. 
After the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), more than a million 
Hutu sought refuge across the border and contributed to the chaos and mis-
ery in the Kivus. Incursions into Rwanda by remnants of the former Rwandan 
army and Interahamwe militias went hand-in-hand with massacres among 
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the Tutsi population in North-Kivu, with the help of Mobutu who provided 
substantive military assistance to the Hutu leaders. The destruction of the 
refugee camps by the RPF, which Hutu extremists used as a base for their mil-
itary operations against the new government in Kigali, was followed by the 
“first” Congolese war. In 1996, Rwanda and Uganda decided to support the 
military offensive in eastern Congo through the Alliance des Forces Democra-
tiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (ADLF), led by Laurent Désiré Ka-
bila, all the way to Kinshasa. The Mobutu regime collapsed like a house of 
cards. 
Cold War logic had helped Mobutu to remain in the saddle for 32 years. The 
end of his rule in the aftermath of the rebellion by Rwanda- and Uganda-sup-
ported rebels turned the “Mobutu or chaos” rhetoric into a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. The final collapse of the regime was the result of a combination 
of a number of factors: the underperformance by the political elites during 
the transition period, intensified political mobilization along ethnic lines, the 
suspension of international aid to the regime, the conflict in eastern Congo 
as a consequence of the political and economic exclusion of Congolese of 
Rwandan descent, and a coalition of convenience between Rwanda, Uganda, 
Angola, and Zimbabwe against Mobutu. Taking into account his background 
and personal history, the succession of Mobutu by Kabila was rather remark-
able and perhaps typical of the erratic recent history of the Congo. 
The Kabila regime was basically a combination of all kinds of informal, shad-
owy networks. He continued, with a great deal of verve, the “revolving door 
system” of Mobutu: potential rivals were frequently dismissed from one job 
and reappointed in another. Many of the key positions in the government, 
army, and parastatals, however, were awarded to Katangese and, in particu-
lar, to the Lubakat group from North Katanga, the area from which Kabila 
originated. The regime combined an authoritarian approach with a high level 
of (policy) incoherence and a belief in a strong interventionist state (which 
scarcely existed anymore). Moreover, Kabila was faced with a dilemma. On 
the one hand, he had come to power thanks to the support of Rwanda (and 
Uganda), while, on the other, he had to distance himself from these countries 
in order to achieve legitimacy and gain support among the Congolese popu-
lation. After a number of incidents, he decided that the second consideration 
was more important than the first. He had to get rid of Rwandan and Ugan-
dan tutelage, and ordered all Rwandese (and other foreign) military to leave 
the country immediately. This triggered the “second” Congolese war. 
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The circumstances in 1998 were very different from the “first” Congolese war. 
First, the foreign coalition against Mobutu disintegrated into two competing 
camps. While Rwanda and Uganda opposed Kabila, Angola and Zimbabwe 
chose to align themselves with the “legitimate” regime in Kinshasa. Moreo-
ver, contrary to 1996, the rebel groups that joined Rwanda and Uganda were 
internally very much divided. In the Congo, the “first war” was at least in the 
beginning regarded as a war of liberation; this time the majority of the Con-
golese saw this as a war of aggression against the country. By appealing open-
ly to racist anti-Tutsi sentiments in Congolese society, Kabila managed to in-
crease his popularity among the Congolese population. Returning the favor, 
Kinshasa supported Rwandese and Ugandan rebels operating from eastern 
Congo. As a result the continuing conflict between the several ethnic com-
munities living in the Kivu provinces intensified even further.
Illustration 4.3
Laurent Kabila
In 2001 Laurent Kabila was murdered by one of his bodyguards and was 
succeeded as president by his son Joseph. On the ground, the territory of 
the Congolese state was divided up into three areas controlled by the gov-
ernment in Kinshasa, by the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie 
(RCD) supported by Rwanda and by the Mouvement de Liberation du Con-
go (MLC) supported by Uganda, respectively. The 1999 ceasefire agreement 
of Lusaka (which was never implemented) confirmed the informal partition 
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of the Congo. Following the Accord global et inclusif of Sun City in 2001, 
the main parties in the conflict eventually formed a transition government, 
which was given the task of reunifying the country, reestablishing a national 
army, and holding national elections. The political settlement was based on a 
“1 + 4 formula.” Power was distributed among the four main parties, being Jo-
seph Kabila’s government, the MLC led by Bemba, the RCD of Ruberwa, and 
the political opposition, with Kabila junior as the president of the country. 
Illustration 4.4
Joseph Kabila
4.2 Elections
Extreme political fragmentation characterized the first years after independ-
ence. Mobutu could count on a lot of support when he excluded political par-
ties from the political process. Politics became the prerogative of the Mou-
vement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR), established by the government for 
this purpose. The Congo became a one-party state, allowing the regime to 
keep a close eye on all political activities. Gradually the separation between 
party and state disappeared. Although there was not much choice, paradoxi-
cally the MPR (originally established to substitute political competition) was 
mainly used to win elections and to legitimize the regime in a formal sense. 
Mobutu won the elections in 1970, 1977, and 1984, receiving more than 99 
percent of the votes. 
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In response to external and internal pressure to introduce a more pluralist 
political system, Mobutu put the “Third Republic” in place in 1990, which 
was supposed to pave the way for political competition on the basis of a mul-
tiparty system. Within a year, more than 200 political parties were estab-
lished. Similar to the period after independence, these parties were predomi-
nantly organized along ethnic or regional lines, and served as instruments for 
the personal interests of ambitious politicians. 
The elections, as provided for by the Sun City peace agreement, finally took 
place in 2006 after being postponed a number of times due to political, logis-
tic, and procedural problems. On the whole these elections were considered 
free and fair, but they confirmed the deep division between the east and the 
west of the country. In the first round, Kabila and Bemba got 45 and 20 per-
cent of the vote, respectively, which necessitated a second round. The Congo-
lese voted predominantly against those who, during the war, called the shots 
in the areas where they lived. The population living in the area controlled by 
the government in Kinshasa voted against Kabila, whose Congolese origin 
was called into question. The population living in the regions controlled by 
rebel groups voted against Bemba and Ruberwa, since they were held re-
sponsible for the continuing state of war and interference by Rwanda. 
In preparation for the second round, both presidential candidates formed al-
liance with parties of other candidates. Joseph Kabila established the Alliance 
de la Majorité Présidentielle (AMP), consisting of 31 parties, and Bemba the 
Regroupement des Nationalistes Congolais (RENACO), consisting of 23 par-
ties. The result of the second round of the presidential elections was as fol-
lows: Jean-Pierre Bemba (a native of Équateur) got the majority of the votes 
in the west (all in all 42 percent of the votes); Kabila got most of the votes in 
the east of the country. He mustered more than 90 percent of the votes in the 
east. His election victories in Kivu, Ituri, Katanga, and Maniema provinces 
made it possible for Kabila to win the overall elections (58 percent of the 
votes). Kabila probably owed his initial popularity in the east of the country 
to the return of peace, the reunification of the country, and the withdrawal of 
Rwanda and Uganda from the Congo, for which he received the credit. 
Violence between (armed) supporters of Kabila and Bemba accompanied 
both rounds of the presidential elections. After the refusal by Bemba’s mi-
litia after the elections to join the Congolese army, heavy fighting erupted 
between Bemba’s “bodyguard” and the official Congolese army. Bemba was 
indicted on a charge of high treason and fled the country. At the request of 
the International Court of Justice, he was afterwards arrested in Belgium on 
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charges of war crimes (in Congo-Brazzaville) and extradited to the ICC in 
The Hague. Exit Bemba. The expected outbreak of violence in Kinshasa failed 
to happen. Partly thanks to the military presence of the United Nations, of 
the European Union, and repressive behavior by Kabila’s Presidential Guard, 
the population in Kinshasa and the western provinces had to comply. How-
ever, the popularity of Kabila dropped dramatically in the east of the country 
in the years following the elections. He was unable to deliver peace to the east 
of the country. An agreement with Rwanda that allowed the country, togeth-
er with the Congolese army, to engage in military operations in the Congo 
against the Rwandan rebel group FDLR caused a breach of trust between the 
president and the non-Tutsi population in the Kivu provinces. Internal divi-
sions within the political opposition benefitted Kabila once again. Initially, 
the MLC dominated the opposition camp but was weakened considerably af-
ter the departure of its leader Bemba. The main opposition leader Tshisekedi 
and his UPDS decided to boycott the 2006 elections. The other rebel group, 
which turned itself into a political party, the RCD of Azaria Ruberwa, was 
wiped out in the 2006 elections due to its close ties with Rwanda. 
Table 4.1
Results 2006 presidential elections in the Congo
Candidate (Party) [Coalition] First Round Second Round
Number 
of Votes
% of Votes Number 
of Votes
% of Votes
Joseph Kabila Kabange 7,590,485 44.81% 9,436,779 58.05%
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (MLC) 3,392,592 20.03% 6,819,822 41.95%
Antoine Gizenga (PALU) 2,211,280 13.06% – –
François Joseph Mobutu Nzanga 
 Ngangawe (UDEMO)
808,397 4.77% – –
Oscar Kashala Lukumuenda (UREC) 585,410 3.46% – –
Azarias Ruberwa Manywa (RCD) 285,641 1.69% – –
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
In the build-up to the 2011 elections, the political opposition offered a well-
known picture of a large number of different parties. These elections were 
a lot less free and fair than in 2006. It appeared that the incumbent regime 
manipulated the electoral process to such an extent that Kabila could not lose 
the elections. Capitalizing on the divisions among the opposition, the presi-
dential electoral process consisting, if required, of two rounds was changed. 
Now the candidate who got most votes (in the first round), would win the 
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elections. The lack of transparency during the registration, the partisanship 
of the electoral commission, and the gross irregularities during the count did 
the rest. For example, Katanga, the homebase of the president, showed an 
improbably high turnout, while in Kinshasa, a stronghold of the opposition, 
the results of approximately 2000 polling stations were lost. International ob-
servers were refused access to the center where all the votes cast in Kinsha-
sa were collected. In the opinion of the Carter Center, the elections lacked 
credibility.
Illustration 4.5
Presidential guard (2011 elections)
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Table 4.2
Results 2011 presidential elections in the Congo
Candidate (Party) Number of Votes  % of Votes
Joseph Kabila Kabange 8,880,944 48.95%
Étienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba 
(UDPS-Tshisekedi)
5,864,775 32.33%
Vital Kamerhe Lwa-Kanyiginyi (UNC) 1,403,372 7.74%
Léon Kengo wa Dondo (UFC) 898,362 4.95%
Antipas Mbusa Nyamwisi 311,787 1.72%
François Joseph Mobutu Nzanga 
 Ngangawe (UDEMO)
285,273 1.57%
Jean Andeka Djamba (ANCC) 128,820 0.71%
Adam Bombolé Intole 126,623 0.70%
François Nicéphore Kakese Malela 
(URDC)
92,737 0.51%
Josué Alex Mukendi Kamama 78,151 0.43%
Oscar Kashala Lukumuenda (UREC) 72,260 0.40%
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
4.3 Short overview of economic developments
In the last years of Mobutu’s regime, economic policy by the government 
was basically absent. It was everyone for himself. The device was: Débrouillez 
vous (the imaginary “article 15” of the constitution): Manage on your own! 
This trend continued during the war. During this period the Congolese state 
was almost completely dismantled. To quote the Belgian Great Lakes expert 
Filip Reyntjes: “Almost 100 procent of its performance became informal. 
Economic actors often of a mafia-like nature, pursue short-term interests in 
what often amounts to plundering rather than entrepreneurship.”26 The war 
situation resulted in a further change of the economy, which was already in 
a nosedive, for the worse. During the war (1996-2001) economic policy fo-
cused on getting hold of sufficient foreign currency to be able to finance the 
war. For this purpose, heavy taxes were imposed on the few still operating 
private companies. Regarding the extraction of natural resources, in particu-
lar diamonds, monopolies and concessions including tax exemptions were 
26 F. Reyntjes, “Briefing: The second Congo war: more than a remake,” African Affairs, 98:391 
(1999), 248.
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granted to companies that were willing to pay up front. In addition, a sys-
tem of different exchange rates and price controls was introduced leading 
to a major shortfall of imported goods that were crucial to keep the econo-
my going. The (formal) economy collapsed. The budget deficit was financed 
by printing money and negotiating additional loans. The national income in 
2000 amounted to 80 percent of that in 1995 (which was already a pretty bad 
year). 
After succeeding his father in 2001, Joseph Kabila changed course: a program 
of economic reforms was implemented, which put an end to the vicious circle 
of monetization of the budget deficit, hyperinflation, and devaluation. It re-
sulted for the first time in thirteen years in some economic growth. In 2005, 
the regime temporarily abandoned these policies aimed at macroeconomic 
stability. This coincided with the preparation for the elections to be held the 
following year. In 2008, the economy suffered badly because of a slump in 
the price of copper on the world market. From 2009 on, the economic and 
fiscal situation improved again. The Congo benefitted from substantial debt 
relief within the framework of the international debt relief initiative HIPC; a 
structural reform program was under implementation and inflation reduced 
to 15%. Although reliable data are lacking, it appears rather obvious that a big 
majority of the Congolese population continued to live in absolute poverty. 
Given the turbulent history of the Congo, hardly any information is available 
that can provide some insight into the level of structural transformation of 
the Congolese economy. However, it almost goes without saying that, taking 
into account the circumstances, this could hardly have been the case. 
4.4 Response of the political elite
Political cohesion
In the history of the Congo since independence, the fragmentation among 
the political elites runs as a common thread. Within this context, a number 
of phases can be distinguished. The first elections after independence in 1960 
immediately resulted in a civil war and a disintegration of the national elite: 
nationalists against federalists, radicals against moderates, separatist move-
ments (the most important being in Katanga), and UN military interven-
tions. Moreover, this fragmentation went hand-in-hand with frequent ethnic 
violence between and in different regions. 
After his takeover in 1964, Mobutu succeeded in temporarily committing 
major parts of the Congolese elites to the regime, to him personally and to 
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the idea of a nation-state. Secession was no longer an option. Elite factions 
from the relatively poor north of the country became more influential and 
realized that their interests were better taken care of in a united Congo. Rep-
resentatives from the mineral rich south of the country gave up their threats 
to secede. The United States made very clear their support for Mobutu and 
their preference for a united Congo as an ally in the Cold War. Mobutu of-
fered stability to the Congolese elites as a whole but at the same time kept the 
individual members of these elites in a state of suspense. He tried to deprive 
them of the opportunity to establish an independent powerbase by frequent-
ly changing their positions and sometimes by dismissing them altogether or 
even putting them in jail. In the history of independent Congo the first ten 
years of Mobutu’s regime was the only period until now in which a deliberate 
and reasonably effort was made to forge a level of unity among the political 
elites: “...Mobutu was implementing a strategy designed to construct a cen-
tralized system of patronage, which would allow the state to capture funds 
and discipline wealth holders, subjecting them to a national project.”27
As long the president was able to count on foreign financial and political sup-
port (due to the export of minerals to the West and the strategic position of 
the Congo during the Cold War), his position within the country was secure. 
The suspension of financial aid in the 1980s, the drop in the price of minerals 
on the world market, the mismanagement of the economy and the related 
scarcity of means for patronage, forced Mobutu to change course. The earlier 
relative consensus among the political elites could not be sustained under 
these pressures. The president had to change tactics to survive politically. 
Against the background of the reduced opportunities for patronage the cen-
tral government could offer, Mobutu as well as members of the political elites 
felt compelled to tap into alternative sources. However, the networks based 
on regional and ethnic affiliations to which they turned, were much more 
difficult to control by the political center in Kinshasa. Mobutu’s debureau-
cratisized patrimonialism encountered more problems as the “sanctioned” 
private accumulation made it easier for local Big Men to create their own 
local powerbase and to avoid control by Kinshasa. During the 1980s a shift 
took place towards decentralized networks as a basis for political power. Still, 
for the time being Mobutu remained the main patron of the Congolese elite, 
which in the meantime fragmented further. 
27 J. Putzel, S. Lindemann, and C. Schouten, “Drivers of change in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo: the rise and decline of the state and challenges for reconstruction,” Crisis States Re-
search Center – Working paper 26:2 Crisis Research Centre (London, 2008).
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The political (and economic) liberalization initiated by external and internal 
pressure led to a further weakening of the central government and more au-
tonomy for the regional elites. Government institutions increasingly had to 
compete with alternative centers of power. Mobutu used the reintroduction 
of multiparty politics, announced in 1990, to give preferential treatment to 
different ethnic power brokers. As opposition against his rule increased, he 
resorted more and more to playing off regional Big Men against each oth-
er, whose powers were based on ethnic patronage networks. As part of this 
strategy, in 1991 he ordered that all regional civil servants, including gover-
nors, had to originate from the region in which they worked. This constituted 
a fundamental policy change: previously, civil servants had to come from a 
different region than the one where they held office so as to avoid the estab-
lishment of an independent local powerbase. Most of the new parties, which 
were formed around this time, were therefore predominantly ethnic and/or 
region based.
The political void created by the meltdown of the Mobutu regime played an 
important role in the rapid fragmentation of the political arena. In the east-
ern part of the country, competing centers of power were in control of the 
local natural resources thanks to their informal networks and armed groups, 
undermining even further the already corroded monopoly on the use of force 
by the state.  Mobutu had become just one of many players in the political 
and economic power play in the Congo. The establishment of new patronage 
networks in the east of the country, linked to Rwanda and Uganda since the 
start of the war, further complicated the situation. 
During the regime of Laurent Kabila nothing much changed. Furthermore, 
his government could only exercise authority in a part of the Congo. Kabila’s 
domestic powerbase initially only consisted of Banyarwanda from the Kivu 
region. After he was done with them, he sought support from the elites from 
Katanga (his home region), Kasai, and the capital Kinshasa. The advancing 
fragmentation of the political elites along ethnic/regional lines intensified 
during the civil war. Rebel groups also mobilized their support on the basis 
of ethnic allegiance. 
After the establishment of a transition government consisting of the main 
warring parties, the Congo sailed into calmer waters. The layout of this gov-
ernment (2001-2006), cumbersome as it might have been, was rather inclu-
sive as far as its composition was concerned. This period was characterized 
by a political agreement to which all participating parties actually adhered. 
The key to its success appeared to be a combination of active involvement by 
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the international community in sustaining the government and the access 
by all the important players (being members of the government) to state re-
sources. In the aftermath of the 2006 elections and the departure of the main 
rival Bemba, the government was still cohesive enough and had the necesary 
determination to carefully begin some repairs of the Congolese state. This 
did not apply to the east of the country. Kabila junior was unable to commit 
major parts of the political elite in the east to the regime, with all kind of re-
percussions for the stability of the Congolese state as a whole. 
Ethnic and regional dimensions
Mongo
(14%)
Luba
(14%)
Kongo
(10%)
Mangbetu-
Azande
(7%)
Other
(55%)
Figure 4.1
Ethnic groups The Congo
As in so many African countries, the colonial authorities in the Congo sharp-
ened the dividing lines between ethnic groups. Some ethnic groups, like the 
Kongo and the Kasai Luba, benefitted in the eyes of many Congolese more 
than other ethnic groups from the proximity of transport routes and eco-
nomic centers offering employment, access to education, and, last but not 
least, from ethnic prejudices of the colonial rulers. Electoral competition 
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turned these ethnic perceptions into political issues. Partly as a consequence 
of the concentration of power in the hands of the president and the aversion 
among the population towards the ethnic excesses during the first years after 
independence, Mobutu initially managed to put an end to the excessive use 
of ethnicity for political purposes, the ethnic patronage practices within gov-
ernment institutions, and ethnic propaganda. 
Of course, the politically canny Mobutu saw to it that most ethnic groups felt 
represented in the different government institutions. However, the position 
of their political leaders was not so much based on their ethnic connections 
as on the benevolence of the president. The first requirement for qualifica-
tion for an important government position was fidélité au Guide. But even 
Mobutu could not escape the ethnic reality on which his power was based. 
Representatives of Équateur province, the home area of Mobutu, occupied 
the most crucial positions. In the course of time their dominance, particu-
larly in the security sector, became more and more visible. As mentioned, 
the return to multiparty politics, announced by Mobutu in the early 1990s, 
resulted in heightened ethnic tensions in a number of regions. Once again, 
the combination of political competition and ethnic mobilization appeared 
to be fatal. 
Against this background, generally speaking, a number of criteria can be dis-
tinguished, which Congolese apply in identifying friend or foe depending on 
the circumstances. Whether these “identities” actually corresponded to the 
reality on the ground is, within this context, less relevant. First, there was an 
ethnic distinction on the basis of local circumstances, whose contours were 
established in particular during the colonial era. As ethnicity often had an 
impact on the access to local political power and land, this turned out to be 
an explosive issue in some areas. Second, one could differentiate between 
provinces, known in the Congo as géopolitique. Mobutu made use of this dis-
tinction in response to challenges of political pluralism in the 1990s. Resent-
ment against the Rwandaphone population in the Congo became a popular 
distinction as well, initially in the east but, as a consequence of events during 
the Congolese wars, also in other parts of the country. In line with this re-
sentment, the intractable myth of the perceived antithesis between Bantus, 
the “original” inhabitants, and the Nilotes, the “invaders” from the north be-
came once again popular. As part of this construct Bantus were portrayed as 
hard-working farmers, naive but honest by nature and with specific physical 
features, while Nilotic nomads were characterized as calculating, dominant, 
cunning, and having other physical features. For the sake of simplicity Hutu 
were equated with the first group and Tutsi with the second.
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The developments in the Kivus and Katanga might serve as an illustration of 
the correlation between increased political competition and the use of eth-
nicity for political purposes. 
The Kivus
It appears that in the case of the Kivus all the in/out qualifiers were applied 
depending on the circumstances. The Congolese state never succeeded in ad-
equately defining the political and social status of the population originating 
from Rwanda. The equation of the system of land allocation in this region, 
with the instrumentalization of ethnicity for political purposes, resulted in 
sharp divisions and exclusion among the local population. Exclusion was a 
continuous threat to the originally non-indigenous inhabitants, since access 
to land and the corresponding land rights were defined on the basis of eth-
nicity. In the last two centuries, different Rwandaphone groups settled down 
in eastern Congo. In the nineteenth century, Banyamulenge emigrated from 
Rwanda. During the 1930s, the Belgian colonial authorities encouraged the 
inflow, in particular, of Hutu from Rwanda to be able to provide the Belgian 
plantations with labor and ease demographic pressure in Rwanda itself. In 
some areas this group even constituted the majority of the population. 
After the Hutu “revolution” in Rwanda in the 1960s, a new Rwandaphone 
group, this time of Tutsi, took refuge in eastern Congo. Among them were 
also members of the Tutsi elite, who were richer and better educated than the 
earlier influx of Rwandese and certainly than the local population. After the 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994, a huge number of Hutu refugees marched into 
the area. Against this background, the claim of Rwandaphone Congolese to 
Congolese citizenship was strongly opposed by the local population. Initially 
the Mobutu regime had given a segment of the Rwandaphone population 
preferential treatment.28 However, as the Congolese state slowly disintegrat-
ed, the regime, as well as local Big Men, had to come up with new approaches 
to protect their positions. 
The reintroduction of multiparty politics intensified political competition in 
the country. Ethnic manipulation was a favorite political tool. The Rwanda-
phone population was the main victim. A 1981 law that stipulated that Con-
golese nationality would be reserved for those who could prove to have Con-
28 In 1972, all Rwandaphone citizens, who had entered the country before 1960, received Con-
golese citizenship, thanks to a number of influential Banyarwanda and, in particular, the direc-
tor of the Bureau de la Présidence, Barthelemy Bisengimana, appointed by Mobutu in 1969. 
Rich Banyarwanda also made use of the opportunity to acquire large tracts of land. 
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golese ancestors going back to 1885 was used by the local authorities to deny 
this group any political rights. The democratic counterpart of the Mobutu re-
gime, the Conférence Nationale et Souveraine, chipped in by reconfirming the 
nationality law of 1981. The delegation from North-Kivu used the conference 
as a platform to continuously agitate against the Rwandaphone population by 
bringing up the alleged economic and political exploitation of the region by 
Rwandese “foreigners.” It was hardly surprising that tensions further increased 
in the aftermath of the first but especially after the second Congolese war.
Illustration 4.6
Internally displaced near Goma (2004)
Katanga 
The dividing line between the “indigenous” Katangese (although also Luba) 
and “foreign” Luba-Kasai played an important role in the recent history of 
Katanga. The tense relationship between the two ethnic groups originated 
in the colonial period. Initially the local population resisted Belgian rule and 
refused to become part of the colonial system. The mine industry especially 
was forced to recruit laborers from other regions. Neighboring Kasai start-
ed to provide the bulk of the labor force in the mines. This group benefitted 
from all kind of services and provisions like education, access to formal em-
ployment, and even the colonial civil service, from which the local Katangese 
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population was excluded. In the colonial set up, the Luba-Kasai were hierar-
chically superior to the Katangese. This would not go without repercussions. 
In the run-up to independence, the establishment of political parties in Ka-
tanga along strictly ethnic lines confirmed the antagonism between the two 
groups. Ethnic violence surfaced whenever a political power struggle oc-
curred, for example, at the time of the secession of Katanga or towards the 
end of the Mobutu era when a return to a multiparty system was planned. 
In the early 1990s, Mobutu tried to neutralize his political opponents by en-
couraging ethnic discord. Mobutu actively supported the emergence of Ka-
tangese chauvinism, which strongly opposed the perceived privileged status 
of the Luba-Kasai. In this manner, he was able to undermine the position of 
his main political rival at the time, Étienne Tshisekedi, originating from Ka-
sai, and divide the opposition. As could be expected, this went hand-in-hand 
with a lot of violence against the Luba-Kasai.
Congolité
An important weapon in the hands of Bemba during his political battle with 
Kabila in the 2006 presidential elections was doubts about the Congolese 
origin of Kabila. In the Bemba propaganda, Kabila was continuously accused 
of being a “foreigner,” an oiseau migratoire, who hardly spoke any French or 
Lingala. His mother was supposed to be Rwandese and Laurent-Désiré Kabi-
la (the murdered previous president) was not his real father. Although Bemba 
lost the elections, he gained a lot of support with these accusations among 
the Congolese population in large parts of the country. This campaign rhet-
oric not only appealed to xenophobic sentiments among the population (tar-
geted mainly at Rwanda) but was, indirectly, also an indication of the broad 
popular support for the state as a national unity. This is quite remarkable giv-
en the nature of the breakdown of the Congolese state, the diversity among 
the Congolese population, the intense polarization along ethnic and regional 
lines, the several separatist movements in the past, and the existence of a 
number of rebel movements during the second Congolese war (1998-2000), 
which occupied large parts of the country. And yet, the Congo endured. In 
spite of everything, political elites and population alike supported the idea of 
national unity wholeheartedly. 
Why? Sovereignty of the Congolese state offered to the elites more economic 
and political opportunities than a division of the country. It provided inter-
national legitimacy and allowed for the provision of international aid and 
investments. Realizing the advantages of international recognition of the 
Congolese state, political elites in the end pursued their agendas within the 
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context of the national state. The numerous armed rebellions concerned 
not so much different views on the question of unity of the Congolese state 
as the conditions under which the rebels were prepared to take part in this 
state. The purpose of these armed rebellions and/or the wish to secede were 
all efforts to rearrange the balance of power within the Congolese state as a 
whole. Tshombe, the leader of the Katangese secession in the 1960s, became 
prime minister of the Congo in 1965; Kalonji, leader of the South-Kasai sep-
aratist movement, became a minister under Tshombe. Bemba and Ruberwa, 
leaders of the rebel movements during the second Congolese war, joined the 
transitional government. Many Congolese consider federalism as a means 
to express their identity but want to do so within the existing national con-
text. Once in power the same politicians suppressed the quest for a more 
decentralized government system in order to prevent infringement on their 
authority and the establishment of alternative institutional power centers: 
“Quand on va manger a Kinshasa, c’est fini.” 
In spite of all its deficiencies the Congolese state provided many Congolese 
with a sense of predictability as opposed to armed insurgencies, military re-
bel leaders, and humanitarian emergencies. Moreover, it was precisely the 
weakness of the state that provided Congolese political elites as well as ordi-
nary Congolese with the opportunity to make money. In an article about the 
nature of the Congolese state, Pierre Englebert gives the example of the many 
potholes in the streets of Kinshasa. From a longer-term perspective, it would 
have been of course more efficient to repair the road once and for all. How-
ever, these potholes were also a source of income for young, unemployed Ki-
nois. By carrying out temporary ad hoc repairs, they were in a position to ask 
for contributions by motorists.29
Political instrumentalization of violence 
As explained, the outcome of the elections in the run-up to independence 
in 1965 and the return to a more pluralist political system in the early 1990s 
triggered a lot of violence. One of the more structural factors underlying the 
violent nature of Congolese history, before and after independence, has to do 
with the Congolese armed forces. The power of the state is, in the final anal-
ysis, based on its monopoly on the use of force. If, however, the main instru-
ment to exercise this monopoly, the army, is considered weak, unreliable, and 
turns occasionally against it own population, it undermines the credibility of 
29  P. Englebert, “Why Congo persists: sovereignity, globalization and the violent reproduction 
of a weak state,” QEH working paper series 95 (2003), 8. A more generic explanation is offered 
in P. Chabal and J. Daloz, Afrika works. Disorder as political instrument (Oxford, 1999).
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the state and can even jeopardize the existence of the state itself. That is what 
happened in the Congo. Within a week after independence the army rose in 
mutiny. Since then nothing much changed. The Congolese army turned out 
to be the main perpetrator of violence against its own population, of plun-
der, and violation of human rights. However, in terms of fighting, the track 
record of the Congolese army is rather poor. The performance of the Congo-
lese army against rebels after independence; against Katangese insurgents in 
1966, 1967, 1977, and 1978; the military support to the FNLA in Angola; and 
their failures during both Congolese wars is a case in point.
Illustration 4.7
14th brigade of the FARDC in North-Kivu (2006)
The army potentially constituted the greatest threat to the power of the pres-
ident. Mobutu maintained an extensive system of patronage and internal 
competition within the army in order to neutralize this threat. His successors 
applied the same divide-and-rule tactics. At the same time, the leadership of 
the army and security services remained an important mainstay of the re-
gime. This patrimonial context might partly explain the absence of political 
will to implement real security sector reforms (a precondition for the rein-
statement of the monopoly on the use of force by the state). A reformed, pro-
fessional army with a clear command and control structure could, after all, 
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endanger the powerbase and important sources of income of the elite linked 
to President Kabila.30
The gradual loss of the monopoly on the use of force by the state of course 
created an environment conducive for the establishment of private armed 
groups. As part of the intensified political competition in the 1990s, a num-
ber of armed groups rose up, initially to protect the interests of local pol-
iticians. As political and ethnic issues got more intertwined, these groups 
developed into armed militias with a specific ethnic agenda. As the fragmen-
tation of the state progressed, government institutions felt more and more 
obliged to negotiate and compete with non-governmental parties, including 
on the use of force. 
This was especially the case in the border areas in the east of the country. 
The two Congolese wars changed the nature of the patronage networks 
in these areas. They acquired a strong military dimension and established 
strong links with neighboring countries (Rwanda and Uganda). A number of 
rebel groups, ethnic militias, and military “entrepreneurs” demanded access 
to available funds and minerals. The manner in which they tried to achieve 
this led, in a number of cases, to even more violence. An instructive example 
in this context was the modus operandi of the RCD Goma. In 1998, this rebel 
group (supported by Rwanda and Uganda) began a military campaign against 
Kabila senior from the east of the country. Once the RCD had occupied the 
strategic centers in the east, they never reverted to seriously establishing an 
alternative administration in this region but limited themselves to collecting 
taxes and the exploitation of minerals. However, the rebels too were depend-
ent on the willingness of other groups and individuals to work together with 
them (the rebels) in exchange for protection of their economic interests. 
The militarization of patronage networks encouraged local RCD command-
ers to start their own businesses and conclude lucrative business deals with 
local traders. They created their own parallel structures that led to an entan-
glement of rebel groups and local businessmen: “As economic stakes in this 
unfolding war economy were high, the need for (private) protection engen-
dered new patterns of interaction between rebel leaderships and local entre-
30 In the period 2005-2013, I was working at the Africa department of the Netherlands min-
istry of Foreign Affairs and closely involved in the effort – unsuccessful – by the international 
community to initiate a meaningful process of army reform. 
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preneurs.”31 The east of the country especially could not escape this vicious 
circle. The search for alternative means of protection, in the absence of the 
state, contributed to a proliferation of ethnically based local networks and a 
further fragmentation of the monopoly on the use of force. 
Against this background it was quite surprising that the 2006 and 2011 elec-
tions passed by relatively peacefully. Still violence did occur. When neces-
sary, violence was used to make clear who was in charge. Following the vio-
lent skirmishes after the first round of presidential elections, violent clashes 
broke out again in March 2007 between troops of Kabila and Bemba. For two 
days there was heavy fighting in the center of Kinshasa. Kabila was deter-
mined to disarm his opponent, who still had under his command a number 
of soldiers for his “personal protection.” Bemba fled the country and the op-
position was further weakened. 
Political corruption
Political corruption in the Congo is endemic. Successive regimes used public 
resources to maintain and expand their political patronage networks. Mobu-
tu set the trend. During his 35 years in power Mobutu employed state re-
sources and international financial aid, which flowed into the country until 
the end of the Cold War, to consolidate support for his regime among the 
Congolese elites and the army. Politics of this nature did not disappear after 
Mobutu finally had to leave the political stage. Wealth depended to a large 
extent on access to the state coffers, political office, or favors by the president. 
Kabila senior and junior as well distributed important positions in the gov-
ernment and parastatals on a massive scale to political supporters, who were 
then able to accumulate private wealth. The manner in which this happened 
changed depending on the political situation, but this organizing principle of 
doing politics remained the same: granting access to government institutions 
to parts of the political elites in change for support. 
The state itself became a source of income to the political elites and their sup-
porters. It was the very weakness of these state institutions, which made this 
possible and contributed to a large extent to the survival of the regime. This 
type of corruption among the elite was not unusual, but the scale on which 
this happened in the Congo was. Not only did the political elites benefit; 
all over the country the weakness of government institutions was exploit-
ed to generate private income. Elites, employees, and citizens alike used the 
31 K. Vlassenroot and T. Raymakers, “New political order in the DR Congo? The transforma-
tion of regulation,” Africa Focus, 21:2 (2008), 46.
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non-functioning of ministries, government institutions, provincial instititu-
tions, and other administrative units to their own advantage. 
The presidential elections also took place within this context. Apart from the 
means and instruments that the incumbent had at his disposal to influence 
the outcome of these elections, no reliable information (at least to me) is 
available about large-scale political corruption (like, for example, the Golden-
berg scandal in Kenya), which can be directly linked to the election process in 
either 2006 or 2011. An explanation might be the fluid and unstable nature of 
the patronage networks, which will normally have to be used for this purpose 
in a country as big as the Congo and with such a large electorate. It is obvious, 
however, that, during elections on a smaller scale, money changed hands. In 
the 2007 elections for governor by the provincial parliaments, the coalition of 
the president managed to win in eight provinces, while the main opposition 
party MLC only got the governorship of Équateur (the homebase of Bemba). 
The Congo expert Filip Reyntjes provides the following explanation: “Wide-
spread corruption explains why Kabila’s camp was victorious even in prov-
inces where it scored poorly during the presidential elections. This was made 
possible because the provincial assemblies have only a few dozen members 
who can individually be approached and bought.”32
4.5 The role of the international community 
During the Cold War, Mobutu could count on the support of the West. The 
Congo was considered an important anti-communist ally in this part of the 
world. The Western countries provided financial as well as military support 
to suppress periodic regional rebellions. No conditions with regard to “good 
governance” were imposed, for example. Access to this support facilitated 
the consolidation of Mobutu’s regime. The end of the Cold War changed this. 
Mobutu was no longer needed. Western donors started to demand political 
and economic reforms. The way Mobutu implemented the “democratic tran-
sition” did not convince Western donor countries. He was put under pressure 
to resign. Aid flows were suspended. The politics of his successor, who came 
to power in 1997, were not very different from Mobutu. During this period, 
the efforts of the international donor community were mainly focused on 
ending the war that held the Congo in its grip. 
32 F. Reyntjes, “Briefing: Democratic Republic of The Congo: political transition and beyond,” 
African Affairs, 106:423 (2007), 312.
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The establishment of a transitional government, in which the main warring 
parties took part, triggered the resumption of international aid. The World 
Bank and IMF started to provide substantial loans to the Congo. In 2003, 
the Congo became eligible for substantial additional funds within the frame-
work of the HIPC initiative. Donor countries also contributed generously to 
the 2006 and 2011 elections, both won by Kabila. There appeared to be an 
informal consensus among Western donor countries that the Congo, above 
anything else, needed stability and that Kabila, of all the candidates, was the 
least bad choice.33
The nature of politics did not change after the elections of 2006 and 2011. 
Although more discrete than during his father’s regime Joseph Kabila and his 
entourage basically applied the same political methods as his predecessors. 
The Congolese state confronted the international community with a dilem-
ma. Donor countries continued to provide financial support to the Congo to 
prevent the Congo from collapsing again, but by doing so limited the possi-
bilities for the necessary political reforms in the country. At the same time, 
a collapse of the state (as we have seen before) would run the risk of a new 
regional armed conflict. 
4.6 Conclusions
The Congo is a perfect example of competitive clientelism that got completely 
out of hand. With the exception of the first years of the Mobutu regime, the 
most salient feature of Congo politics was elite fragmentation. Congolese po-
litical elites perceived a strong government more as a threat to their interests 
than a means to achieve national economic and social development. Political 
survival of the regime systematically prevailed over development. Multiparty 
elections confirmed the fragmented nature of Congo politics. The large num-
ber of parties participating in these elections was almost without exception 
ethnic- or region-based, and personal vehicles for ambitious politicians. The 
weakness of the Congolese state institutions offered subsequent regimes the 
opportunity to use state resources to win over parts of the political elites. 
As a consequence, the legitimacy and strength of these institutions eroded 
even further. The regime as well as the elites linked to the regime benefitted 
from a continuation of this state of affairs. Although reliable data are lacking, 
33 This was the general feeling during the frequent donnor meetings I attended during that 
period. 
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it seems rather obvious that scarcely any transformation of the Congolese 
economy took place in the period under review. 
The use of ethnicity, violence, and corruption for political purposes also de-
termined the nature of the political settlement in the Congo. The return to 
political pluralism in the 1990s and the political manipulation of ethnicity 
were strongly interconnected in the Congo, with dire consequences for the 
population. Local Big Men managed to build their own ethnic, political, and 
economic powerbase, without having to be accountable to the central gov-
ernment. These local networks also became explicitly military in nature dur-
ing the 1990s as a consequence of the establishment of armed groups, in 
particular in the east of the country. The economic entanglement, especially 
with military patrons from Rwanda and Uganda, added to the fragmentation 
among the elites. Politics and corruption are closely linked in the Congo. 
Subsequent regimes used public resources on a massive scale to maintain 
political patronage networks. 
The “democratic transition” in the early 1990s, the increasing tensions in 
eastern Congo partly as a consequence of the Rwandan crisis, and the ex-
treme divide-and-rule politics by Mobutu resulted in a further fragmentation 
of the Congolese elites and a meltdown of an already very fragile political 
settlement. After the armed rebellion in the east, the Mobutu regime col-
lapsed like a house of cards. The problematic nature of the Congolese armed 
forces constituted another Leitmotiv in the recent history of the Congo. The 
Congolese army posed not only a threat to its own population but was also 
incapable of enforcing the monopoly of the state on the use of force. 
The international donor community faced a difficult dilemma. Especially pit-
ted against the background of the recent past of the country, political stability 
is a precondition for economic recovery and development. At the same time, 
given the manner in which this stability has been achieved in the Congo until 
now, structural development seems highly unlikely in the forseeable future. 
The reintroduction of a multiparty system brought about no improvement. 
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5 Rwanda
5.1 What preceded
As has happened in the other countries, the existing distinctions between 
ethnic groups in Rwanda were further emphasized during the colonial peri-
od. The initially complex web of economic, social, and political relationships 
between Hutu and Tutsi was defined and exploited unambiguously by the 
Belgian colonial regime. The Tutsi elite was supposed to administer Rwanda. 
The colonial authorities considered Hutu less suitable for this responsibility. 
Tutsi replaced Hutu even in areas that were traditionally administered by 
Hutu. The Belgian colonial rulers applied a rather rigid ethnic classification 
and intentionally strengthened the position and status of the Tutsi elite by 
granting preferential access to administrative positions, sources of income, 
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and education. Most school pupils were Tutsi. The Catholic Church, which 
monopolized education in Rwanda, played a crucial role in this effort. An-
other necessary condition in order to be part of the native elite was to convert 
to Catholicism. In his study on the history of the Rwandan genocide, Prunier 
explains: “…And since the Tutsi were the natural born chiefs they had to be 
given priority in education so that the church could enhance its control over 
the future elite of the country.”34 The myth of the so-called Hamitic origin of 
the Tutsi, with corresponding connotations about their superiority over the 
Hutu, commanded widespread support in colonial circles. This quasi-scien-
tific theory not only influenced the colonial authorities but also the ethnic 
groups themselves. This “heavy bombardment with highly value-laden stere-
otypes” over a period of sixty years resulted in an inflated self-image among 
the Tutsi population, and an inferiority complex and resentment among the 
Hutu.35 
Against the background of resistance by a segment of the Tutsi elite against 
the colonial order and a change of mind within Belgian clerical circles, the 
Catholic Church started to purposefully cultivate a Hutu counter-elite after 
the Second World War. Similarly the Belgian colonial administration imple-
mented a fundamental policy change in the period prior to independence: A 
Hutu elite was being quickly prepared to take over after independence. The 
influence and dominant position of the Tutsi elite in the Rwandan society 
was reduced as much as possible. 
In 1959, the colonial authorities endorsed the establishment of political par-
ties, which were organized along ethnic lines. The main parties were the 
Union National Rwandais (UNAR), consisting of Tutsi traditionalists and 
monarchists, and the Parti du Mouvement et de l’Ėmancipation Hutu (PAR-
MEHUTU), whose main objective was indeed Hutu emancipation. The Hu-
tu-Tutsi animosity now became part of the public domain and served as an 
important vehicle for political mobilization. It was a struggle between two 
competing elites: the new Hutu counter-elite, cultivated by the church and 
colonial authorities, and the older, “neo-traditionalist” Tutsi elite, initially 
supported by the colonial regime. In 1960, the colonial regime began replac-
ing Tutsi chiefs with Hutu. Immediately the persecution of the Tutsi began 
on the hills controlled by the Hutu. 
34 G. Prunier, The Rwanda crisis. History of a genocide 1959-1994 (Kampala, 1999), 33.
35 See also the chapter on the Congo.
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The Hutu party PARMEHUTU won the 1961 elections convincingly, and the 
Tutsi monarchy was abolished. The “Hutu revolution” became a reality and 
implied a transfer of power along ethnic lines. The exclusive right of a demo-
graphic majority was put on an equal footing with democracy. The changes 
in the political situation and the corresponding ethnic violence forced many 
thousands of Tutsi to flee, in particular to Burundi and Uganda but also to 
the Congo and Tanzania. In 1963, Tutsi rebels from the first two countries 
carried out armed raids into Rwanda. In response, anti-Tutsi razzias intensi-
fied and more Tutsi had to flee the country. The number of Tutsi who sought 
refuge in neighboring countries rose as high as 130,000. Efforts to return to 
Rwanda by force of arms failed and were abandoned (temporarily). Moreo-
ver, the Kayibanda regime in Rwanda outlawed all Tutsi political parties. An-
ti-Tutsi intimidation intensified. Still, the regime faced growing unpopularity, 
increasing internal divisions, and regional infighting among the Hutu elites. 
The ethnic cleansing and killing of Tutsi appeared to be an effort to complete 
the process of political, economic, and social Hutu dominance and, at the 
same time, to put an end to the discord among the Hutu themselves. 
Illustration 5.1
Juvenal Habyarimana
In 1973, the army led by Juvenal Habyarimana seized power. The Hutu elite 
from the north of the country and especially Gisenyi (Habiyarimana‘s home-
base) and Ruhengiri took over. Until the 1980s, Rwanda experienced a period 
of relative stability under the leadership of Habyarimana. The economy grew 
at a steady rate, and the regime did not instigate pogroms against the Tutsi, 
as was the case during the previous government. Otherwise, it was business 
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as usual. As far as access to political offices, education, and government po-
sitions was concerned, strict quotas were applied, based on ethnic and re-
gional considerations. Ethnic identification in official personal documents, 
maintained after independence, facilitated this process. As long as the Tutsi 
did not try to tamper with these policies, they were left in peace. Under Hab-
yarimana Rwanda became formally a one-party state. Every Rwandese was 
supposed to be a member of the presidential party, Mouvement Républicain 
National pour la Démocratie et le Développement (MRND). Power was con-
centrated in the hands of the president, his wife Agathe Kazinga, and her 
closest family. The MRND became in practice an important instrument for 
exercising complete control over the population, and for protecting the pow-
er and interests of the ruling elite. 
While the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was establishing itself in Ugan-
da and preparing to invade Rwanda, internal tensions in the country were 
on the rise. The Hutu opposition was increasingly frustrated about the lack 
of opportunities to participate in the political process. The economic crisis 
in Rwanda during the late 1980s, and as result increasing hardships for the 
Rwandese population, coincided with domestic dissatisfaction about the mo-
nopolistic character of the regime, the corruption, and “regionalism.” Habya-
rimana’s clout within the MRND declined, while the extreme anti-Tutsi wing 
of the party gained more influence. Moreover, the MRND, dominated by the 
Hutu elite from the north of the country, was confronted with strong com-
petition by the “southern” Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR), 
which was under the influence of Hutu extremists. The invasion by the RPF 
in 1990 further complicated the situation. 
A threat to some often implies a chance for others. The transition towards a 
more pluralist political system posed an internal political threat to the ruling 
elites and a chance to those who were until then excluded from the political 
process. The invasion by the RPF constituted an external threat to the Hutu 
regime and provided the opportunity for the Front, mainly consisting of Tut-
si, to seize power. One could roughly distinguish three groups fighting for 
political power: the regime tried to survive, the domestic political opposi-
tion attempted to gain political recognition, and the Tutsi exiles, who made 
an effort to return to the Rwandan political stage. MRND extremists seized 
the opportunity to portray the moderate Hutu opposition as accomplices of 
the Tutsi military invasion by the RPF. A number of new parties were estab-
lished. The most important were the Mouvement Démocratique Républic-
ain (MDR), partly a continuation of Parmehutu, strongly associated with the 
anti-Tutsi pogroms in the past, and with Gitarama as a homebase, and the 
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Parti Social Démocrate, representing moderate Hutu concentrated around 
Butare. In 1992, Habyarimana was obliged to form a coalition government 
with the opposition and start negotiations with the RPF. Eventually, under 
pressure of the international community, a peace agreement in Arusha was 
signed, which provided for a power-sharing arrangement between Habya-
rimana’s MRND, the domestic political opposition, and the RPF. However, 
things turned out differently. The civil war and the peace agreement of Aru-
sha led to an increased radicalization of anti-Tutsi sentiments in Rwandan 
society and a consolidation of Hutu power ideology. The killing of Habya-
rimana in April 1994 was the detonator that caused Rwanda to explode. It 
created a power vacuum that Hutu extremists used to their full advantage.36 
Genocide followed.
After seizing power in 1994 the RPF formed a transition government in line 
with the Arusha agreement, in which all the major actors were represented, 
with the exception of the MRND and CDR, which were considered instigators 
of the genocide. The transition period, foreseen for a period of 22 months, 
lasted nine years. After the events of 1994, the first years were dominated by 
recovery, return to stability, security, and reconstruction of the state. After 
the replacement of Bizumungu by Kagame as president in 2000, the develop-
ment of the country was pursued vigorously with impressive results. 
5.2 Elections
The Arusha agreements of 1993, on which Rwanda’s interim constitution was 
based, provided for a multiparty system and a government in which the main 
parties would be represented. In a sense Kagame took a risk when in 2002 
he announced multiparty elections to be held the following year. In Burundi, 
Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi who came to power through a military coup d’état, 
had also called elections hoping he could win over the Hutu majority. The 
opposite happened. But the RPF won the 2003 national elections by an over-
whelming majority. Kagame and RPF did not leave anything up to chance. 
The regime saw to it that the political space for opposition groups was indeed 
very limited. 
36 The actual events and the role of the international donor community are not part of this 
study. See also the paragraph on ethnic and regional dimensions. 
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Table 5.1
Results 2003 presidential elections in Rwanda
Candidate (Party) Number of Votes  % of Votes
Paul Kagame (FPR) 3,544,777 95.05%
Faustin Twagiramungu 134,865 3.62%
Jean-Népomuscène Nayinzira 49,634 1.33%
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
The government excluded a number of influential political parties from the 
pre-genocide period from the elections due to their complicity in the geno-
cide or their perceived ethnical nature. According to some, these elections 
were to a large extent a cosmetic exercise meant for international consump-
tion. In spite of all kinds of shortcomings in the electoral process, other au-
thors are of the opinion that Kagame enjoyed widespread approval: “There 
can be little doubt that by August 2003 the vast majority of the Rwandan 
electorate associated their president closely with the recent years of security 
and stability that their country has known since the end of the insurgency in 
the north and the west of the country.”37 As in so many developing countries, 
control over state organs and resources turned out to be an important fac-
tor in defeating the political opposition. Kagame, and others, not only relied 
on their track record. In order to silence the opposition, they also accused, 
rightly or wrongly, the opposition of manipulating ethnic sentiments. Laws 
that were introduced to advance national unity and reconciliation, such as a 
ban on divisionism, were also used to limit the political space of the political 
opposition. 
For example, the Movement Democratique Republicain (MDR), one of the few 
existing parties which tried to maintain a certain political autonomy vis-à-vis 
the RPF, was banned in 2003. The regime made life difficult for other emerg-
ing opposition parties like the Parti Démocratique pour le Renouveau and 
the Parti pour la Solidarité et Progrès. Sometimes they were simply banned. 
During the run-up to the 2010 presidential elections, something similar hap-
pened to the FDU-Ikingi and the Democratic Green Party, new opposition 
parties that were critical of the RPF. Kagame was reelected as president re-
ceiving 93 percent of the votes. 
37 C. Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda: power, genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(Jefferson NC, 2004), 194
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Illustration 5.2
2010 elections in Rwanda
Table 5.2
Results 2010 presidential elections in Rwanda
Candidate (Party) Number of Votes  % of Votes
Paul Kagame (FPR) 4,638,560 93.08%
Jean Damascene Ntawukuriryayo (PSD) 256,488 5.15%
Prosper Higiro (PL) 68,235 1.37%
Alvera Mukabaramba (PPC) 20,107 0.40%
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
5.3 Short overview of economic developments
During the first ten years of his regime, Habyarimana pursued relatively 
sound economic and development policies. In the late 1980s, Rwanda faced 
serious economic problems partly as a consequence of a sharp decline in cof-
fee prices (Rwanda’s main export product). The sustained political crisis was 
neither very conducive to robust socioeconomic policies. The genocide and 
subsequent events resulted in a total collapse of the economy. After seizing 
power, the RPF initiated policies initially geared towards recovery and, after-
wards, reconstruction. In spite of the total breakdown of society, impressive 
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results were achieved in a relative short period. The Rwandan government 
embarked on an ambitious strategy to boost modernization and diversifi-
cation of the economy and achieve (lower) middle-income status in 2020. It 
also pursued regional economic integration by joining the Common Market 
for East and Southern Africa and the East African Community. Efforts were 
undertaken to increase agricultural productivity by encouraging farmers to 
grow more suitable crops, based on the conditions in the regions they lived 
in. Part of this strategy was relocation and “regrouping” farmers in villages, 
some new, in order to use scarce farmland more efficiently and provide high-
er quality basis services to the rural population. 
In recent years, the Rwandan economy has grown faster than the African av-
erage and the other countries of the East African Community. Between 2001 
and 2011, the Rwandan economy grew by on average 8 percent and was one 
of the fastest growing economies in the world. Services and the industrial 
sector (mining and construction) were mainly responsible for this growth. 
However, agriculture remained the most important sector of the economy. 
Rwanda appeared to be more on track in achieving the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals than most other African countries. Between 2005/2006 and 
2010/2011, poverty was reduced by almost 11 percent (in the period 2000- 
2005/2006 it amounted to one percent). The number of school pupils in-
creased considerably; the access to health services, clean drinking water, and 
sanitation improved as well. The high economic growth also contributed to a 
modest reduction in income inequality. 
The RPF embarked on reforming the Rwandese economy. Several sectors 
were privatized such as telecommunication, banking, and power. Measures 
were taken to diversify the economy and reduce the country’s dependence 
on agriculture. The government took a number of initiatives to improve the 
investment climate. In 2010, Rwanda rose the fastest in the Doing Business 
Index (from place 143 to 67) of the World Bank. Corruption remained very 
low by African standards.
Social and economic progress started in earnest after Kagame took over from 
Bizumungu as president. It should be noted, however, that it is not too sur-
prising that the results achieved under Kagame were so much more impres-
sive than during the Bizumungu years. The first years after the genocide were 
dominated by efforts to start everyday life up again, the restoration of law 
and order, the refugee crisis, and the fight against armed rebel groups. These 
challenges made it nearly impossible for the Bizumungu government to con-
centrate on the actual development of the country as well. When Kagame 
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succeeded Bizumungu in 2000, security and stability had more or less re-
turned to the country. Moreover, it was obvious that the RPF was also pulling 
the strings during the presidency of Bizumungu. That does not alter the fact 
that the determination of the Kagame regime to bring economic develop-
ment to the country appeared to be rather exceptional.
A study carried out within the framework of the African Power and Politics 
Program provides an interesting and original explanation for the economic 
success of the RPF government.38 The study focuses on the centralized man-
ner in which resources were mobilized for a long-term development agenda. 
During the Kagame regime, rent seeking was organized quite differently in 
comparison to the previous regimes. The new ruling elite used the initial 
main sources of income, such as contributions by RPF supporters in the dias-
pora, profits from the trade in minerals during the two Congolese wars, and 
profits made by parastatals, only to a limited extent for its personal enrich-
ment. The regime mobilized a substantial part of these resources, with the as-
sistance of enterprises under the control of the RPF like Tri-star Investments 
and Horizon Group, to support the economic and social agenda of the gov-
ernment (while of course the army was not forgotten either). The RPF made 
use of these companies to encourage and attract private investment in sec-
tors such as telecommunication and to contribute to the diversification of the 
economy. Policies and politics were not so much determined by the necessity 
to create funds for purposes of political patronage as by the realization that 
rapid economic and social development seemed to be the only viable route to 
leave behind the ethnic divisions of the past.
Against this background, the policy adjustments implemented in 2007/8 have 
to be mentioned. In its efforts to turn Rwanda into a middle-income country 
as fast as possible, the government initially did not regard smallholder agri-
culture as paramount. It considered the development of a modern, technolo-
gy-based economy (for example, ICT) as the fastest option for achieving this 
goal. The 2007 food shortages changed the view of the Rwandan authorities. 
These shortages, the continuing poverty in the rural areas, along with their 
possible implications for the political stability of the country led to a reap-
praisal. The agricultural sector and in particular smallholder agriculture was 
given an important role in the developmental ambitions of the country. In-
vestment in agriculture increased considerably. While the national budget 
38 D. Booth and F. Golooba-Mutebi, “Developmental patrimonialism? The case of Rwanda,” 
Africa Power and Politics Program. Working paper 16 (2011).
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expenditure on agriculture amounted in 2008 to 4.2 percent, in 2010/11 this 
percentage had gone up to 10.2. 
Illustration 5.3
“ICT bus” in Rwanda
According to the African Center for Economic Transformation, Rwanda is a 
fine example of successful post-conflict reconstruction. Thanks to the deter-
mined policies of the government and its ability to provide leadership to the 
national development effort, Rwanda made impressive progress in improving 
its business climate. Rwanda has been ranked eighteenth on the ACET trans-
formation index. Although in itself a modest placing, it might be considered 
quite an achievement, given the recent history of the country (the disastrous 
consequences of the genocide, a devastating civil war, and the total collapse 
of the Rwandan state in 1994). 
5.4 Response of the political elite
Political cohesion
The long-term cultivation by the colonial authorities of an elite consisting 
exclusively of Tutsi came to an abrupt end in the years prior to independence 
with all its political, socioeconomic, and political implications. Encouraged 
by the Catholic Church, efforts were made, in a short period of time, to cre-
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ate a Hutu counter-elite, which were supposed to take over power after inde-
pendence. The policy to first offer preferential treatment to a specific ethnic 
part of the elite and then to reverse this policy radically in order to establish 
a new elite consisting of representatives of another much bigger ethnic group 
was not particularly helpful in promoting a cohesive elite, which was to rule 
the country after independence. And so it turned out. 
Not only the evident inter-ethnic but also at a later stage intra-ethnic ten-
sions and rivalry determined the relationship between the several elite 
groups. During the years leading to and after independence, the often violent 
competition between the “new” Hutu and “old” Tutsi elites took center stage, 
but after this was decided to the disadvantage of the Tutsi elite, the rivalry 
within the Hutu elite itself became the main feature of political competition. 
The Kayibanda regime was dominated by that part of the Hutu elite that, just 
like the president, came from the south and in particular from Gitarama. The 
increasing political and economic exclusion on the basis of regional origin 
intensified the tensions within the Hutu elite. Under pressure the regime re-
sorted in the early 1970s to imposing more and more discriminatory meas-
ures against the Tutsi population in order to divert attention from its own 
failings and internal divisions. Power became even more concentrated in the 
hands of the representatives from the south. After the military coup in 1973, 
the Hutu elite coming from the north of the country took over. Close family 
and marriage ties were a main feature of this elite. 
A group consisting primarily of family members of the wife of Habyarimana 
constituted an important center of power and enjoyed accompanying privi-
leges. They controlled state enterprises, and influenced domestic and foreign 
policy of Rwanda. The group was known as Akazu (little house) or the Clan 
de Madame. The coup of 1973 signified the victory of the Hutu elite from the 
north over the south. Subsequently internal divisions within this group came 
to the fore. President Habyarimana and his wife favored that section of the 
Hutu elite that, just like themselves, originated from Gisenyi over those from 
Ruhengeri, another region in the north of Rwanda. The economic crisis, the 
dissatisfaction among the population, and the reintroduction of a multiparty 
system led to further divisions and fragmentation of the political arena.
The nature of the political settlement under the RPF regime was strongly in-
fluenced by the following factors: the genocide and its effects on the popula-
tion, the military victory of the RPF, the initial threat of Hutu extremists from 
eastern Congo, and the association of political competition with political vio-
lence and killings in post-colonial Rwanda. That is why the RPF opted explic-
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itly for (at least initially) an inclusive political approach and a fundamental 
change compared to the past. The principle of power sharing, as formulated 
in the Arusha agreement, was to a large extent respected. Moderate Hutu 
leaders were co-opted in the RPF and the government. 
Although it is clear who in Rwanda was pulling the strings from 1994 on, an 
effort was made to avoid a winner takes all scenario, as was the case under 
Kayibanda and Habyarimana. The constitution of 2003 stipulates that min-
isterial posts should be distributed among political parties in line with their 
number of seats in parliament and that the party occupying the majority of 
the seats (in reality the RPF) will get no more than half of those. Moreover, in 
practice it was seen to it that the prime minister and the chairmen of parlia-
ment, senate, and supreme court did not belong to the party of the president. 
All governments in Rwanda became coalition governments.
It was the first time in the post-colonial history of Rwanda that power, at 
least formally, was no longer distributed on a purely ethnic basis. Opinions 
differ on the question of to what extent this was also the case in reality. The 
secrecy around the policy decision-making process within the RPF, the lack 
(as a consequence) of reliable information, and the polarized debate (outside 
of Rwanda) or the lack of it (inside Rwanda) about the achievements of the 
Kagame regime undoubtedly contributed to this. The more extreme position 
is that there is a remarkable continuity between the pre- and post-genocide 
regimes in Rwanda. 
According to this opinion, those in power during the Habyarimana as well as 
Kagame regimes accumulated wealth and privileges. Both cliques manipulat-
ed ethnicity, the first by turning the Tutsi population group into scapegoats 
and eventually exterminating them, the other by discriminating Hutu in the 
name of ethnic “amnesia.” Both presidents eliminated political opponents 
without having to account for it. Continuity is also apparent in not only the 
exercise of power but also in the nature of the state with its strong author-
itarian characteristics. A completely different view emphasizes that the po-
litical settlement of 1994 has been more solid, consistent, and inclusive than 
many suspected. This settlement is supposed to still be based on the follow-
ing principles: 1) the RPF giving up voluntarily the winner takes all principle 
in 1994, enshrined as such in the constitution of 2003; 2) combatting “sectar-
ism” by pursuing rapid socioeconomic development; and 3) acceptance by an 
important section of the Hutu elite that, at least for the time being, given the 
circumstances, the present political constellation is the only realistic option.
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Illustration 5.4
Paul Kagame
At same time, it appears that support for the elite in power has been gradually 
eroding. Initially the RPF was capable of winning moderate Hutu to its side. 
In conformity with the Arusha accords, the main democratic Hutu parties 
participated in the government. However, this multi-ethnic façade could not 
be maintained for long. Rather quickly a number of non-RPF politicians as 
well as prominent RPF leaders resigned from the government or were forced 
to do so. The resignations over the years of prominent Hutu leaders and Tutsi 
survivors of the genocide undermined the inclusivity of the government. A 
number of them went into exile after being accused of corruption or divi-
sionism. Prominent examples: prime minister Faustin Twigarumungu (Hutu, 
MDR) who resigned in 1995, minister of Internal Affairs Seth Sendashon-
ga (Hutu, RPF), premier Celestin Rwigema (Hutu, MDR) who resigned in 
2002, Joseph Sebarenzi (Tutsi, president of the transitional parliament) in 
2000, and, last but not least, the resignation of President Pasteur Bizumungu 
(Hutu, RPF), also in 2000. In the opinion of an author rather sympathetic to-
wards the Kagame regime, the departure of Bizumungu signified the end of 
the Rwandan “multi ethnic experiment.”39 Probably more dangerous to the in-
ternal cohesion and the RPPF leadership was the opposition from within the 
RPF, in particular from a number of companions of Kagame who belonged to 
the inner circle of the RPF. In September 2010, four former high-ranking of-
ficials, who initially operated at the highest political levels and subsequently 
39 C. Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda: power, genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(Jefferson NC, 2004), 152.
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went into exile, issued a statement in which they condemned Kagame and his 
regime in very strong terms.40
Ethnic and regional dimensions
Hutu
(84%)
Tutsi
(15%)
Twa
(1%)
Figure 5.1
Ethnic groups Rwanda
It is obvious that against the background of the genocide in 1994, ethnicity 
was and is a highly charged topic, which has rightly received a lot of atten-
tion. In this section, I would like to limit myself to those aspects that are rel-
evant to an adequate understanding of the present political settlement. First, 
reference has to be made to the legacy of Belgian colonial rule. As described 
above, the cultivation for many years of a Tutsi elite as “natural rulers,” who 
were supposed to keep the majority of the population in check, saw to it 
that the relationship between the majority (Hutu) and minority (Tutsi) was 
40 Theodore Rudasingwa, former secretary generl of the RPF; Gerald Gahima, former pub-
lic prosecutor of Rwanda; Patrick Karegaya, former head of Rwanda’s intelligence service; but 
particularly Kayumba Nyamwasa, former chief of staff of the Rwanda army and once a close 
confidant of Kagame.
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seen from a strictly ethnic perspective. The Hutu population considered the 
Tutsi chiefs not so much as representatives of the colonial state but of the 
Tutsi community as such. In the years preceding independence, the colonial 
authorities made a complete U-turn. In a new round of social engineering, 
efforts were undertaken to create a Hutu elite as fast as possible, which would 
take over power from the Belgian colonial authorities after independence at 
the expense of the old Tutsi elite. Once in power, a number of Hutu politi-
cians used the resentments and feelings of vengeance towards the former 
Tutsi “rulers” to secure their own position of power. 
Illustration 5.5
Genocide monument near Kigali
The logic of the génocidaires built on this, based on the following lines of 
reasoning. The civil war legitimatized the killings because of security consid-
erations. In addition, the tradition of obedience to the state made it possible 
to associate the genocide with the authority of the state. The most important 
argument, however, concerned the specific interpretation of ethnicity. This 
was based on the notion that all Tutsi are basically similar. Tutsi equaled en-
emy of Rwanda, and the enemy needed to be eliminated. 
The focus of the official policy of Kagame, and others, was to never allow a re-
turn of ethnically based politics in Rwanda. The policy was explicitly geared 
towards national unity, based on “ethnic amnesia.” References to ethnicity 
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were off limits. Ethnicity and ethnic divisions, as happened in the past, were 
never to be used again for political purposes. A strict ban was introduced on 
using ethnic identification as a political frame of reference (“divisionism”). 
As indicated earlier, this ban was interpreted rather liberally and often used 
as a pretext to clamp down on opposition. It was not always clear where 
the effort to stop ethnic politics ended and frustrating political opposition 
against the regime began. In spite of the return of stability, law and order in 
the country, and the socioeconomic achievements, the regime still appeared 
to be uncertain as to what extent Rwandan society would be able to resist 
ethnic politics. In the opinion of Reyntjes, the official policy of the RPF to 
eliminate ethnic discrimination was only cosmetic. After having seized pow-
er in 1994, the RPF, according to this author, rapidly monopolized power and 
the access to resources for the benefit of a small group of Tutsi with strong 
mutual ties, originating from specific refugee camps in Uganda.41 The truth 
might be a bit more nuanced. Although it is clear that the RPF leadership was 
and is mainly a Tutsi affair, at the same time, there appears to be a certain 
overlap between ethnic and political alliances. Still, quite a number of prom-
inent Hutu are active RPF members and part of the government. Moreover, 
political opponents can also be found in the Tutsi community and the RPF 
inner circle itself, whether or not originating from Uganda. 
Illustration 5.6
Countryside in Rwanda
41 F. Reyntjes, “Rwanda ten years on: from genocide to dictatorship,” African Affairs 103:411 
(2004), 177–210.
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The poorest and the majority of the Rwandan population live in in the coun-
tryside and consist mainly of Hutu smallholders. One of the aims of Rwandan 
socioeconomic policy is to reduce poverty among this group as fast as possi-
ble (see the overview of economic development) in order to boost the legiti-
macy of a regime that, in the eyes of many Hutu, is dominated by Tutsi. This 
realization has also shaped the decentralization policy implemented by the 
RPF. The regime considered decentralization to be an important instrument 
in speeding up socioeconomic development in the rural areas. Therefore, it 
emphasized the achievement of rapid and concrete development results. Al-
though this policy went hand-in-hand with the delegation of a number of 
powers and resources to local governments, the regime saw to it that control 
by the center over local administration was maintained and the possibili-
ties for creating an autonomous powerbase among the rural Hutu population 
would be limited. The regime was not prepared to take any chances. 
Political instrumentalization of violence 
Political violence permeates the recent history of Rwanda. The establishment 
of ethnically based political parties during the run-up to independence in 
1959 resulted immediately in inter-ethnic violence. The factors that contrib-
uted to the violent nature of the post-colonial culture in Rwanda can be sum-
marized as follows: the sharpened ethnic distinctions during the colonial pe-
riod; the political violence between ethnic population groups in the build-up 
to and after independence, and the subsequent exodus of many thousands of 
Tutsi; the policy of the Rwandan governments not to allow them to return 
to their country; the continuing discrimination of the Tutsi who remained 
behind; the frustrating experiences of a number of Tutsi groups in exile; in-
tra-Huta competition; and demographic pressures on land and the economy 
in general as well as the political liberalization in the early 1990s. The geno-
cide in 1994 constituted the sad apotheosis.
This came to an end after the RPF seized power in 1994. This did not mean 
that the RPF regime shunned violence if it was considered necessary. A clear 
example of this were the military operations by the Rwandan army in the 
Congo to counter the threat of armed Hutu rebels and the forced clearance 
of Hutu refugee camps, during which many thousands of civilians perished. 
In addition, there are strong suspicions that the regime was involved in the 
liquidation, or efforts of that nature, of a number of political opponents in 
and outside Rwanda.42 Topics that are off-limits in Rwanda. 
42 For example the death of former minister of Foreign Affairs Zaken Sendashonga, who died 
in Nairobi in 1995 under suspicious circumstances; the mysterious murder of the vice-president 
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Illustration 5.7
Kayumba Nyamwasa & Paul Kagame
Political corruption
Elections are not free and fair in Rwanda. Given the total control by the RPF 
over the political process the use of patronage, and its accompanying costs, 
to influence the outcome of elections was scarcely an issue in the Rwandan 
context, unlike some of the other countries under review. Remarkable in the 
Rwandan case is that the available funds were not used on a large scale either 
for self-enrichment or to secure political support from specific groups in so-
ciety. The only exception has been probably the army, which was able to get 
ahold of sufficient resources at all times. A substantial part of the available 
resources were used for economic initiatives the regime considered of strate-
gic importance. This is rather exceptional in the region. 
An instructive example of this rather unique approach was the difference in 
the use of the profits resulting from the military presence in the Congo, on 
the one hand, of Rwanda and of Uganda, on the other. The Ugandan “elite 
network” that monopolized the trade in minerals, the border trade, and tax 
collection distributed the profits among themselves and was a loose, unstruc-
tured group of UPDF officers, businessmen, rebel leaders, and local adminis-
trators. The UPDF and the rebel groups linked to Uganda constituted de facto 
the armed extension of this network. The Rwandan “network” was, however, 
of the Green Party Andre Rwisereka in 2010; and the assassination attempt on Kayumba Nyam-
wasa, former chief of staff of the Rwandese army, in South Africa in 2010.
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directed centrally by the Congo Desk of the Rwandan army, which coordinat-
ed the Rwandan military and commercial activities in eastern Congo. The 
profits were partly used to finance the military presence of Rwanda in the 
Congo and, as such, to keep it outside the official Rwandan budget. One of 
the reasons for the departure of a number of former allies of Kagame, among 
whom Bizumungu, appeared to be, according to a number of authors sympa-
thetic to the regime, the lack of access to these funds limiting the possibilities 
of using public funds to acquire political support. The limited access by the 
new elite to the “legitimate” spoils of war in Rwanda or the Congo might have 
been also one of the reasons for the departure of prominent RPF members 
such as general Kyumba Nyamwasa, initially one of the closest companions 
of Kagame.
The manner in which the resources generated by political and other inter-
ventions were used signified a fundamental break with the past. Prior to the 
seizure of power by the RPF, the political culture of Rwanda was dominated, 
just like in the surrounding countries, by considerations based on patronage. 
Entrepreneurs, for example, needed godfathers within the government or the 
military to be able to do business. To get this support, money had to change 
hands. These funds were then partly used to finance political activities. As 
indicated earlier Akazu, a powerful network closely linked to the family of 
President Habyarimana, was the apex of this system. 
Rwanda Patriotic Front
Apart from the personality of Kagame himself, the discipline, the tight or-
ganization, and the clear strategy of the RPF during the war as well as in the 
political arena formed part of the success of the Kagame regime. The ideol-
ogy and way of operating were initially clearly derived from the experiences 
and lessons of the National Resistance Army in Uganda, in which Kagame 
and other RPF leaders held important positions. The struggle against Obote 
was an important frame of reference for Kagame and his companions. To 
quote Prunier: “The equation present in every ‘Ugandan’ RPF fighter’s mind 
was MRND = UPC, Habyarimana = Obote and RPF = NRA (and later in the 
war Kagame = Museveni).”43 That the RPF was primarily a Tutsi organization 
(15 percent of the population), while the NRA could count on the support of 
almost half of the population was conveniently forgotten. The no-party sys-
tem in Uganda also had its attractions for post-genocide Rwanda. In view of 
the demographics of the country, the experiences with multiparty politics in 
the final years of the Habyarimana regime and the impact of the genocide on 
43 G. Prunier, The Rwanda crisis. History of a genocide 1959-1994 (New York, 1995), 155.
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society, a rapid return to pluralistic politics did not appear a realistic option 
to the RPF. In line with the NRM philosophy, the RPF emphasized cohesion 
and collaboration in the aftermath of the genocide. 
Illustration 5.8
Return of the RPF from eastern Congo
Given their decisive role in seizing power (as in Uganda), the military com-
manders played an important and influential role in the RPF. Similar to the 
NRM in Uganda, close ties existed between the political and military leader-
ship within the RPF. Although military officers were initially very much part 
and parcel of the political scenery in Rwanda, gradually they became less vis-
ible. Still, former military RPF leaders remained part of the Rwanda political 
elite. Although Hutu constituted the majority of the Rwanda Defence Force 
(particularly in the lower ranks), the overall leadership of the army remained 
in the hands of former RPF commanders of Tutsi origin. As was the case with 
the NRM in Uganda, the army was an important support base for the RPF.
Differing from the NRM, the RPF developed into a relatively tightly organ-
ized party having the internal discipline necessary to be able to mobilize pub-
lic and other resources generated by the RPF for prior-agreed-upon develop-
ment objectives (and not so much for self-enrichment of the ruling elite). The 
RPF seemed to have the authority, power, and the willingness to discipline 
those who did not play by the rules and to reward (moderately) those who 
did. Whether this will remain the case will depend, among other things, on 
the question of whether the RPF will also be capable in the future to commit 
potentially competing elite factions to its agenda. In addition, it is still an 
open question whether the succession of the present RPF leadership can be 
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taken care of in an orderly manner. The fact that still only a few high RPF of-
ficials do not originate from Uganda, in spite of all recruitment efforts, seems 
to be an important “weaving fault.”
5.5 The role of the international community 
After the genocide, the international community showed a lot of sympathy 
for Rwanda. The RPF faced the task of rebuilding a devastated country, de-
fending itself against the Interhamwe and other Hutu rebels operating from 
the Congo, and prosecuting génocidaires, along with implementing political 
and institutional reforms. Because of the energetic manner Kagame, and oth-
ers, addressed these problems, Western donor countries offered large scale 
support to Rwanda. The feeling of not having done enough to preempt the 
genocide no doubt contributed to this generosity. 
In spite of the criticism by Western donor countries about the flawed demo-
cratic process in Rwanda, irregularities during elections, limited freedom of 
expression, and intimidation of the political opposition, Rwanda continued 
to receive substantial donor support. In addition to the “genocide dividend,” 
the socioeconomic achievements of the country played an important role. 
Rwanda witnessed sustained economic growth and made spectacular results 
in achieving a number of Millennium Development Goals. The low levels of 
corruption, political stability, and the effectiveness and active involvement of 
the government in the implementation of development programs were high-
ly appreciated by the international donor community. Donor countries got 
value for money in Rwanda. In practice, these achievements appeared to be 
more important than the “good governance” deficit.
The relationship between Rwanda and the international donor community 
came under pressure in particular from the alleged support of Rwanda to 
rebel groups in eastern Congo. Even after the warring parties in the Con-
go reached a peace agreement (in eastern Congo), Rwanda continued to be 
suspected of providing military support to Tutsi rebel groups. Initially, this 
involved the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP). A 2012 
United Nations report accused Rwanda of actively supporting another rebel 
group, partly the successor of the CNDP, the M23. These accusations resulted 
in a decision by a number of important Rwanda donor countries to tempo-
rarily suspend a part of their aid to the country. Preoccupations about the 
negative implications of the Rwandan interventions for the fragile stability 
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of the Congo were the main reason to use the aid instrument this time as a 
conditionality.44
5.6 Conclusions
The assumption of power by the RPF in 1994 signified a departure from the 
post-colonial political economy of Rwanda. The political settlement under 
the guidance of the RPF proved to be successful in terms of consolidating the 
political stability of the country, and boosting economic growth and devel-
opment. The term potential development coalition seems to apply to Rwanda. 
The excluded factions played only a marginal role in Rwandan politics, and 
the control of the RPF over its supporters was beyond question. Given the 
lack of transparency about the political decision-making process, it is hard to 
assess to what extent this settlement is sustainable. The cohesion of the RPF 
as a political organization and the existing culture of respect for government 
authority were main assets. 
Apart from the break, there was also continuity. The RPF utilized to the full 
extent the deeply rooted tradition of Rwandan political culture of uncondi-
tional obedience to government authority. According to this tradition gov-
ernment is (supposed to be) all powerful, strongly hierarchical in nature, and 
have effective control over the population. Elections in this context served as 
a legitimization of existing power arrangements. The regime took care that 
this façade of electoral legitimacy would not be undermined. 
The regime pursued the transformation of the Rwandan economy vigorous-
ly. This policy seems to be partly the result of the realization that economic 
and social developments are the only viable option to bridge the ethnic divi-
sions of the past. Whether this approach, aimed at creating a common inter-
est among the population in a successful socioeconomic development of the 
country, will, in the future, also be able to neutralize the dangers related to 
the ethnic divisions from the past and a potentially hostile ethnic majority in 
the country of course remains to be seen. 
Taking into account the key role of the political elites in instrumentalizing 
ethnic sentiments in the past, the nature and the extent of the settlement be-
tween the RPF leader and parts of the Hutu elite will be of crucial importance 
in the longer term. Given the relative predominance of the RPF in the Rwan-
44 I was closely involved in the donor meetings about this topic.
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dan political arena, the internal cohesion of the RPF itself appears, for the 
time being, to determine the nature of this arrangement. Within this context, 
a complicating factor might be the policy of the RPF to utilize the available 
resources for developmental objectives to a large extent, and not so much for 
self-enrichment and acquiring political support of important groups in soci-
ety. This could undermine the support among certain sections of the elite for 
the regime. 
After seizing power in 1994, the political violence that Rwanda had so often 
been a victim of came to an end. Still, the regime did not hesitate to use force 
if it was of the opinion that vital interests were at stake. The involvement of 
Rwanda in the Congo created serious tensions with the international donor 
community. However, Rwanda might serve as an example of a country that 
confronted Western donor countries with the dilemma of a “good govern-
ance” situation at odds with the expectations and demands by these same 
donor countries, while at the same time the country in question engaged in 
very successful and effective development policies. 
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6 Ethiopia
6.1 What preceded
The history of Ethiopia distinguishes itself from the other countries under re-
view in one important aspect. Ethiopa is the only country in Africa that was 
able to maintain its independence during the colonial period, for the most 
part, and therefore went through its own process of state formation. Against 
this background, the tension between the center and the periphery runs as a 
common thread throughout the history of Ethiopia. Other historical divid-
ing lines, such as between high- and lowlands, Christianity versus Islam, and 
the division between ethnic groups, can be linked to this historical dividing 
line. The Orthodox Christian highlands of Amhara and Tigray constitute the 
historical nucleus of Ethiopia. Its past goes back to the empire of Axum (first 
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to the seventh century), which at one time included the northern highlands 
as well the coast along the Red Sea. Partly as a consequence of the rise of 
Islam, the empire gradually shrunk again and was reduced to the northern 
highlands. 
The Ethiopian state took on its present shape in the nineteenth century. After 
the Ethiopian (at the time Abyssinian) victory over Italy in the battle at Adwa 
in 1896, the empire not only managed to maintain its independence but also 
to substantially expand its territory. Under the Amhara emperor Menelik II 
(who ruled from 1889 to 1913) in particular, the empire increased its mili-
tary power and engaged in a number of wars to bring neighboring regions 
under its control. Territories outside the historical center of the empire were 
brought under its rule by force. It was not a foreign colonial power as else-
where in Africa but the Orthodox Christian elite from the northern high-
lands that enforced the unification of the modern Ethiopian state and, as a 
result, gained privileged access to its institutions of power. In a word, the 
Ethiopian empire was enlarged with territories that, until then, were never 
associated with the Ethiopian state. Ethiopia was not a victim of the scramble 
for Africa, but an enthusiastic and active participant.
The rulers from the northern highlands succeeded more or less in integrating 
the highlands of the southern periphery (a part of nowadays Oromia and the 
southern region of the country) into the Ethiopian state. These conquered 
territories were administered by representatives of the political elites from 
Amhara and assimilated local elites, which also took possession of the most 
fertile lands. These territories, as was customary in the north, were adminis-
tered on the basis of a feudal structure. In the slipstream of these events, huge 
numbers of Amhara immigrants established themselves in these areas with 
the dissemination of Amhara culture as a consequence. The integration of 
the lowlands in the west and the east, mainly occupied by nomads, went be-
yond the (financial) reach of the empire. They primarily served as conquered 
lands and were left to their own devices. The Amhara elite especially looked 
down on the population of the western periphery. The Muslims living in the 
eastern lowlands were feared and despised at the same time by many Chris-
tian highlanders. The center monopolized power and took possession of the 
structures of the state, while the periphery was mainly excluded, and given 
only a marginal political and economic role. 
This process went hand-in-hand with the dissemination of the political cul-
ture as featured in the northern highlands. This political culture was verti-
cally organized and layered. Society was organized along strong hierarchical 
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lines, in which the socioeconomic and political status of every individual was 
clearly defined and as such understood. In this context, authority was abso-
lute. In Ethiopian political tradition, no distinction was made between gov-
ernment and state.
The concept of (political) opposition traditionally held a negative connota-
tion. The display of authority and its continuity constituted an important as-
pect of the enforcement of power in Ethiopia. Large segments of the pop-
ulation obeyed governments and state officials, simply because they were 
supposed to be in power. From a historical perspective, control over the Ethi-
opian state was strongly associated with this tradition, which also clearly left 
its traces in the present political culture. According to political scientist and 
Ethiopia expert Christopher Clapham, the main cause of the conflicts that 
have structurally influenced the formation of the Ethiopian state has been 
the incompatibility between the hierarchical and authoritarian concept of 
the state in line with the political culture in the northern highlands and the 
different ethnic, cultural, social, and economic interests, which could not be 
accommodated within this concept.45
The Orthodox Christian Church played an important role in the process of 
state formation. Since the fourth century state formation, Christianity and 
the institution of the Orthodox Church were closely intertwined. The Church 
provided ideological legitimacy to the ruler, who in turn rewarded the Church 
with land and accompanying privileges. The alleged threat of Islam, from the 
eighth century on, in the region consolidated the unity between church and 
state, which supported an increased centralization of power in the hands of 
the monarchy. 
Moreover, during the long rule of emperor Haile Selassie (1917-1974) Ethi-
opian statebuilding was closely linked to Amhara culture. The Orthodox 
Christian faith was actively propagated in other parts of Ethiopia. An Am-
hara ethnicity-defined political class, in which other elites were moderately 
assimilated, continued to be in charge. The state became further centralized 
and bureaucratized. Rebel groups in Tigray, Eritrea, and Ogaden were vio-
lently suppressed. The regime made an effort to modernize Ethiopia as well 
as maintain the feudal, absolutist character of the state – in vain, as became 
clear in 1974. Against this background, it is rather evident that the process of 
the formation of the Ethiopian state has been interpreted in different ways: 
45 C. Clapham, “Post-war Ethiopia: The trajectories of crisis,” in Review of African Political 
Economy 36:120 (2009), 181–192.
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For Ethiopian nationalists and in particular Christian highlanders, it has 
been a cause for pride, while those who have been integrated into the Ethio-
pian state by force, consider this process as a form of domestic colonialism. 
Derg
The student protests that intensified in the second half of the 1960s weak-
ened the empire. The fight against the feudal regime of Haile Selassie went 
hand-in-hand with a proliferation of political opposition movements, often 
Marxist-Leninist oriented. Rebellious military officers, however, dealt the fi-
nal blow to the crumbling regime. After a bloody internal political struggle, 
power ended up in the hands of the Derg under the leadership of colonel 
Mengistu Haile Mariam. What had started as broad-based resistance against 
autocratic rule turned eventually into a military dictatorship. The military 
regime adopted the Marxist-Leninist jargon of the leftist student movement, 
but simultaneously, and with a lot of violence, eliminated one by one the 
several competing student movements (“red terror”). The revolution of 1974 
also destroyed the material and ideological basis of the empire of Haile Se-
lassie. The close ties between church and state were abruptly terminated. The 
Derg abolished all feudal obligations, nationalized land, financial institutions, 
and private enterprises, and put agricultural production and markets under 
control of the state. 
Not only the “socialist” transformation of the society but also the numerous 
military campaigns against insurgent regions were the main features of the 
Derg. Supported by the Eastern Bloc, the Somali army, which had invaded the 
contested Ogaden region, was beaten. In addition, large-scale military oper-
ations were carried out against several regional rebel movements. This un-
compromising approach, the miserable circumstances under which the rural 
population had to live, in combination with the political terror led, in a num-
ber of regions, to the establishment of ethnically based rebel movements. 
Moreover, towards the end of the 1980s, the regime could no longer count 
on the support of the Soviet Union and its allies. In spite of massive military 
operations, the Derg failed to neutralize the rebel movements, in particular 
in the north of the country. 
The EPRDF in power
In 1991, the revolts in Eritrea and Tigray eventually overthrew the Mengistu 
regime. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) had already prepared 
itself for the fall of the Derg regime by establishing the Ethiopia People’s Revo-
lutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1989, a collaboration between a num-
ber of regional rebel movements. This coalition, which is still in power, con-
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sists, in addition to the TPLF, of the Amhara National Democratic Movement 
(ANDM), the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), and what 
later would become the Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic Movement 
(SEPDM). The ANDM emerged from that part of the revolutionary student 
movement that decided in the 1980s to collaborate with the TPLF. Although 
initially modest in size the organization gained importance after many Am-
hara prisoners of war joined the ANDM. In view of the active involvement of 
the TPLF in creating the organization, the ANDM initially found it difficult 
to be considered as an independent representative of Amhara. The same ap-
plied a fortiori to the OPDO. The OPDO was established in 1990 partly on 
the initiative of the TPLF and ANDM, and became a member of the EPRDF 
as well. Former ANDM members of Oromo origin constituted the first mem-
bers of the OPDO. Given the background of the establishment of the OPDO 
and the presence of a rival, the Oromo Liberation Front, the OPDO encoun-
tered problems as well while trying to build its own support base among the 
Oromo population. Finally, several Popular Democratic Organizations in the 
south of the country (supported by the EPRDF) were transformed into the 
SEPDM in 1994. It was quite clear from the beginning that the TPLF was the 
dominant party in this coalition. 
Figure 6.1
EPRDF coalition
After 30 years of civil war, the victor, the EPRDF, found a highly centralized 
and militarized country and a ravaged economy. In 1991, a transitional gov-
ernment was established under the leadership of the EPRDF. During that 
year, a “peace and democracy” conference adopted a transitional charter, 
which served as a temporary constitution. On the initiative of the EPRDF 
an interim Legislative was established in which many political organizations 
participated. The opposition that opposed the ethnically based regionaliza-
tion of the country or was considered a potential political rival was, however, 
not invited by the EPRDF. Parties that initially participated in the transition-
al government, but were in disagreement with the political positions of the 
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EPRDF or were not prepared to accept its leadership, were soon excluded 
from power as well. Almost immediately tensions arose between the Oromo 
Liberation Front and the EPRDF. Towards the end of 1993, the transition-
al government only consisted of the EPRD and a number of ethnic parties 
closely linked to the EPRDF. 
The EPRDF-led transitional government pushed for three major reforms: the 
introduction of a parliamentary democracy, liberalizing the economy, and 
federalization of Ethiopia along ethnic lines. These reforms featured prom-
inently in the constitution, which came into effect in 1995. The explicit rec-
ognition of ethnicity as an organizing political principle was especially quite 
remarkable. While in other African countries leaders distanced themselves, 
in any case officially, from ethnic politics, the new regime under the lead-
ership of Meles Zenawi explicitly took into account the ethnic diversity of 
Ethiopia. The ethnicity-based federal system introduced by the government 
signified a fundamental break with the past. The regions created along ethnic 
lines received wide-ranging powers including the right of secession. Earlier 
in 1993, Eritrea made use of this provision and became an independent state. 
From now on Ethiopia consisted of nine ethnicity-based, regional states and 
two federally administered cities (Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa). 
6.2 Elections46
In the 1990s, the EPRDF faced opposition on two fronts: on the one hand, 
a number of regional parties and former rebel movements that were of 
the opinion that the type of federalism introduced by the EPRDF was just 
a divide-and-rule tactic to be able to remain in power and, on the other, a 
pan-Ethiopian nationalist tendency, which as a matter of principle opposed 
ethnic federalism and the secession of Eritrea. Initially the opposition boy-
cotted the political process, as was the case during the referendum of 1994 
and the parliamentary elections in 1995. In 2000, the opposition decided to 
participate again in the election but was unable to threaten the position of 
the EPRDF. 
46 Ethiopia does not have a presidential system like the other countries under review. The 
prime minister, appointed by parliament has the main executive powers. The presidency is ba-
sically of a ceremonial nature.
Koper ASC.indd   138 28-11-18   16:26
526893-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 3-12-2018 PDF page: 139
139
Table 6.1
Results 1995 national elections in Ethiopia
Party/[Coalition] Number of Seats (548)*
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
[EPRDF]
483
Independents 08
Others 46
Unconfirmed 11
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
Table 6.2
Results 2000 national elections in Ethiopia
Party/[Coalition] Number of Seats (547)
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
[EPRDF]
■ Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO)
■ Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM)
■ Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic  Movement 
(SEPDM)
■ Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)
481
 
183
146
112
40
EPRDF-Affiliated Parties 37
Others 16
Independents 13
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
Thanks to the national reputation and dominance of the EPRDF and the lim-
ited geographic appeal of a number of only regionally organized opposition 
parties, the EPRDF initially did not face serious competition. This changed 
during the 2005 elections. The two most important opposition coalitions 
proved to be a real political threat to the EPRDF. The Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy (CUD) could count on the support of large parts of the urban 
population, the higher educated, and the Amhara rural population. The Unit-
ed Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) was considered the voice of oppo-
nents of the regime from Oromia and the south of the country, in particular. 
The popularity of the opposition appeared to be more the result of a protest 
against the ruling party than because of its political program. Parts of the 
population were concerned about the “loss” of Eritrea, ethnic federalism, and 
the authoritarian manner in which the EPRDF governed the country. The 
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ANDM, especially, seemed to be unable to counter these grievances in Am-
hara, as put forward by the CUD. Moreover, the war against Eritrea stirred 
up nationalist sentiments in society. Together with the weakening of the au-
thority of the regime as a result of the split within the TPLF about the conflict 
with Eritrea, the opposition was granted new political legitimacy. 
Illustration 6.1
Demonstration by political opposition in 2005
On the basis of the disputed (by the opposition) outcome, the EPRDF and al-
lied parties won 371 seats in parliament (68 percent), the CUD 109 seats, and 
the UEDF 52. The CUD constituted the biggest political threat, especially in 
Addis Ababa, where the coalition gained an absolute majority. However, the 
opposition refused to take over the administration of the city and withdrew 
from the political process in order to protest against alleged vote rigging, 
intimidation by the EPRDF, and the use of force against its political leaders. 
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Table 6.3
Results 2005 national elections in Ethiopia
Party/[Coalition] Number of Seats (547)
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
[EPRDF]
327
Coalition for Unity and Democracy [CUD] 109
United Ethiopian Democratic Forces [UEDF] 52
Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM) 11
Benishangul-Gumuz People’s Democratic Unity Front 
(BGPDUF)
08
Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP) 08
Gambela People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM) 03
Sheko and Mezenger People’s Democratic Unity Or-
ganization (SMPDUO)
01
Harari National League (HNL) 01
Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP) 23
Argoba National Democratic Organization (ANDO) 01
Independent 01
Vacant 02
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
The 2005 elections turned out to be a “historical watershed.” The EPRDF saw 
the unexpected popularity of the opposition as an existential threat to its 
position. It had anticipated electoral losses in the cities but not in the coun-
tryside, in particular in Amhara. The EPRDF chose to consider all political 
protests as law-and-order problems and suppressed these with a great deal of 
force. The opposition was being neutralized in a number of ways. Parliament 
adopted new laws to make life difficult for the opposition. In addition, the 
EPRDF reorganized itself and embarked on an expansion of the coalition na-
tionwide. EPRDF membership increased from 700,000 in 2005 to 6.5 million 
in 2013, with the majority being farmers.  
The various opposition parties faced serious internal divisions. As a conse-
quence of the pressure by the EPRDF and these internal differences of opin-
ion, the opposition fell apart after 2005. It took part in the 2010 elections, 
however, without having addressed these disagreements. Divided, intimi-
dated, and badly organized, the opposition was unable to pose an electoral 
threat to the EPRDF in 2010. The coalition was well prepared and left nothing 
to chance, especially in the rural areas. 
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Table 6.4
Results 2010 national elections in Ethiopia
Party/[Coalition] Number of Seats (547)
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
[EPRDF]
499
Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP) 24
Benishangul-Gumuz People’s Democratic Party (BGP-
DP)
9
Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP) 8
Gambela People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM) 3
Argoba People’s Democratic Organization (APDO) 1
Harari National League (HNL) 1
Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum [MEDREK] 1
Independent 1
Source: africanelections.tripod.com
In spite of the legalization of political opposition in 1991, the same coali-
tion of political parties has dominated the political landscape since then. 
The EPRDF won the elections in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 and has been 
in charge of the federal government during this period. The four regional 
EPRDF parties have been administering the four most important regions 
of the country; the five other regions were governed by parties allied to the 
EPRDF. Exclusion and polarized politics were the main features of the polit-
ical debate. Government and opposition operated on the basis of very rigid 
and inflexible positions, from which they opposed each other, instead of hav-
ing a genuine political dialogue. 
With the exception of 2005, the political opposition was unable to threat-
en the political dominance of the EPRDF. Since 1991, hundreds of political 
parties have been established in Ethiopia. Most of them were small, found 
it hard to cooperate among themselves, and disappeared again very quickly. 
The landscape of political parties consisted, first of all, of officially registered 
parties, with the majority refusing to participate in the electoral process until 
2000. Furthermore, political organizations agitating against the regime from 
abroad among which groups advocating the use of force to remove the gov-
ernment; these groups enjoyed support among parts of the diaspora. The 
nature of the opposition against the regime also differed. Some parties had 
a specific ethnic background; others had a multi-ethnic base. From an ide-
ological point of view the latter group often presented itself as advocates of 
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political liberalism and individual citizen’s rights. Most of the parties based 
on ethnicity emphasized collective rights along ethnic lines. 
As far as the opposition is concerned, one can distinguish two phases since 
1991. Until 2000, the majority preferred not to participate in elections, not 
only as a protest against the absence of a level playing field but even more so 
as part of an effort to deny legitimacy to the political process as a whole. The 
opposition was unwilling to accept the new constitution and EPRDF rule. 
From 2000, however, opposition parties did participate in national and re-
gional elections. This change in tactics seemed to have been influenced by 
the fear that the electoral board would no longer recognize these parties. 
Most of the time, coalitions of opposition parties proved short-lived. Rele-
vant factors in this context involved the intimidating political climate and 
obstruction by the EPRDF, a collaboration, based more on a collective dislike 
of the regime than on a common agenda, the radical political positions of 
parts of the diaspora, and lack of internal party democracy and of genuine 
efforts to reach consensus.
Illustration 6.2
2010 elections in Ethiopia
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6.3 Short overview of economic developments
The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000) meant a serious setback 
for the economic recovery of the country, which had begun to kick off after 
many years of civil war and signified the start of a period in which Ethiopia 
embarked on new economic policies. It was after the split within the TPLF 
that the EPRDF explicitly decided that the Ethiopian version of the develop-
mental state was the most suitable model for the development of a country 
like Ethiopia. In this model, the state was to play an important role in pushing 
the economy forward. The results were impressive. In the period 2004-2011 
Ethiopia witnessed an average growth of more than 10 percent. Poverty was 
reduced in rural as well as urban areas. However, in its Country Partnership 
Strategy, the World Bank identified the following main challenges in this con-
text: maintaining macro-economic stability, the still very high poverty levels, 
dependence on food aid, the low quality of basic social services, and the lim-
ited capacity of the public sector.47 
The Ethiopian developmental model relied heavily on large government in-
vestments (as in Asia), but was faced with a very low savings ratio and limit-
ed availability of local resources to finance these investments (unlike Asia). 
To sustain the high economic growth, the government, in the opinion of the 
World Bank, should have opened up more space in the economy for the na-
tional and international private sector. Given its size, agriculture remained 
the backbone of the economy and the main source of economic growth, since 
the majority of the Ethiopian population lived in the countryside. Although 
Ethiopia experienced high economic growth and achieved impressive results 
in the area of poverty reduction, the economic transformation, held so dear 
by the EPRDF, lagged behind.  As in other African countries, the services sec-
tor was the main source of economic growth. 
The basis for the developmental agenda of the EPRDF was the Growth and 
Transformation Plan 2011-2015 (GTP I). The main objective of GTP I was to 
see to it that Ethiopia reached the status of a (lower) middle-income country 
by 2025. Within this context, the following ambitious goals were formulated: 
an average GDP growth of 11 percent per year within a stable macroeco-
nomic framework; achieving the Millennium Development Goals in the so-
cial sectors, in particular, education and health; and the realization of a sta-
ble and democratic state. The GTP put great emphasis on economic growth 
47 “Country partnership strategy for the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,” World 
Bank (Washington, 2012)
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and creating jobs, in particular, in modern agriculture and industry. During 
a transition period, special attention was given to supporting areas of the 
country with chronic food shortages. 
Illustration 6.3
Growth and Transformation Plan
The rationale behind the Ethiopian model of development 
The EPRDF explicitly rejected the notion that the free market was the ideal 
mechanism to increase production and to allocate resources for the benefit 
of economic transformation. Such “neoliberal” economic policies would only 
serve the interests of the non-productive sectors of the economy. Because of 
the numerous market distortions in development countries, the market in 
the opinion of the EPRDF would not be able to produce accelerated econom-
ic growth. This was certainly the case in Ethiopia, which, in comparison with 
other countries, scarcely had any comparative advantage, and where patron-
age and the unwillingness to create added value dominated the private sector. 
Under these circumstances, market forces alone did not offer an appropriate 
solution. What was needed was a strong activist state that could operate in-
dependently from the private sector and centralize the necessary resources 
for economic development. Therefore, the government took on a leading ini-
tiating and supervisory role in facilitating and stimulating economic growth. 
Of crucial importance in the eyes of the EPRDF was a government that had 
the will and the power to discipline the market and the private sector in such 
a manner that economic transformation could be enforced. For that, a pri-
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vate sector was needed that focused on creating added value in industries 
and services instead of rent seeking. This term has, in the Ethiopian context, 
a clearly negative connotation. Such an interpretation had far-reaching im-
plications for the private sector. This sector needed to be explicitly coached 
and encouraged in order to contribute actively to economic development. 
Only in this manner could the private sector make a constructive contribu-
tion, complementary to that of the government. The dominant position of 
the government in the economy would continue until the private sector had 
developed sufficiently to be able to take the lead. It goes without saying that 
this long-term vision on the part of the Ethiopian political leadership con-
cerning the development of the country also had political ramifications.
The so-called “endowment” companies played an important role in this un-
dertaking. Following the example of Tigray, where the Endowment Fund for 
the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT) was active, similar outfits were es-
tablished in other regions. They financed or facilitated investment in areas 
where there was insufficient interest on the part of the private sector. Orig-
inally the starting capital consisted of funds made available by the EPRDF 
coalition parties after having seized power. Although formally no ties existed 
between the EPRDF and these companies, a number of EPRDF politicians 
were intimately involved in these enterprises, which focused in particular 
on politically sanctioned commercial activities. In addition, the government 
had a number of state enterprises at its disposal to push the economy in the 
required direction. At the same time, some important economic sectors were 
excluded from privatization, such as the financial sector, telecommunication, 
power, and the airlines. The regime maintained close ties with the MIDROC 
business conglomerate of Mohamed Al Amoudi (a businessman and billion-
aire of Saudi-Ethiopian origin), which had interests in various sectors of the 
Ethiopian economy. 
In spite of all the efforts of the EPRDF regime to bring about structural trans-
formation of the Ethiopian economy, in addition to economic growth and 
poverty reduction, the reality is that Ethiopia is still very much at the begin-
ning of this process. Ethiopia occupies the seventeenth place in the economic 
transformation index list of 21 African countries. The negative effects of an 
inherited centralized economic system, the de facto discouragement of pri-
vate sector development and of the long civil war during the Derg regime, are 
still very much felt in Ethiopian society.
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6.4 Response of the political elite
Political cohesion
After coming to power in 1991, the main priorities of the EPRDF were to 
democratize the country, to solve the “national question.” and to fight poverty 
and underdevelopment. The Ethiopian state was thoroughly reorganized. A 
formal multiparty system was introduced, elections were held, a new ethnic-
ity-based administrative system was introduced, the bureaucracy was decen-
tralized, and several sectors of the economy were privatized. The manner in 
which these reforms were implemented had important consequences for the 
composition and cooperation among the political elites. A number of inter-
acting factors were at play: the interpretation by the regime of the concept 
of revolutionary democracy, the role of and relationship between party and 
state as regards the development of the country, the implications of the im-
plementation of ethnic federalism, the role of the TPLF in the political arena, 
the personality of (the late) Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, and a certain con-
vergence of existing political traditions in Ethiopia and the political ideology 
of the EPRDF. 
Revolutionary democracy
Before coming to power, The TPLF/EPRDF already put forward the notion 
of revolutionary democracy. The notion of revolutionary democracy was de-
rived from Lenin’s concept of proletarian democracy, meant as a revolution-
ary equivalent of “parliamentary bourgeois democracy.” The application of 
this concept to developing countries where non-capitalist governments and 
movements were in power (but where no socialist revolution had taken place 
yet) became known as revolutionary democracy. 
Despite the fact that the political system introduced by the EPRDF after 1991 
had the appearance of a liberal parliamentary democracy, the revolutionary 
democracy philosophy was not abandoned. After the electoral upheaval of 
2005, the concept was revitalized as part of a renewed emphasis by the party 
on ideology. Although it was not always very clear what was meant by rev-
olutionary democracy, the concept was once again an important reference 
for the EPRDF. The version adapted to the Ethiopian context emphasized the 
collective interests and rights of the poor masses, in the past oppressed and 
primarily living in the countryside, and of the various ethnic minorities. It fo-
cused on the crucial importance of inclusive economic development. In the 
opinion of the EPRDF granting rights on the basis of ethnicity and political 
power to ethnic parties in the new regions constituted an important compo-
nent of this concept.
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According to this view, a liberal democracy as such would jeopardize the inter-
ests of the majority of the population, since it would lead to a rapid accumu-
lation of wealth by competing rent seeking elites at the expense of the (poor) 
population. In the eyes of the EPRDF, there are two fundamental differences 
between liberal and revolutionary democracy: the first emphasizes individual 
rights and representation, while the second promotes collective rights and di-
rect political participation (by means of mass organizations), in short, an inter-
pretation which is rather diferent from the Western view and which cannot be 
easily aligned to the existing parliamentary system in Ethiopia. 
In the opinion of the EPRDF, the relevance of this concept is limited by time. 
Economic growth and development will eventually result in the formation of 
clearly defined groups in society with different socioeconomic interests and 
will provide the basis for a functioning liberal “Western” democracy.48 In the 
ideological rhetoric of the EPRDF, the necessity of a productive, well-edu-
cated middle class is emphasized, not only because of its importance for the 
development of the economy but also to underpin the eventual transition 
towards a competitive, liberal democracy. 
But that has not been the case as yet. Such a middle class does not exist in 
Ethiopia. In the opinion of the EPRDF, economic growth and transformation 
in the present phase of development of the country can only be sustained 
and be in the interest of the majority of the population, if the principles of 
revolutionary democracy are applied as well. An unregulated introduction 
of a competitive political system would only be misused by rich elites and 
lead to exploitation of the poor. According to the EPRDF, revolutionary de-
mocracy under the leadership of a vanguard party, in combination with the 
developmental state, is the only democratic option under the present cir-
cumstances. The EPRDF considers itself to be the party or political coalition 
best equipped to implement this agenda. Following the example of the TPLF, 
the parties that are members of the EPRDF are organized on the basis of the 
classic Leninist principle of a vanguard party and are established along de-
mocratic-centralist lines.
The result was a rather hybrid political system. Although the EPRDF opted 
in the early 1990s for a pluralist political system and a parliamentary de-
mocracy, the article of faith with regard to revolutionary democracy and the 
48 These arguments show similarities with the rationale behind the Ugandan Movement sys-
tem, which is not surprising taking into account – to a certain extent – the common ideological 
background of NRM and TPLF when they were still operating as resistance movements. 
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need of a vanguard party, which should be in charge of the political process, 
simultaneously remained equally valid. Apart from the ideological dimen-
sion, the unexpected outcome of the 2005 elections had also something to do 
with this. Against this background, elections in the eyes of the EPRDF might 
be a necessary but certainly not an adequate condition for the success of the 
democratization process in Ethiopia. 
Party and state
Roughly three phases can be distinguished in the relationship between state 
and party. The period 1991-2001 showed two separate power structures: state 
and party. The relationship between the two came under pressure during the 
war with Eritrea. A number of leading member of the TPLF (the most impor-
tant party within the EPRDF coalition) opposed the course vis-à-vis Eritrea 
as set out by prime minister Meles Zenawi (also TPLF). The outcome of this 
internal TPLF party struggle brought about a shift of power from the party to 
state institutions. The emphasis from now on was on building the capacity of 
state institutions. The possibility for the party to make autonomous decisions 
became more restricted. Priority was given to strengthening of the capacity 
of politically active party members within the government bureaucracy. Af-
ter the electoral upset in 2005, the emphasis shifted back again to the further 
development of the party as separate entity and as the driving force behind 
the Ethiopian development model: “The ruling party’s self-conceptualisation 
is that it ‘deals’ with the software of developmental change, whilst the govern-
ment deals with the ‘hardware.’”49 
The blending of party and state came with a price. It is clear that the EPRDF 
exercised strong influence on the Executive. Not only did the party deter-
mine to a large extent the policies of the government but it also had an im-
portant say in the appointment of high-ranking officials. The absence of any 
separation between party and state meant that Ethiopian bureaucrats be-
came highly politicized. Party membership and loyalty to the EPRDF became 
important conditions for making a career for oneself. This created a prob-
lem. In view of the decisive role given to the government and its institutions 
in the Ethiopian development model, a competent and, to a certain extent, 
independent state bureaucracy is necessary to make the model work. The 
scale and the frequency of political appointments in all sectors of the state, in 
tandem with the traditional hierarchical political culture, did not particularly 
contribute to a well-equipped bureaucracy.
49 S. Vaughan, M. Gebremichael, ‘Ethiopia: Country Level study’. Report for the European 
 Union. 2014. xii.
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Ethnic federalism 
According to the constitution, Ethiopia is a federal state with far-reaching 
powers for the regions. The constitution recognizes fully the identity of each 
ethnic group, including language and culture. The federal administrative or-
ganization of the state, based on ethnicity, allowed for the rise of new region-
al elites. For the first time in the history of Ethiopia, political and bureaucrat-
ic appointments went to representatives of local ethnic population groups 
on a large scale. In practice, these rights and powers were curtailed. Local 
political elites were, at the same time, an integral part of the existing political 
system, in which all regions were governed by parties that were also members 
of the EPRDF coalition or closely linked to it. Moreover, the EPRDF itself 
was structured in a very centralist manner. Last but not least, the careers of 
many leaders of the regional parties in power were based and depended on 
personal relationships with their EPRDF mentors in the capital. The federal 
government was therefore still capable of greatly influencing the policies of 
the regions and imposing uniform policies, procedures, and rules. In reality, 
all the important decisions of a political nature were taken at the central, fed-
eral level, and subsequently via the different parties imposed on the regions. 
In such a context, in which the same parties were in charge at a central as 
well as a regional level, there was hardly any space for political pluralism at 
the local level. 
Other factors were also at play that saw to it that devolution of power was 
rather limited. The constitution stipulates that the policies of the regional 
states should be in line with federal norms and principles. In addition, the 
capacity at the regional level to be able to make autonomous decisions was 
still underdeveloped. That was especially the case in regions in the periphery 
of Ethiopia like Somali, Afar, Gambella, and Benishangul Gumuz. The center 
exercised control over most of the financial resources of the regions as well 
(federal subsidies). Behind the façade of a formally highly decentralized ad-
ministrative structure was hidden a less visible but very effective oversight 
by the central authorities. In spite of the nominal decentralization of power 
to the regional and local authorities, the federal state remained powerful and 
very much in charge.
The role of the TPLF and of Meles Zenawi 
No doubt the TPLF was the most important party within the EPRDF coa-
lition. The TPLF (and its slipstream the EPRDF) had beaten the Derg and 
decided the civil war in its favor. The TPLF was the driving force behind the 
establishment of similar parties in other regions of Ethiopia. The founder of 
the Ethiopan state in its present shape and prime minister (until his death in 
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2012) was Meles Zenawi, who was the political leader of the TPLF as well. 
Opinions differ whether or not the TPLF is still the completely dominating 
party within the coalition as was the case during the first years of the regime. 
The fact that political discussions and decision-making within the EPRDF 
takes place exclusively behind closed doors makes it difficult to answer this 
question. It is clear, however, that the political decisions taken within the 
TPLF were still, to a great extent, influencing internal political events in Ethi-
opia as a whole. 
From a historical point of view, the rift within the TPLF central committee 
in 2001 was of crucial importance for the political and economic direction of 
Ethiopia. Initially the disagreements concerned Ethiopia’s position towards 
Eritrea. A number of senior TPLF leaders blamed Prime Minister and TPLF 
chairman Meles Zenawi for having been insufficiently assertive prior to and 
during the war with Eritrea. In addition and perhaps more importantly, opin-
ions differed on the proper development strategy for Ethiopia. Eventually, 
Meles Zenawi and his supporters gained the upper hand. An internal party 
cleansing and a shift in power in favor of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and 
the political institutions in Addis Ababa followed, at the expense of the TPLF 
political headquarters in Mekelle (capital of Tigray). A number of TPLF vet-
erans had to step down. Meles Zenawi emerged from this political crisis as 
the undisputed leader of the TPLF. 
Illustration 6.4
Meles Zenawi
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This outcome made possible the implementation of a development strate-
gy, which is still valid today. The doctrine of government-led development 
towards developmental capitalism was linked to the vanguard role of the 
EPRDF. The political leadership, albeit not always visible, also changed some-
what in character. Together with the dominant position of Prime Minister 
and TPLF leader Meles Zenawi, a more collective-oriented leadership was 
established with a more important role for the other EPRDF partners in the 
decision-making process than before. This possibly facilitated the political 
continuity after the death of Meles Zenawi. Paradoxically, the replacement of 
a number of disproportionately powerful TPLF veterans by a more balanced 
EPRDF leadership came about due to the evergrowing power of the TPLF 
chairman.
Not only as a politician but also from a policy perspective, Meles Zenawi 
left his mark on Ethiopia. The Prime Minister never finished his dissertation 
“African development: Dead ends and new beginnings,” but a draft has been 
preserved.50 It constitutes the justification of and a blueprint for the demo-
cratic developmental state, as has been put in place in Ethiopia. According to 
Zenawi, the political process determines the extent of economic transforma-
tion in developing countries. The political forces that are capable and willing 
to implement this transformation need to be assured of a longer period in 
power than can usually be offered by the limited time scale of an election 
cycle. At the same time, the state, in the opinion of Meles Zenawi, has to be 
“democratic.” In view of the attractiveness of democracy to the population, 
the international context, and especially the existing ethnic divisions, there 
is, according to Zenawi, no future for African countries without a certain 
democratic legitimacy. 
The most likely scenario for a state that aims to be developmental as well as 
democratic is a political settlement with a dominant political party or coa-
lition. Initially the private sector cannot be a part of such a coalition, as it 
has to be sufficiently independent to be able to punish the “non-productive” 
behavior of the private sector and reward the creation of added value. The 
basis of such a coalition must be initially rural in nature. The majority of the 
population lives in the countryside and has, according to Zenawi, nothing 
much to gain from patronage and rent seeking. That is how the necessary 
continuity can be guaranteed. The political implications are clear: For the 
successful economic development of Ethiopia, representatives of the political 
50 http://cgt.columbia.edu/files/conferences/Zenawi_Dead_Ends_and_New_Beginnings.pdf 
(2012).
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class, who have the will and the capacity to implement this agenda, should 
stay in power for a substantial period of time. The dominant position of the 
EPRDF in Ethiopian politics had been legitimized. 
Continuity and change 
The seizure of power by the EPRDF in 1991 signified a radical break with the 
past. At the same time there was a certain historical continuity as well in the 
manner in which (political) power was exercised. Traditionally in the political 
culture of the Ethiopian highlands, great importance was attached to a gov-
ernment that could guarantee stability, efficient administration, and united, 
hierarchical leadership. The modus operandi of the EPRDF fitted well within 
this tradition. In addition to the political culture in Ethiopia, the Leninist 
ideological legacy emphasizing the leading role of a vanguard party played 
an important role. Against this background, the concept of the Ethiopian de-
velopment model was familiar territory: The importance placed, particularly 
in the highlands, on order and stability, based on hierarchy and authority, sat 
well with an omnipresent and directive government (an essential component 
of the promoted model of development), which was rather unique compared 
with other African countries (perhaps with the partial exception of Rwanda). 
Subsequently this “holistic” understanding of authority led to a blurring of 
the institutional distinction between state, government, and party. 
One could also recognize a certain continuity in comparison to the Derg 
regime: top-down ideology-driven policymaking, a marginal role for inde-
pendent media, civil society organizations, human rights groups, and trade 
unions, and the overlap between party and government institutions. Reflect-
ing on the 2005 elections, the Dutch Ethiopia specialist Jan Abbink noted: 
“The 2005 elections and their aftermath thus revealed major constraints in 
Ethiopia’s political system, underlining that after the regimes of Emperor 
Haile Selassie (1930-74) and the military leader Mengistu (1974-91), central-
ist authoritarianism is not gone but perhaps is being reinvented in a new 
form.”51 The question whether this type of exercise of power constitutes an 
impediment in the present Ethiopian development context will be addressed 
later in this book.
The political development, as explained above, of course also created losers. 
The regime, in power since 1991, has a long-term agenda regarding the de-
velopment of the country. The EPRDF considers itself as the only party capa-
51 J. Abbink, “Discomfiture of democracy? The 2005 election crisis in Ethiopia and its after-
math,” African Affairs 105:419 (2006), 174.
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ble of actually implementing this agenda. After the electoral shock in 2005, 
the regime consolidated its power to such an extent that a repetition of the 
uncertainty about election outcomes seemed unlikely. That part of the Ethi-
opian elite that was represented by the opposition remained excluded from 
political power during the electoral cycles in the period under review. 
The development model introduced by the EPRDF imposed restrictions an-
yway on groups within Ethiopian society having political aspirations. In its 
2012 Country Partnership Strategy for Ethiopia, the World Bank summariz-
es the situation as follows: “EPRDF’s dominance has allowed it to establish 
a strongly interventionist ‘developmental state’ system, which is often per-
ceived as limiting the space and role of non-government social, political and 
economic actors in economic growth, promotion of liberal democracy and 
pluralism. These include non-governmental organizations and civil society 
organizations, whose role is limited largely to service delivery under recent 
legislation; private media outlets, whose activities are also regulated by strict 
legislation and a tough judicial approach to editorial freedom; and private 
sector investors, who often also feel their interests are neglected by a govern-
ment determined to curb what it sees as anti-development ‘rent-seeking.’”52 
The issue of integration (or the lack thereof ) of the Muslim population in 
the political system is burdened with history. Until the fall of the empire in 
1974, the Orthodox Christian faith was the official religion of the state. Islam 
entered the country in the seventh century, its expansion started in the tenth 
century. Generally speaking, the Orthodox Christian elite prevailed over the 
Muslim elite within a context of pragmatic co-existence. Initially the major-
ity of Muslims were not part of the Ethiopian state but lived in the semi-au-
tonomous regions in the east of what became later Ethiopia. The separation 
between church and state, as stipulated in the 1995 constitution, was to the 
advantage of the Muslim (and Protestant) population. The strategy by the 
EPRDF to grant religious freedom to all denominations was prompted by 
its experiences of the deeply religious population in the rural areas during 
the rebellion against the Derg. On the other hand, recognition of religious 
diversity in Ethiopia fitted in with the EPRDF concept of ethno-regional fed-
eralism. The dominant position of the Orthodox Church in Ethiopian society 
was brought to an end. The position of Muslims, from a political as well as an 
economic perspective, improved considerably. A growing number of Mus-
52 World Bank, “Country partnership strategy for the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethio-
pia” (Washington, 2012), 2.
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lims held government and public functions, and Muslims were represented 
at all party and state levels. 
Simultaneously the EPRDF pursued a consistent policy to stop religion or 
religious organizations from becoming a vehicle for mobilizing anti-EPRDF 
sentiments. In the second half of the 1990s, the government became increas-
ingly preoccupied with the trend among certain groups of Ethiopian Muslims 
towards religious activism, which was interpreted as politicizing Islam in 
Ethiopia. The 9/11 attacks, the increasing geopolitical tensions in the region, 
and the rise of radical Islamic groups in neighboring Somalia contributed to 
the worries. In the opinion of the government, the political radicalization 
among certain groups took root to such an extent that it felt obliged to take 
action. A number of Islamic organizations were abolished. The government 
imposed restrictions on others. The Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Coun-
cil (EIASC), strongly under the influence of the government, became the sole 
representative of all Muslims in Ethiopia. The perceived preference given by 
the government to Christians, the intervention in Somalia, the interference 
by the government in internal Muslim affairs, in particular with regard to the 
EIASC, resulted in a more critical stance of parts of the Muslim population 
towards the EPRDF than previously had been the case. As a consequence, 
new tensions entered the present political system, which might have implica-
tions in the long-term for the tenability of the existing settlement.  
The tenability of the present coalition
To what extent has the EPRDF coalition, in power since 1991, succeeded in 
establishing a sufficiently broad political base to implement its long-term de-
velopment agenda? According to Christopher Clapham in an article in 2009, 
this coalition, with its roots in the local revolt in Tigray against the Derg, 
has failed in this respect.53 He put forward the following arguments: disa-
greements within the regime itself, the opposition in the big cities as well as 
among Ethiopian nationalists, the wish of several “nationalities” for greater 
autonomy, and the problems related to the many conflicts in the Horn of Af-
rica. Other authors point to the lack of “ethnic” legitimacy or of an electoral 
mandate. 
However, the following observations should be added. In spite of the crisis 
within the dominant party (TPLF) of the coalition in 2001 and the unexpect-
ed strong performance during the 2005 elections, the political base of EPRDF 
53 C. Clapham, “Post-war Ethiopia: The trajectories of crisis,” Review of African Political Econ-
omy, 36:120 (2009), 181–192.
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coalition was solid enough not only to remain in power since 1991 but also to 
implement an ambitious development program and mobilize the necessary 
resources. 
The death of the undisputed leader of the country, Meles Zenawi, in 2012 did 
not alter that either. The chaos after his death, expected by many, failed to 
happen. Apart from the strong economic growth and the spectacular reduc-
tion of poverty in Ethiopia, the successful institutionalization of the party or-
ganization might be part of the explanation. After the 2010 elections, which 
confirmed the dominance of the EPRDF, the party oversaw a process of grad-
ual resignation of a number of political veterans and the entry of a new gen-
eration of leaders taking office, who constituted a more ethnically balanced 
representation. It appeared that the EPRDF leadership were fully aware of the 
deteriorating health situation of the prime minister and prepared a smooth 
transition. The successor of Meles Zenawi as prime minister, Hailemariam 
Desalegn, originated from the south, while the three deputy prime ministers 
represented each a member of the EPRDF coalition and therefore a region. 
Many considered Hailemariam to be a compromise candidate (a Protestant 
from the south) who did not pose a threat to the other factions within the 
EPRDF. 
The political culture in Ethiopia, which attaches great importance to a strong 
government, the inclusion of regional elites, the control over government 
institutions, and the internal divisions among the excluded part of the polit-
ical elite, all contributed to the consolidation of the existing political settle-
ment. The ruling coalition did not seem to base its legitimacy primarily on 
its electoral mandate. The way in which the election victories were normally 
achieved must have been noted by every Ethiopian citizen. Preferably, for 
purposes of legitimacy, reference was made to the socioeconomic progress in 
recent years. As indicated earlier, the ideological justification for legitimizing 
the regime in this manner was based on the conviction that, according the 
principles of revolutionary democracy, the EPRDF as vanguard party is best 
equipped to lead and shape the development of Ethiopia.54 
54  See also the Post Scriptum at the end of this chapter.
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Ethnic and regional dimensions
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Figure 6.2
Ethnic groups Ethiopia
Ethiopia has a population of more than 90 million people and more than 70 
ethnic groups. Approximately 62 percent of the population consists only of 
two ethnic groups: Oromo (33 million) and Amhara (26 million). Somali (6 
million) and Tigray (6 million) together constitute 12 percent of the popula-
tion. The rest of the population is responsible for the big ethnic diversity of 
the country. 
The EPRDF opted for a completely different approach than its predecessors 
(and elsewhere in Africa) for addressing the question of ethnic diversity. Ethi-
opia was transformed into a federation of different, ethnicity-based regions, 
each with its own government and the right to self-determination, including 
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the right to succession. Ethnic diversity was accepted as a political fact and 
applied to the administrative organization of the country and to government 
policies. Unique in Africa, ethnicity became the explicit organizing principle 
of the state. In accordance with the constitution adopted in 1995, Ethiopia 
consists of nine, ethnicity-based regional states: Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, 
Southern Nations, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Harar, and Afar. 
These states are very heterogeneous. For instance, the federation consists of 
relatively densely populated regions such as Oromia and Amhara as well as 
sparsely populated and underdeveloped areas like Gambella and Somali. 
This remarkable policy appeared to be based on three main considerations. 
The military victory and the very existence of the TPLF were partly due to 
the mobilization of ethnic sentiments. Second, during the final years of the 
regime of Haile Selassie and afterwards the Derg, the “national question” had 
been identified by the student movement in particular as one of the main 
causes for Ethiopia’s problems. Finally, in order to beat the Derg, the TPLF 
deemed it necessary to work together with other regional rebel movements 
and to formulate a common political agenda. Instead of a strong centralized 
state, as was the case in the past, Ethiopia became a federation based on eth-
nicity. The multi-ethnic state replaced the Ethiopian unitary state, allegedly 
dominated by Amhara highlanders. It was an effort to put an end once and 
for all to the domination by one specific population group and to the many 
regional conflicts affecting Ethiopia during the regimes of Haile Selassie and 
the Derg. This approach also allowed for the secession of Eritrea.
Furthermore, from a political point of view, this approach was understand-
able: How could the victor in the civil war (TPLF), representing only a rel-
atively small ethnic minority, rule a huge and diverse country and establish 
a new political order without forming an alliance with other ethnic groups? 
Moreover, such an approach would offer the new rulers the opportunity to 
attract to their side other, until then oppressed minorities. In short, the use 
of ethnic mobilization had an ideological as well as a political background. 
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Illustration 6.5
Ethnic diversity in Ethiopia
The reality of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia was a bit more ambiguous. A 
number of phases can be identified in the development of this federal ex-
periment. The main feature of the period 1991-2000 was the establishment 
of stability after thirty years of civil war. During this period the transition 
towards a federally organized state was initiated. The war with Eritrea and 
the internal TPLF power struggle resulted in 2002-2003 in a change in policy 
direction within the TPLF and at a national level. Subsequently in 2003-2005, 
the EPRDF expanded its support base by integrating new regions into its 
network. From 2005 on, the concept of the developmental state became the 
main policy for the country emphasizing national development and projects, 
with accompanying powers for the federal government. 
Opponents of the EPRDF regime regarded ethnic federalism as an effort to 
protect the interests of the TPLF clique from Tigray. Behind the scenes, the 
TPLF was still pulling the strings and dominated the other regional EPRDF 
parties. The promised autonomy just did not materialize. Depending on their 
political background, parts of the opposition blamed the EPRDF for destroy-
ing the unity of the Ethiopian nation or refusing to allow for meaningful po-
litical competition by other parties that claimed to be more authentic repre-
sentatives of the population groups in question. 
The alleged political dominance of the TPLF and therefore Tigray within the 
EPRDF was an ongoing topic of discussion within (although not too openly) 
and outside Ethiopia, especially among the diaspora. In addition, in more 
academically oriented circles, it has been pointed out that the EPRDF regime 
has admittedly achieved impressive results in term of development, but this 
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has not translated into genuine legitimacy among a substantial part of the 
population due to the ethnic bias of the regime. Since all important political 
discussions and decision-making within the EPRDF take place behind closed 
doors, it almost impossible to appropriately assess the extent to which the 
TPLF continue to run the show within the EPRDF. What is clear is that, dur-
ing the period under review, TPLF members were very well represented at 
the highest federal levels, in particular in the armed forces, the intelligence 
services, and the (semi-) public economic sector. 
The manner in which the EPRDF conceptualized the notion of ethnicity and 
converted it into policy was strongly influenced by the Marxist-Leninist tra-
dition in this area, especially Stalin’s interpretation of the “national question.” 
Two principles, at odds with each other, figured prominently in this approach. 
On the one hand, the conviction that communities could be mobilized and 
involved in their own political development more effectively if the members 
of those communities were provided the opportunity to do so in their own 
language and on the basis of their own cultural traditions. On the other, the 
EPRDF, following the example of Stalin, was of the opinion that criteria for 
“nations, nationalities and peoples” could be identified independently and 
externally. Such an interpretation resulted in the notion that a vanguard par-
ty could decide which ethnic groups qualified for the right of self-determina-
tion, the specific ethnic criteria for these groups, and the borders of the areas 
where these groups were living. 
This approach was only partly successful. The “territorial” approach did not 
always match the reality on the ground. The ethnic composition in a number 
of cities but also of rural areas was mixed, resulting in all kind of problems. 
Moreover, in the final analysis regional autonomy was subordinate to the po-
litical interests of the EPRDF and to the federal agenda as determined by 
the EPRDF. The EPRDF was not prepared to recognize the legitimacy of any 
regional or ethnic movement, which was not under the control of the party. 
Political instrumentalization of violence 
As do so many countries, Ethiopia has a violent past. The Ethiopian state was 
established by the use of force. The regions in the periphery were incorpo-
rated in the empire by military means. Revolts by regional rebel groups and 
protests by the opposition were brutally dealt with. A sad climax was the “red 
terror” instigated by the Derg and the military actions particularly against 
the rebel movements in Eritrea and Tigray. In addition, Ethiopia and Somalia 
went to war in 1978 after Somalia invaded the Ogaden 
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After the seizure of power by the EPRDF in 1991, Ethiopia has known greater 
stability than in the past. Concerning its relations with its neighbors, the ma-
jor exception was of course the war with Eritrea. Efforts by Eritrea to occupy 
a disputed area on the border between the two countries led to an all out, 
bloody war. Otherwise Ethiopia was a relative beacon of stability in a very 
volatile region. 
That did not mean that Ethiopia did not have its own, internal problems con-
cerning peace and security. Some opposition movements tried to realize their 
political agenda by force. A number of them committed themselves to and 
received support from the regime in Eritrea, which tried to make life as dif-
ficult as possible for big brother Ethiopia. As such these groups did not con-
stitute a military threat to the government in Addis Ababa, but were able to 
stir up local conflicts and to destabilize a number of border areas. The Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front were the most 
important armed opposition movements. In view of the position and the size 
of the Oromo population group, the OLF was mainly a political threat to 
the EPRDF. The EPRDF and the OLF already clashed in 1991 regarding the 
question of whose forces should temporarily administer the areas inhabited 
by Oromo and when the local regional elections, planned for 1992, should 
be held. Moreover, the OPDO (the Oromo party which is a member of the 
EPRDF coalition) came forward as a rival to the OLF. The EPRDF managed 
to rapidly neutralize the OLF militarily and politically. Afterwards, the OLF 
faced disintegration and internal divisions among its leadership. Still, in spite 
of its military and organizational weaknesses, the organization could always 
count on some support among Oromo nationalists. 
Taken into account the context of this study, it is important to take a brief 
look at the use of force to influence the outcome of elections. Primarily, this 
concerns the attitude of the EPRDF and subsequently the authorities towards 
the political opposition. As indicated earlier, opposition groups were har-
assed and intimidated especially during the run-up to an election. Usually 
this approach sufficed to condemn the opposition to a political existence on 
the margins. This was, however, not the case in 2005. After the surprising 
election results, the EPRDF did not hesitate to eliminate the opposition by 
all possible means, including the use of force. During the protests, a number 
of people were killed, tens of thousands detained, and non-governmental or-
ganizations silenced. 
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Political corruption
While corruption for political purposes was an important feature of the po-
litical process in countries like Kenya, Uganda, and the Congo, this was less 
the case in Ethiopia. Given the political dominance of the EPRDF there was 
less need for it. Besides, the government, as in Rwanda, appeared to be seri-
ous about centralizing funds in order to use them for the development agen-
da as defined by the EPRDF. In practice, the political will to implement a 
zero-tolerance policy lagged behind the other developmental state in Africa, 
Rwanda. The far-reaching powers of the government and the size of its in-
vestments of course created in itself plenty of opportunities for rent seeking 
and corruption. In particular the alleged preferential treatment by the EPRDF 
of the endowment companies linked to the party was sharply criticized. 
The regime succeeded in limiting the patronage pay-offs needed to consol-
idate its position. Regarding the sectors in which the government played an 
important role, research of the World Bank shows that corruption in sectors 
that provide basic services, like education, health, water, and the legal sec-
tor, was relatively limited and less than in other low-income countries.55 In 
sectors with traditionally high capital investment, such as construction and 
mining, the corruption risks were higher but still lower than in many develop-
ing countries. The risk of corruption in capital-intensive, relatively new sec-
tors, like telecommunication, was comparable with other, corrupt developing 
countries. There was a shared perception among the public that members of 
the political parties in power enjoyed unfair advantages when it came, for in-
stance, to the allocation of jobs, selection of students or members of the ju-
diciary, or awarding construction tenders. The World Bank report also noted 
that Ethiopians, because of the specific cultural-historical context, assessed 
the level of corruption in their country higher than non-Ethiopians. 
There was also the perception among the public that prosecution in corrup-
tion cases was selectively applied and was often politically motivated. The 
prosecution on account of corruption against a number of opponents of Me-
les Zenawi during the political purges in the aftermath of the 2001/2003 dis-
cord within the TPLF could serve as an example. Politicians, who were politi-
cally correct, scarcely ran any risk of being prosecuted and publicly sentenced. 
55 J. Plummer (ed.), “Diagnosing corruption in Ethiopia. Perceptions, realities and the way for-
ward for key sectors,” World Bank (Washington, 2012).
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6.5 The role of the international community 
Under the leadership of the EPRDF, Ethiopia became a recipient of large 
sums of international aid. Three factors contributed to the popularity of Ethi-
opia as a recipient of foreign aid. Donor countries were pleasantly surprised 
by the initial ideological flexibility of the EPRDF, as became apparent in the 
liberal constitution, in renouncing the socialist model of development and in 
applying economic reforms. Ethiopian policies coincided with the emphasis 
on poverty reduction by international donors. Ethiopia had one of the most 
pro-poor budgets in Africa. Third, shared geo-political interests were at play. 
The global war on terror identified the Horn of Africa as a region of strategic 
importance. Ethiopia positioned itself as a frontrunner in the fight against 
terrorism. Because of its proximity to Somalia and the Middle East, Ethiopia 
became an important foothold for the West. 
The still existing ideological differences between the Western international 
donor community and the EPRDF carried less weight. The EPRDF advocated 
a developmental model that gave a leading role to the government in an oth-
erwise capitalist developmental process. Western donor countries acknowl-
edged that the government could play an important role in starting up eco-
nomic development but should limit itself to those sectors in which it had a 
comparative advantage. In particular, they criticized the dominant role in the 
economy of companies linked to the EPRDF. 
Another bone of contention was the limited political space for the opposi-
tion. The handling of the 2005 elections resulted in sharp criticism by the 
European Union, among others. According to the EU observer mission, the 
elections were far from democratic. The donor community decided to sus-
pend its budget support. Aid did not stop but was now mainly provided as 
project support. Albeit in less harsh terms, the 2010 elections were criticized 
as well, due to the absence of a transparent election process and of a level 
playing field for the opposition. 
In addition, Western donors, on a regular basis, requested less restrictive leg-
islation concerning civil society organizations. According to the EPRDF many 
NGOs were patronage networks, whose members received high salaries with-
out showing any tangible results. It is obvious that such an approach was di-
ametrically opposed to the role the international donor community grants to 
civil society organizations in the political as well the developmental process. 
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In recent years, non-traditional donors have become increasinly active in Ethi-
opia. A new important donor country, as elsewhere in Africa, is China. It is 
clear that this country does not share the “good governance” preoccupations of 
the Western donor countries. From a commercial perspective, Ethiopia is not a 
priority for China: It does not possess large quantities of natural resources nor 
is it an important trading partner. The reasons for China’s interest in Ethiopia 
are of a different nature: a government of a big country sympathetic to China 
and the perceived diplomatic influence of Ethiopia in Africa.
6.6 Conclusions
The political coalition, in power since 1991, has been able to maintain a long-
term agenda. The regime most of the time was in a strong position as regards 
the political elite that was not a part of the coalition as well as the potential 
opponents within the coalition. There appeared to be a potential develop-
ment coalition. The integration of a part of the regional elites within the polit-
ical settlement, the delegation of powers to the regions, the internal divisions 
among the excluded opposition, and the economic success of the Ethiopian 
model of development undoubtedly contributed to the weakness of the ex-
cluded elite. The tight internal organization of the EPRDF, partly based on 
the revolutionary democracy concept, contributed, in turn, to the strong in-
ternal discipline of the EPRDF coalition. 
Once in power, the EPRDF implemented a number of fundamental reforms. 
What did not change was the authoritarian and hierarchical way the country 
was governed, such that there was scarcely any space for dissident opinions. 
The government continued to play a central role in society. It is often noted 
that, unlike much of the rest of Africa, Ethiopia suffers from too much gov-
ernment, not too little. At least in the central agricultural highlands (much 
less so in the pastoralist periphery), the state is well entrenched, down to the 
highly deconcentrated local level of the kebele (local administration).56
Elections in this context served, just as in Rwanda, to legitimize the existing 
political balance of power. After the electoral upset in 2005 the EPRDF did 
not leave anything to chance to prevent that the façade of electoral legitimacy 
would be jeopardized again. The trend, especially after 2005, towards a more 
56 See also: S. Vaughan, M. Gebremichael, “Rethinking business and politics in Ethiopia. The 
role of EFFORT” The Endownment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray, Africa Power and Pol-
itics Program. Research report 2 (2011), 24.
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authoritarian political environment can be interpreted as an integral part of 
the developmental strategy of the EPRDF. The political settlement and the 
developmental strategy of the EPRDF enabled Ethiopia to witness an impres-
sive economic growth and a substantial reduction in poverty. The aspired 
transformation of the Ethiopian economy is still at the beginning. 
The choice for a political settlement based on ethnicity was partly dictated by 
political necessity: The real victor of the civil war against the Derg, the TPLF, 
only represented a small minority (Tigray) of the Ethiopian population. More-
over, it was the conviction of the EPRDF that the oppression of the ethnic as-
pirations of the different population groups was the main cause of the political 
problems in the past. The EPRDF believed that this could be solved only by 
making ethnicity the organizing principle of the political system. 
Of course, there were also tensions in the political system. In the perception 
of many, the TPLF, which only represents a small minority of the popula-
tion, was still the dominating force in the EPRDF. The perceived domina-
tion by politicians from Tigray undermined the multi-ethnic legitimacy of 
the regime. Furthermore, the actual political autonomy of the regions can 
be called into question. In spite of the federal structure of Ethiopia and, on 
paper, the far-reaching powers of the regions, the EPRDF and its allies were 
in charge all over the country. Taking into account the way the EPRDF is or-
ganized, policies were still primarily decided in the capital. By embracing the 
developmental state model this trend continued. A further complication was 
the worsening relationship in recent years between the government and the 
Muslim community. 
Partly due to the stability of the political settlement, the regime could resist, 
for the most part, the temptation to make use of government resources to 
win over potential political supporters. Thanks to the concentration of po-
litical and economic power in its hands, the EPRDF, in charge at the federal 
as well regional level, succeeded in using these resources in part for the eco-
nomic development of the country. The question remains to what extent the 
EPRDF will be able in the future to limit rent seeking behavior and corrup-
tion in its own ranks. René Lefort, Ethiopia specialist and critic of the EPRDF 
government, describes this danger as follows: “Then today one of the most 
promising tracks to becoming a rent seeker is to join the party and climb the 
ladder within it.”57
57 R. Lefort, “The theory and practice of Meles Zenawi: a response to Alex de Waal,” African 
Affairs 112:448 (2013), 460– 470. 
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The EPRDF could count on large-scale financial support by the international 
donor community for the following reasons: the implemented reforms, the 
emphasis on poverty reduction, and shared geopolitical interests. The ide-
ological differences between the EPRDF and the Western donors, and their 
criticism of how the regime eliminated the opposition by whatever means 
including the use of force, if considered a serious threat, carried less weight. 
6.7 Post Script
Something happened
In 2016, the political landscape in Ethiopia changed considerably. There was 
an outbreak of wide-scale protest in the country, especially in Oromia and 
Amhara regional states. Sparked by the planned expansion of the Ethiopia 
capital Addis Ababa, the focus of the protests shifted to include wider politi-
cal issues, such as the perceived marginalization of specific ethnic groups and 
demands for more regional autonomy. Long simmering tensions erupted in 
often violent protests. These protests had in common that, to a large extent, 
they were spontaneous and grass roots based. Opposition political parties 
were only remotely and indirectly connected to these protests (in contrast to 
2005). Hundreds of protesters were killed; many thousands detained. Gov-
ernment offices, factories, warehouses, trucks, buses, and large foreign- and 
Ethiopian-owned farms were attacked and burned. In October 2016, a state 
of emergency was temporarily proclaimed.
Why
A combination of factors triggered these protests and the political turmoil in 
the country:
 ■ The (perceived) political and economic domination of one specific ethnic 
group. There was and is a widespread perception that the Tigrayan elite 
monopolizes political as well as economic power at the federal as well as 
the regional level.
 ■ Lack of economic prospects. Young people have been the main driving 
force behind the protests and destruction. Lack of economic progress for 
many young people who received an education but whose expectations in 
terms of employment and prosperity could not be met.
 ■ Local grievances, most of which revolved around land issues. A number 
of farmers were displaced without adequate compensation to make way 
for private investments. In addition, Ethiopia faces growing landlessness. 
Groups of landless, often young people seized the moment to express 
their grievances. Land in Ethiopia, as elsewhere in Africa, is not only an 
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important (economic) asset but is also linked to family history and cul-
ture. It can serve therefore as an easy conflict mobilizer.
 ■ Tensions between the center and the regions. The (ethnic) federalist 
structure of Ethiopia does not sit well with the requirements of a de facto 
over-centralized political system or, for that matter, of the development 
state as a national project. The protests constituted an expression of frus-
tration about the unmet expectations of ethnic federalism. 
 ■ Security response. The security response also played a role in the escala-
tion of the protests. Initially the federal government delegated security to 
the regional security forces, which in a number of cases refused to inter-
vene. This created a security vacuum and provided a window of oppor-
tunity for protesters to go on the rampage. Paradoxically, the restrained 
reaction by the government led to rumors in Amhara and Oromia that the 
government was seriously weakened and had even collapsed.
 ■ Top-down political culture. The absence of a political tradition of dia-
logue and compromise, in tandem with a culture of distrust created a sit-
uation in which government officials were not only caught off-guard by 
the extent and the seriousness of the grievances but also were unable or 
unwilling to address some of these grievances. 
 ■ Manipulation. Finally, in some cases there was a strong suspicion that 
some local elites mobilized communities, especially the youth, into vi-
olent behavior to serve as a smokescreen for lucrative, often illegal, land 
deals they were involved in.
Implications
The intense and large-scale protests shook the political establishment in 
Ethiopia to its core and led to increased divisions within the ruling coalition. 
The question of what the policy implications should be continued to be the 
main topic of discussion within the EPRDF: between the coalition partners 
of the EPRDF at a federal level, within the parties themselves, and between 
these parties and political center in Addis Ababa. The outcome of this debate 
will determine to a large extent the nature of the political settlement in this 
country for years to come. It has become clear that the balance of power is 
changing in Ethiopia as a result of the events in 2016. 
The (perceived) Tigrayan domination in politics, the economy, and in the 
security sector has become a major political issue. Ethiopia’s troubled transi-
tion from a historically entrenched unitary state to an ethnic federation could 
be considered as a major form of political settlement among contending 
elites, and a peace-building intervention to the extent that it has redressed 
the historical grievances of minority groups. In the eyes of many, however, 
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the TPLF, which only represents a small minority of the population, is still 
the dominating force in the EPRDF. This widespread sentiment among many 
non-Tigrayan Ethiopians undermines the multi-ethnic legitimacy of the re-
gime and has become a strong mobilizing force in Ethiopian politics.
The protests in 2016 have resulted in a more assertive leadership in Oromia 
as well as Amhara, and an increasingly divided political center. At the same 
time the ruling parties in Amhara (ANDM) and Oromia (OPDO) are mem-
bers of the coalition that governs Ethiopia as a whole. In the wake of the un-
rest, they have extended their powerbase within the coalition at the expense 
of the traditionally dominant position of Tigray (TPLF). As a consequence, 
there are new divisions in the EPRDF coalition itself, as the power balance is 
shifting.
Until the events in 2016, Oromo nationalism was an important but partly 
dormant factor in Ethiopian politics, partly enabled by ethnic federalism and 
the identity politics connected to it. It has fueled Oromo grievances, includ-
ing the rising consciousness that they are the country’s biggest ethnic group, 
with the largest contribution to the national economy. Yet, they believe them-
selves to be “dominated” by an ethnic minority (the Tigrayans). The Oromo 
sense of marginalization is also accentuated by the strong feeling that they 
are not adequately politically represented at the federal level.
The perceived Tigrayan dominance has long undermined the legitimacy of 
the OPDO among the Oromo population. However, under the leadership of 
regional president Lemma Megerssa, who came to power in the aftermath of 
the 2016 troubles, the OPDO has found a new assertiveness. A more (Oro-
mo) nationalist rhetoric and vocal opposition to the federal government, 
when regional interests are at stake, have increased its support base, both at 
home as well as in the diaspora. A similar new sense of independence can be 
observed among members of the ANDM. Like its counterpart the OPDO, 
the ANDM, although to a lesser extent, had a popular legitimacy deficit, giv-
en its dependence on the TPLF. Amhara followed and deployed similar tac-
tics as Oromia with similar results. This recent mutual solidarity between 
Oromia and Amhara is remarkable. Historically the two are not natural allies, 
yet currently they are united in trying to increase their political power. 
As the political leaders of Oromia and Amhara have been positioning them-
selves as staunch defenders of regional interests, Oromo nationalism and its 
Amhara equivalent have become a crucial driving force in regional and na-
tional politics. The main political players in Oromia and Amhara seem to aim 
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at a change in the national balance of power within the context of the prevail-
ing political set-up, not to abolish it. The regional presidents are themselves 
products of the existing political system. 
The inbuilt tensions between the concept of (ethnic) federalism and the re-
quirements of the developmental state have come visible. Ethiopia’s federal 
project principally responds to the challenges of ethnic diversity. EPRDF’s 
developmental state ideology and “vanguard capitalism” on the other hand 
are a national project, which does not leave much room for regional econom-
ic and political diversity. 
Moreover, the identity politics of the OPDO and ANDM and the efforts by 
the TPLF to remain in charge suggest that the EPRDF is in danger of loosing 
its ideological rigor, which is a precondition for a successful application of 
the developmental state model and its ambitious transformational agenda. 
As a consequence, the EPRDF seems to find it increasingly difficult to speak 
with one voice and have its policies enforced.
In short, ethnicity is very much back on the agenda. Ethnicity as an impor-
tant political point of reference has become increasingly relevant in Ethiopi-
an politics. The recent political unrest has intensified tensions and divisions 
between different regional partners of the federal government coalition along 
ethnic lines. As indicated, ethnic nationalism has particularly come to the 
fore in the two most densely populated regions of the country: Oromia and 
Amhara. Sentiments about alleged historical injustices or entitlements, with 
ethnicity as a reference, have become a dominant factor in Ethiopian poli-
tics. The perceived inequality between regions is being increasingly framed 
in ethnic terms.
Conclusion
What keeps a political settlement together is the convergence of interests 
within the dominant coalition, and the relationship between these interests 
and those of other groups in society: the power balance, on which this settle-
ment is based, is fluid and dynamic. As a result the political settlement has 
to adjust itself regularly and is subject to renegotiation and disagreements. 
As the protests in 2016 and the subsequent political divisions show, the polit-
ical settlement did not turn to be as solid as it appeared. Since the opposition 
outside the ruling coalition is fragmented, badly organized and divided on 
how to approach the EPRDF, the existing political constellation is not threat-
ened so much by excluded factions as by the lack of its control over a part of 
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their own rank-and-file, the subsequent divisions within the ruling coalition, 
and its diminished capacity to implement and enforce policies.
The abovementioned tensions form an integral part of the (recent) history of 
Ethipa and cannot be resolved overnight. The main task of the powers-that-
be is not so much to find a definitive solution to these rather fundamental 
problems but to seek a negotiated compromise. The EPRDF has to accom-
modate and realign the changed ethnic balance of power within the ruling 
coalition as a consequence of the political crisis of last year. Moreover, the 
ruling coalition is faced with the task of honoring, in one way or another, the 
demands for greater regional autonomy. At the same time, the centrifugal 
forces in the Ethiopian society along ethnic lines have to be kept under con-
trol and, in spite of everything, its relatively successful developmental state 
model sustained. This touches upon the core of the political settlement and 
implies winners and losers. As this is, in the end a zero-sum game, this pro-
cess will have to be carefully managed. Still, there is no realistic alternative for 
the present EPRDF coalition. An open-ended political transition could lead 
to the de facto disintegration of Ethiopia along ethnic lines with dire conse-
quences for the stability of the country and the region as a whole.
Addis Ababa, December 2017   
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7 Common lines and patterns 
The introduction of a multiparty system, the subsequent political settlements, 
and the nature of the economic development in each country can only be 
properly assessed if the specific historical context of the countries under re-
view is taken into account. It is self-evident that this context was different for 
each country. The outcome depended to a great extent on the circumstances, 
limitations, and opportunities that were often specific in nature. First, there 
are a number of circumstances of a permanent or semi-permanent character 
typical for each country like geographic location, ethnic composition, demo-
graphic pressure, etc. Second, the way in which the different colonial regimes 
exercised and organized their power has left its mark to this day. The lack of 
proper preparations for the independence of the Congo, the land policy in 
the Rift Valley in Kenya, the position of the Buganda kingdom in Uganda, 
cultivating a specific ethnic group to be the political elite of Rwanda might 
serve as clear examples. Neither can the recent history of the Congo, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Uganda, and Ethiopia be separated from the personalites of their 
leaders. Mobutu, Kenyatta, Zenawi, Kagame, and Museveni influenced very 
much the developments in their countries, of which they were president and, 
in the case of Uganda and Rwanda, still are. 
That does not mean that behind this diversity there are no commonalities, 
which also underlie developments in these countries. With the country cases 
as a starting point, common lines and patterns can be identified that were 
related to and influenced the way in which political settlements were shaped 
after the introduction or reintroduction of multiparty democracy. Academic 
findings about political and societal developments, in general, and in Africa, 
in particular, will also be used to the extent that they help to explain what 
happened and why. The following topics will be addressed: the specific nature 
of the political process in these countries, corruption for political purposes, 
ethnicity, instrumentalization of violence, the role of elections and political 
parties, the cohesion of the political elite, and the relationship between eco-
nomic transformation and political settlements. 
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7.1 The specific nature of the political process 
Since the reintroduction of a multiparty system, much has changed. Politi-
cians had to try harder to stay in power. Those in power in Kenya, Uganda, 
and the Congo had to be more careful than before. Governments and their 
leaders were more exposed to criticism from the public, media, and parlia-
ment, and had to explain themselves more than in the past. The 2002 tran-
sition of power in Kenya took place peacefully after free and fair elections. 
Corruption scandals involving political elites were extensively covered in the 
media, whether it was the Goldenberg case or the Anglo Leasing scandal in 
Kenya, the purchase of military equipment or the privatization of public en-
terprises in Uganda, or the illegal trade in minerals in the Congo. During the 
2005 elections in Ethiopia, the governing coalition was unexpectedly given a 
pounding. 
At the same time, much remained the same. As explained, for example, by 
Bratton and Van de Walle, the neo-patrimonial nature of African regimes 
and extreme “presidentialism” did not go away.58 After the reintroduction of 
a multiparty democracy, the political arena in all five countries was still very 
much dominated by the president (in the case of Ethiopia the prime minis-
ter). Mobutu and later Joseph Kabila in the Congo, Daniel arap Moi and to a 
lesser extent Mwai Kibaki in Kenya, Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, Paul Kag-
ame in Rwanda, and (prime minister) Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia systemati-
cally strengthened the power of their office. They did not shrink from using 
government resources for this purpose. The corruption scandals in Kenya, 
the proliferation of local administrative offices in Uganda, and turning a blind 
eye to the illegal practices by the Congolese army are just some examples. In 
Rwanda and Ethiopia this was less the case. 
Political accountability Western style, as promoted by the international do-
nor community, could not cope with neo-patrimonial logic, which still held 
the political system captive. Democracy and more in particular elections 
adapted to the obstinate reality of a political patronage system and not the 
other way around. Moreover, after the reintroduction of a pluralist political 
system, politics and political power relationships remained above all infor-
mal and personalized in nature. Political reciprocity was based on the per-
sonal ties between political Big Men and their support base. Still, the modal-
ities were different for each country. Repression, but even more importantly 
58 M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, Democratic experiments in Africa. Regime transitions in 
comparative perspective (Cambridge, 1997).
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his alliance with the leaders (and their supporters) of a number often smaller 
ethnic groups, held together by a strong anti-Kikuyu sentiment, kept Moi 
in power in Kenya for ten more years after the introduction of multiparty 
politics. In Uganda, Museveni managed to remain in power, partly by using 
tested patronage methods. The three presidents who ruled the Congo after 
independence (Mobutu, Kabila senior, and Kabila junior), are classic exam-
ples of personalized power. As the political center lost influence, local Big 
Men replicated this way of exercising political power at a local level. 
Rwanda and Ethiopia appeared to break at least in part with this practice. 
The political agenda of the elites in power in these countries was less shaped 
by the necessity to create and use resources for political patronage purposes 
than by the notion that rapid economic development constituted the best 
and most practical option to leave the ethnic divisions of the past behind and 
subsequently protect the position of the ruling elite.
Political and state institutions could not escape the powerful influence of the 
omnipresent patron-client relationships either. According to the conceptual 
framework developed by North, Wallis, and Weingast in their Violence and 
social orders, the main cause for this is that a number of important institu-
tions, such as the Legislative, Executive, and the Judiciary, are not tailored to 
the reality of the Limited Access Order (see also the paragraph in this chap-
ter on instrumentalization of violence).59 Although the point of departure of 
Chabal and Daloz is different, they reach the same conclusion: “We are thus 
led to conclude that in most African countries, the state is no more than a 
decor, a pseudo-Western façade masking the realities of deeply personalized 
relations.”60 
The reality in the countries under review was of course more nuanced at the 
same time. The return to macroeconomic stability in the five countries could 
not have been realized without the presence of expertise within and some 
level of autonomy of the respective ministries of Finance. While in the Con-
go most bureaucratic institutions still remained an empty shell, in the other 
four countries a certain degree of “institutionalization” of state structures did 
take place, which made it possible at least in theory to operate independent-
ly from the ruling elite to a certain degree. For the Rwandan government to 
implement its developmental agenda, efficient institutions in a number of 
59 D. North, J. Wallis, S. Webb, and B. Weingast, Violence and social orders. A conceptual 
framework for interpreting human history (Cambridge, 2008).
60 P. Chabal and J. Daloz, Africa works, 16.
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areas are indispensable. The same goes for Ethiopia. Due to the economic de-
velopments in Kenya, the professionalization of the government turned out 
to be unavoidable as well. Certainly during the first years of the NRM gov-
ernment in Uganda, important steps in this direction were taken. The prac-
tices and needs of the ruling elite clearly imposed restrictions on this trend. 
Government and related institutions were still used for patronage purposes 
on a wide scale. 
As regards the “institutionalization” of the separation of powers, one can be 
brief. Although the Executive could permit itself fewer liberties than prior 
to the introduction of pluralist politics, the concentration of power in the 
hands of the president defined much more the political reality in all the five 
countries than the separation of powers according to the Western template. 
Against the background of the personalized and informal nature of politics, 
parliaments in Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda, and the Congo remained 
closely linked to the Executive. The Judiciary suffered the same fate. 
To consolidate their power leaders also applied the principle of extraversion, 
the thrust being that African elites appropriate the (political) profits that are 
generated by the dependency on the outside world.61 The way those in pow-
er tried to use the reintroduction of multiparty politics to their own advan-
tage may serve as an example. Manipulation was the order of the day. In the 
Congo, President Mobutu took advantage of the introduction of a multiparty 
system in the early 1990s by promoting the establishment of as many politi-
cal parties as possible in order to stay in power himself. In Uganda, the NRM 
used the introduction of pluralist politics to restore the cohesion within its 
own ranks, as dissidents did not have to be accommodated within the NRM 
any longer. In Ethiopia and Rwanda, multiparty elections went hand-in-hand 
with so many restrictions, as regards the political space for the opposition, 
that they hardly influenced the political landscape. The build up towards the 
1992 elections in Kenya gave the government the opportunity to deliberately 
incite population groups against each other in order to remain in power. 
In short, after the reintroduction of a multiparty system and regardless of the 
type of electoral system, the term neo-patrimonialism still remained, in dif-
ferent shapes and forms, applicable to the political reality of these countries. 
It was based on political relationships, for the most part personal, informal, 
and ethnic in nature. The attributes of Western democracy provided the for-
61 J. Bayart, “Africa in the world: a history of extraversion,” African Affairs, 99 (2000), 217–267. 
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mal framework in which this took place, and imposed certain restrictions on 
this logic. 
7.2 Corruption for political purposes 
Corruption for political purposes is inextricably linked to the logic of African 
politics described above. Whenever the outcome of elections was uncertain, 
as in Kenya or to lesser extent in Uganda, considerable funds were needed 
to win the elections because of the patronage nature of politics. In Kenya, 
the reintroduction of multiparty politics resulted in increased competition 
to gain enough votes to win elections. The need for financial resources in-
creased accordingly. It led to mega corruption scandals: the Goldenberg case 
in the early 1990s and the Anglo Leasing scandal 10 years later. Part of the 
electorate was susceptible to these practices. A patron-client relationship im-
plies reciprocity. Voters, who were prepared to “sell” their vote, gave more 
credence to the election promises by candidates involved in those practices 
than of those who were not. The readiness to “buy” votes was supposed to 
indicate the willingness of politicians to be generous to supporters at a later 
stage as well. 
In Uganda, Museveni applied well-tried patronage practices to commit a sub-
stantial part of the national and local political elites to his regime. It appears 
that the introduction of multiparty politics strengthened this trend. Nothing 
was left to chance. For instance, the creation of new districts was used as 
presidential handouts during election time. Museveni would get most of the 
votes in these districts. Although it was and is clear that patronage is an in-
tegral part of Congolese society, little is known about how this was put into 
practice during the 2006 and 2011 national elections. Possibly this had to 
do with the fluid and unsettled nature of the patronage networks in a coun-
try that big and with such a huge electorate. In any case, money did change 
hands during elections at the regional level. 
In view of the total control by the EPRDF of the political process in Ethio-
pia and of the RPF in Rwanda, the use of patronage in order to influence the 
outcome of elections was less relevant. In Rwanda and to a certain extent in 
Ethiopia, resources did not have to be mobilized to assure an election victory 
or to buy the support of certain groups in society because of political con-
siderations.
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All in all, the abuse of public resources for political purposes did not diminish 
as a result of the reintroduction of a multiparty system in Kenya, the Congo, 
and Uganda, perhaps even the opposite: The picture that emerges is one of 
increasing abuse of public means in Kenya as well as Uganda. In Rwanda and 
Ethiopia, this was less the case. Ironically these were the countries where 
elections actually did not matter given the de facto absolute power of the RPF 
and the EPRDF. In the other countries, the competition between rival politi-
cal factions increased in order to stay in power as a consequence of multipar-
ty politics. As indicated, a well-tried method to win over groups was to dole 
out favors or to make promises along these lines. 
7.3 Ethnicity
Ethnicity can be defined in a number of ways. It is clear, however, that in the 
five countries ethnicity constituted a very important frame of reference. It 
might not come as a surprise that this concept is also multifaceted and con-
text specific in time as well as space. The manner in which colonial powers, 
prior to independence, applied ethnicity in organizing the administration in 
the country, in some cases favored one population group over the other, de-
termined to a large extent by how this worked out.62
Against this background, the British historian and East Africa expert John 
Lonsdale distinguishes two dimensions of modern ethnicity: moral ethnici-
ty and political tribalism.63 The first dimension refers to the debate within a 
specific ethnic group about cultural identity, communality, leadership, and 
rights and obligations in a changing society. The other dimension concerns 
the relationship between the ethnic group and others. In a multi-ethnic con-
cept this dimension often results in the instrumentalization of ethnic identity 
for the purpose of political competition with other (ethnic) groups. It might 
be obvious that this study focuses on the latter. 
The Belgian colonial authorities in Rwanda selected representatives of the 
Tutsi indigenous elite to rule the country under Belgian leadership. The pref-
erential treatment came at the expense of the other population group (Hutu), 
62 B. Berman, “Ethnicity, patronage and the African state: The politics of uncivil nationalism,” 
African Affairs, 97:388 (1998), 305–341.
63 J. Lonsdale, “Moral ethnicity and political tribalism,” in P. Kaarsholm and J. Hulin (eds.), In-
ventions and boundaries: historical and anthropological approaches to the study of ethnicity and 
nationalism (Roskilde, 1994), 131–150.
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which was explicitly allocated to an inferior position in society. In the final 
years before independence, the Belgian authorities made a radical U-turn: At 
a forced rate, a Hutu counter-elite was created. The effects on the relationship 
and mutual perception between the two population groups were not hard to 
fanthom. In the Congo as well, Belgian colonial policy as regards different 
ethnic groups left its mark. The mobilization of labor from Kasai to mine the 
mineral resources in Katanga, and as a consequence greater prosperity and 
development prospects for this population group, gave rise to a deep and 
long-lasting antagonism. 
Something similar happened in the east of the Congo. The employment of big 
numbers of Rwandan laborers (mainly Hutu) on the plantations in eastern 
Congo and the large scale influx of Tutsi refugees in a later period as a con-
sequence of the anti-Tutsi pogroms instigated by a Belgian-supported regime 
in Kigali were partly the cause of the continuous conflicts in that part of the 
country. In Uganda, British colonial power gave preferential treatment to the 
Baganda at the expense of other ethnic groups. It also appointed representa-
tives of this population group to administer other parts of the country on its 
behalf. This approach, in tandem with the policy to recruit the local armed 
forces predominantly from a specific region (the north), determined the na-
ture of the conflicts that came to a head after independence. 
In Kenya, a part of the Kikuyu population group was expelled from their 
homes in favor of British settlers. The preferential treatment given to this 
group in the land distribution schemes, especially in the Rift valley after in-
dependence, stirred up bad blood among other population groups living in 
the region (in particular the Kalenjin). This perceived injustice (originating 
in the colonial period) contributed highly to the tense relationship between 
these two ethnic groups, resulting in periodic violence. In Ethiopia, it was 
not a foreign colonial power, as elsewhere in Africa, but the Amhara elite 
from the northern highlands, which enforced Ethiopian unification. The eth-
nic groups that were subjected to the rule of the Ethiopian empire, by the use 
of force, experienced this process as internal, Amhara colonialism, having 
implications for the administrative structure of Ethiopia after 1991. 
Multiparty elections frequently contributed to a further emphasis on the eth-
nic distinctions created during the colonial period.64 Some politicians used 
these for their own ends for electoral purposes. Unfortunately, there is no 
64 Regarding the question of why political competition is organized along specific different 
ethnic lines, see D. Posner, Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa (Cambridge, 2005).
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shortage of examples. During the Kenyan elections in 1992, 1997, and 2007, 
politicians emphatically used ethnicity to influence the outcome to their ad-
vantage. A popular theme when mobilizing the supporters of the non-Kikuyu 
political elites was the perceived domination of this ethnic group in society, 
the preferential treatment of Kikuyu under Kenyatta as regards the distribu-
tion of land, and an anti-Kikuyu interpretation of the majimbo concept. Eth-
nicity was also the main feature of the multiparty system established in the 
early 1990s in the Congo and during the 2006 elections. 
After Rwanda reverted to multiparty politics in the early 1990s, ethnic (an-
ti-Tutsi) sentiments were once again mobilized and turned out to be the 
prelude to the genocide of 1994. After the RPF came to power in 1994, the 
elections were directed in such a manner that there was no longer room for 
openly expressing feelings of ethnic vengeance. Since the NRM took power 
in Uganda in 1986, ethnicity played a less pronounced role in politics than 
before. The Movement system and the initial policy, focused on political in-
clusivity, no doubt contributed to this. Nevertheless, in this country as well, 
ethnic arithmetic played an important role in the background. The first mul-
tiparty elections in the history of Ethiopia took place after the EPRDF gained 
power in 1991. Given the multi-ethnic composition and the political domi-
nance of the EPRDF, using ethnicity as an explicit mobilization tool did not 
have much chance of success. 
Still an important observation needs to be made here. The mobilization of 
ethnicity for political gains was not reserved for multiparty politics alone. 
The manipulation of anti-Kikuyu sentiments was common currency in Kenya 
before (during the tenure of Moi) as well as after the introduction of multi-
party elections. The same applies to the anti-Buganda rhetoric in Ugandan 
politics (albeit less explicit after the NRM came to power). It is rather obvi-
ous that the heavily charged relationship between Hutu and Tutsi continued 
to leave its mark on Rwandan politics. With the exception of the early years 
under Mobutu, political fragmentation along ethnic lines has been the main 
feature in the Congo since independence. 
The colonial period has partly determined how ethnicity was used and abused 
after independence in the political debate in the countries under scrutiny. Al-
though African leaders in theory distanced themselves from ethnically based 
politics, many political patrons mobilized ethnicity to decide multiparty elec-
tions in their favor. The interpretation of what ethnicity meant depended on 
the specific historical context. Sometimes it concerned the clan, sometimes 
the tribe, sometimes a collection of related ethnic groups, and sometimes the 
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whole nation (for example, Congolité). It has to be noted that emphasizing 
ethnic distinctions and differences, defined in whatever way, never resulted 
in secession but was deployed by political Big Men within the existing state 
structures to get hold of power and of as many resources possible for them-
selves as well as their supporters, most of the time organized along ethnic 
lines. 
In Ethiopia, the new regime led by Meles Zenawi did explicitly take account 
of the ethnic diversity in the country. This was accepted as the fundament for 
the administrative structure of Ethiopia. This approach also allowed for the 
secession of Eritrea.
7.4 Instrumentalization of violence
After their independence, the Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda faced different 
periods of political instability, civil war, and widespread violence. After the 
fall of the regime of Haile Selassie, Ethiopia also witnessed a long period of 
civil war and violence. Initially Kenya was a relative beacon of stability until 
the 2007 presidential elections got totally out of hand. All the five countries 
under review here fit within the concept of the Limited Access Order (LAO) 
developed by North and colleagues.65 The main features of this concept are 
the problem of containing violence in a society and the political and econom-
ic behavior of the elite in its efforts to get access to resources. 
The way in which these are generated and their distribution among the elite 
determine whether this takes place in a peaceful manner or not. A change 
in composition of the dominating elite and, as a consequence, in the distri-
bution of the available resources could result in serious instability and in-
crease in violence in a society. As part of the continuum regarding a LAO, 
one can distinguish three types: “fragile,” “basic,”and “mature.” Seen from this 
perspective, possibly the chief virtue of Zenawi, Museveni, and Kagame has 
been that they have contributed substantially to move Ethiopia, Uganda, and 
Rwanda, respectively, from a “fragile” LAO towards a “basic” LAO. The Con-
go, however, was never able to break free from fragility. In spite of the inci-
dental outbursts of violence related to the election process, Kenya could hold 
its ground as a more or less stable, “basic” LAO. 
65 D. North, J. Wallis, S Webb, and B. Weingast, “Limited Access orders in the developing 
world: a new approach to the problems of development,” World Bank, Policy research working 
paper no. 4359 (Washington, 2007).
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In view of the importance of elections in order to get access to the available 
government resources, it is not too surprising that multiparty elections in 
Africa often went hand-in-hand with violence. In itself, this is not so unique, 
but the frequency with which this occurred on the continent might well be. 
Often intimidation and violence were part and parcel of the tactics applied by 
important political actors. This could take many different forms: an expres-
sion of dissatisfaction (for example, because of disputed elections), violent 
intimidation by the ruling party, the use of informal militias to enforce an 
election victory, and as a means to acquire resources for patronage purposes 
by “political” entrepreneurs. Examples of this can be found in all five coun-
tries. It is worth noting, however, that the recent histories of four of the five 
countries (the exception is Kenya) have been marked by civil war and its con-
sequences for the political process. 
Depending on the political settlement, violence in all five countries took 
different forms during the reintroduction of a multiparty system. Political 
liberalization in Kenya appeared to be risky business. Multiparty elections 
involved political violence, until then unknown in post-colonial Kenya. The 
convergence of elite fragmentation, the loss of the monopoly of force by the 
state, and political liberalization resulted in a highly inflammable mixture. In 
1992 and 1997, the ruling party KANU used violence and intimidation on a 
large scale to secure electoral victory. In 2007, allegations of electoral fraud 
triggered large-scaIe outbursts of violence. 
After Mobutu was forced to allow political liberalization in the early 1990s, 
armed groups were established as a result of intensified political competition, 
initially in order to protect the interests of local politicians. The subsequent 
loss of the monopoly on the use of force by the state and two Congolese wars 
created the conditions for increased fragmentation and multiplication of in-
formal militias, which protected their interests by the use of force. Against 
this background, the relatively peaceful running of the 2006 and 2011 elec-
tions was rather remarkable. 
The violent nature of Rwanda’s political history is self-evident. The establish-
ment of ethnically based parties in the run-up to the 1959 elections imme-
diately led to inter-ethnic violence. The background of the genocide in 1994 
is a case in point. After the RPF came to power, this came to an end, since 
the grip on power by the RPF was so absolute that any large-scale violence 
in Rwanda could be ruled out. Given the political dominance of the EPRDF 
in Ethiopia, the opposition was marginalized. That changed during the 2005 
elections. After the unexpected election results, the EPRDF did not shy away 
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from eliminating the opposition by all possible means, including violence. In 
Uganda, the fraudulent 1980 elections marked the starting signal for another 
bloody civil war, which eventually resulted in the armed seizure of power by 
Museveni in 1986. Since then, the electoral process (initially under the Move-
ment system) for the most part took place peacefully. 
On the basis of the above country cases, one could argue that the chance of 
instrumentalizing (political) violence within the context of the reintroduc-
tion of multiparty politics and multiparty elections increased when the ruling 
party was not sure about the outcome. In the absence of such doubts because 
of the dominance of the ruling party, the risk of election violence also became 
smaller. 
7.5 Elections and political parties
In most cases, the main reference for establishing political parties in Afri-
ca was ethnic and/or regional origin, and not programmatic and ideological 
preferences. This did not imply that political parties became automatically 
ethnic parties, but it did mean that political mobilization took place primar-
ily along ethnic lines. How this mobilization translated itself into the forma-
tion of political parties depended on a number of factors like the size of the 
ethnic group, the ethnic concentration in a specific region, the intensity of 
political moblilization of ethnicity, and, last but not least, on specific histor-
ical circumstances. 
Ethnic fragmentation did not necessarily lead to a fragmented political sys-
tem. In many African countries, the main feature of the political system was 
a dominant, ruling party, which, in a number of cases, was also in power in 
the period prior to the reintroduction of a multiparty system. This might be 
partly explained not only by the authoritarian nature of most multiparty sys-
tems but also by the ethnic diversity itself in African societies. Political lead-
ers of specific ethnic groups were obliged to form coalitions. An important 
consideration of course was that a coalition should offer the best chance to 
get access to political power and the available resources. Still, quite a number 
of a small, unstable opposition parties also continued to exist, which, in the 
run-up to the elections, were not part of such a coalition. The dominating 
position of the president and the patronage character of African politics con-
stituted the main stumbling block for opposition parties to consolidate them-
selves. It encouraged individual Big Men to usually have small parties at their 
disposal to be able to join the winning party. Having one’s own party served 
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as a tool to get access to public means, which were necessary to maintain and 
expand a political patronage network.
The political parties participating in elections after independence were, in 
different varieties, based on the footing as described. In Kenya, initially the 
main political dividing line was between KANU, which was strongly in favor 
of a unitary state and, in particular, represented the biggest ethnic groups, 
and KADU, which as representative of the smaller ethnic group advocated 
a federal structure. In Rwanda, the main divide was between parties with a 
Hutu support-base and those representing Tutsi interests. In Uganda, region 
and religion marked the political divisions, while in the Congo parties were 
organized along strict ethnic lines. In Ethiopia, no political parties were al-
lowed until 1991
After independence, in four of the five countries a one-party system rapidly 
replaced multiparty politics: KANU in Kenya, UPC in Uganda, the MRND 
in Rwanda, and MPR in the Congo. Ethnic and regional considerations to a 
large extent still dominated the political debate but less openly and, in gen-
eral, less intensely. After the reintroduction of a multiparty system the same 
patterns as before could be identified as regards party formation. Depending 
on the strength of the ruling party, ethnic sentiments were mobilized to stir 
up divisions among the opposition and to secure an election victory, clear ex-
amples being KANU under Daniel arap Moi in 1992 and 1997, and the MPR 
of Mobutu in the 1990s. 
Most parties established after the reintroduction of a multiparty system had 
some of the following characteristics: scarcely indistinguishable programs; a 
weak bureaucratic organization; informal, personal, and patronage based; a 
high degree of factionalism; lack of internal democracy; a weak membership 
structure; a narrow financial base; weak links with civil society; and, most im-
portantly, support based along ethnic and regional lines.66 Still, ethnic arith-
metic frequently forced parties to form coalitions. 
Opposition parties faced additional difficulties in Africa. Apart from the 
abovementioned characteristics, the dominance of the president and the re-
sources available to him and his party saw to it that opposition parties were 
most of the time small in size, internally divided, and rather powerless in the 
face of the ruling party. Only when the ruling party itself was strongly divid-
66 G. Erdmann, “Party research: Western European bias and the African labyrinth,” Votes, 
money and violence. Political parties in Sub-Saharan Africa, 34–64,
Koper ASC.indd   182 28-11-18   16:26
526893-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 3-12-2018 PDF page: 183
183
ed and the opposition united, did the opposition stand a chance, examples 
being the opposition united (for a limited time) in the Sovereign National 
Conference in the Congo in the early 1990s and the electoral defeat of KANU 
in 2002 in Kenya. 
Exceptions to this were the Rwanda Patriotic Front in Rwanda, the Ethio-
pia People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front in Ethiopia, and, initially, the 
National Resistance Movement in Uganda. These political organizations suc-
ceeded, at least temporarily, in uniting important parts of the political elite, 
in disciplining those who did not comply with the rules, rewarding those who 
did, and maintaining some checks and balances in order to avoid too much 
power in the hands of one individual.67 Moreover, the EPRDF distinguished 
itself from all the other ruling parties, on the one hand, by the explicitly eth-
nic/regional character of the parties belonging to the EPRDF coalition and, 
on the other, by its expressly ideological stance, which was absent or much 
less present in the other countries. 
The reintroduction of multiparty politics in the 1990s was the result of an in-
teraction of domestic and foreign pressure, and the reaction to this pressure 
by those who were in power. In Uganda, Rwanda, the Congo, and Ethiopia 
this process took place against the background of a civil war (Rwanda, Ethi-
opia), the disintegration of the country (the Congo), or a foreign invasion 
(Uganda). The subsequent developments, as described in the previous chap-
ters, led to considerable delays before multiparty elections could be actually 
held: in Ethiopia in 1995, in Rwanda in 2003, and in Uganda and the Congo 
in 2006. Only in the case of Kenya did multiparty elections in 1992 follow 
rapidly after the liberalization of the political system. 
The reintroduction of a multiparty system and elections, including their in-
tended and unintended implications, did not turn out to be an unqualified 
success. It was clear that those in power as well as those who wanted to come 
to power considered elections, in particular for the presidency, as the most 
crucial part of the political process. They determined who would get access 
to government resources, which were necessary to maintain and possibly ex-
pand the political support base. 
The still strong presence of patronage arrangements in these societies saw to 
it that the manner in which the election campaigns were conducted followed 
67 J. Putzel and J. Di John, Meeting the challenges of crisis states, Crisis States Research Report 
(London, 2012).
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the corresponding logic. It appears that the reintroduction of a multiparty 
democracy strengthened this logic rather than weakened it. During election 
time, accountability was often interpreted literally. Generosity by a candi-
date yielded more votes than asking for support on the basis of political pro-
grams. Hyden summarizes: “In a multiparty political setting, the temptation 
for quick and easy gains grows and the inclination to side step official policy 
objectives consequently becomes even greater.”68 
It appears that many young “democracies” face this challenge. Politicians in 
starting democracies are less capable of making credible promises to large 
groups of voters than in older democracies. Therefore, they turn to giving 
preferential treatment to specific groups of voters and acquiring resources 
for the purpose of patronage at the expense of the provision of public ser-
vices benefitting everyone. In a situation in which a voter thinks he or she 
can benefit most by associating with a political patron, politicians are un-
derstandably tempted to focus on patron-client relationships with potential 
voters to address the problem of credibility. Politicians in older democracies 
have more opportunities than their counterparts in young democracies to es-
tablish a credible political reputation among large groups of the electorate.69
Political considerations of a “vertical” (patron-client) nature determined po-
litical preferences much more often than “horizontal” (for example, shared 
socioeconomic) interests. In practice, these preferences were based on ethnic 
and/or regional affinity, and the political coalitions along these lines. A clear 
example was the elections in Kenya after the reintroduction of multiparty 
politics. Over and over again, politicians were prepared to mobilize ethnical-
ly based “vertical” relationships for political purposes. After the withdrawal 
of the Movement system, the NRM in Uganda was capable by using well-test-
ed patronage practices to win over a substantial part of the political elite at 
the national and local levels. 
The instrumentalization of ethnic and regional affiliations, together with 
widespread patronage practices to win the loyalty of a part of the political 
elite, was an integral part of Congolese politics. As indicated earlier, in Rwan-
da, the position of RPF in the political arena was so overwhelming that elec-
tions were scarcely relevant. In Ethiopia, elections most of the time were a 
formality as well, with the exception of 2005. In these elections a united op-
68 G. Hyden, African politics in comparative perspective (Cambridge, 2012), 137.
69 P. Keefer, “Democratization and clientelism: why are young democracies badly governed?” 
World Bank PS3594  (Washington, 2005).
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position, which was allowed more political space than before, posed a serious 
electoral threat to the EPRDF. Subsequently, the opposition was neutralized. 
Still, this time the above picture also needs to be qualified. The ideals of de-
mocracy, “good governance,” or at least less corruption are very attractive to 
the population in Africa just as all over the world. The Kenyan example might 
suffice here. What Kenyans expect as the output of a multiparty system and 
elections are very familiar: a fair distribution of opportunities and resources, 
righteous leaders, and less corruption. Yearning for a moral economy is still 
very much alive. In spite of all the intimidation, violence, and disappoint-
ment about the results, Kenyans still continue to attach great value to politi-
cal pluralism as a means of electing their leaders. Remarkable but at the same 
time understandable was the discrepancy between the importance given to a 
democratic political system and, on the other hand, the considerations on the 
basis of which people voted: ethnicity and direct reciprocity, which at least in 
part appeared to be contradictory. 
At the same time considerations other than ethnicity or regional background 
and the corresponding reciprocity influenced how people voted. Although a 
candidate from the north was available, an important part of the electorate 
in the north of Uganda voted in 2006 for a candidate from the west, who was 
deemed to stand a better chance against Yoweri Museveni. In 2012, the ma-
jority of same electorate voted this time for the incumbent, primarily because 
he had brought peace to the northern part of the country. Kabila Jr., whose 
family originates from Katanga, won the 2006 elections mainly because of his 
popularity in the east of the country. Voters in the east held him responsible 
for the (short-lived) return of peace, and the withdrawal of Rwandan and 
Ugandan troops from the east of the Congo. 
Exceptions confirm the rule. The reintroduction of a multiparty system and 
the corresponding elections adjusted the rules of the political game but as 
such did not change the neo-patrimonial logic, which was at the heart of Af-
rican politics; at best it imposed certain restrictions. 
7.6 Cohesion of the political elite
The common lines and patterns formulated above had serious implications 
for the degree of political cohesion of the ruling coalition in the five coun-
tries. It must be emphasized, however, that elite fragmentation is not just the 
preserve of a multiparty democracy. In the period after independence, there 
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were also already sharp divisions among the political elites in the Congo, 
Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda. 
An extreme example of this is the Congo. Immediately after independence, 
fragmentation of the political elite was the order of the day. With the excep-
tion of the first ten years of the Mobutu regime, during which he managed a 
certain level of cohesion among the political class, elite fragmentation was a 
main characteristic of the political settlement in the Congo. The opening up 
of the political system in the early 1990s and the subsequent manipulation 
of the political constellation by Mobutu resulted in a further fragmentation 
of Congolese politics. This fragmentation reached its climax during the two 
Congolese wars leading to autonomous regional elites. During the transition 
government established in 2001, the outlines of an elite agreement began to 
take shape again. The period after the elections showed that this type of set-
tlement did not last. 
Initially Uganda did not fare any better. Until the NRM came to power in 
1986, political and military representatives from the north of the country (for 
example, during Obote and Amin) dominated the ruling coalitions. The main 
features of these coalitions were not only the exclusion of important elite fac-
tions from other parts of the country but also the internal divisions of these 
coalitions. Following the terminology of Khan: The vertical and the horizon-
tal bases of the ruling coalition were rather small, with dire consequences. 
The rule of Museveni and the NRM signified an import break with the past. 
The regime, bearing in mind the NRM “philosophy,” was able, with some suc-
cess, to also win over elites other than those from the west and Buganda. The 
NRM, as a political organization, managed to discipline those who did not 
conform and reward those who did. In short, the horizontal as well as the 
vertical bases of the regime were consolidated to such an extent that Ugan-
da for the first time since independence witnessed a long period of stability. 
When the NRM became less successful in maintaining internal cohesion, it 
changed its strategy. The NRM used the reintroduction of a pluralist politi-
cal system to restore internal consensus and regain political strength. Being 
a political party within the framework of a multiparty system, there was no 
longer a need for the NRM to accommodate political dissidents within the 
“Movement.” In other words, the NRM instrumentalized the introduction of 
multiparty politics to consolidate its grip on power. It was accepted that this 
came at the expense of political inclusiveness.
Between independence and the 2003 elections, one can distinguish roughly 
three periods in Rwanda as regards the manner in which the political settle-
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ments between the several elite factions was organized. Confrontation be-
tween between the “old” Tutsi and “new” Hutu elites characterized the first 
period. During the Habyarimana regime, the increasing intra-ethnic compe-
tition between the Hutu elite from the north and south of the country was 
the main feature of the political settlement. The narrowing powerbase of the 
ruling coalition contributed to events leading to the genocide, when not only 
a large part of the Tutsi population group was massacred but also a num-
ber of Hutu opposition leaders murdered. Unlike in the past, the RPF opted 
expressly for inclusivity. It was the first time in the post-colonial history of 
Rwanda that political power was not purely organized along ethnic lines. As 
indicated earlier, opinions differ as to whether this political settlement in-
deed formed a solid horizontal and vertical powerbase for the regime or that 
it just constituted a façade. In any case, its capacity for action was well taken 
care of. 
Although much less destructive than in the Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda, 
competitive clientelism determined politics in Kenya to a large extent as well. 
The period after independence, during which Kenyatta senior left his mark 
on the nature and the composition of the regime, constituted an important 
exception. This changed in the final stages of his regime and even more so 
during the Moi era. Certain factions were given expressly preferential treat-
ment over others. Moi and his allies increasingly used divide-and-rule tac-
tics to consolidate their power. Ethnic arithmetic was the guiding principle. 
The consolidation of political power depended on the alliance of a number 
of – often smaller – ethnic groups, with anti-Kikuyu sentiments as a com-
mon denominator. A certain level of inclusivity under Kenyatta was replaced 
by exclusion. The gradual exclusion of (economically) important parts of the 
various elites narrowed the powerbase of the regime considerably. 
The reintroduction of multiparty politics, and in particular presidential elec-
tions, very much influenced the way ruling coalitions operated. In their effort 
to consolidate or expand their power, members of the political elite had to 
adjust to the changed rules of the game. How this happened was different in 
each country. These adjustments to the new political reality had a number of 
implications for the vertical and horizontal base of the ruling coalitions in the 
five countries and the degree of cohesion among the political elites. 
The 2006 elections in the Congo were relatively successful. They had a stabi-
lizing impact because they formalized, in a visible and recognized way, the 
balance of power between the different elite groups and reduced the risk that 
these groups would try to realize an adjustment by the use of force. In the 
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period following these elections, fragmentation among the political elites in 
the Congo gradually occurred again along familiar lines. The position of the 
ruling elites in Uganda hardly faced any threat by the elites excluded from 
power. More relevant were the challenges coming from within this coalition. 
As indicated, a part of the NRM leadership made a deliberate choice to use 
the introduction of multiparty politics to get rid of a number of important 
dissidents within the NRM. By doing so the cohesion of the organization and 
the loyalty of the lower echelons to the party leadership could be restored. 
Kenya might serve as a classic example of competitive clientelism. Fragmen-
tation of the elite had already started before the introduction of a multiparty 
system, but it subsequently intensified. The position of the ruling coalition 
was repeatedly threatened by excluded factions as well as internal divisions, 
albeit not always simultaneously. In spite of its narrow powerbase, the ruling 
elite managed to stay in power during the 1992 and 1997 elections, partly 
thanks to the divisions among the excluded factions. The situation in the run 
up the 2002 elections was different: The regime was seriously weakened with 
regard to its horizontal and vertical powerbase. For once the opposition was 
united, and, within the ruling party, serious disagreements came to the fore 
about the question of who should succeed Daniel arap Moi as leader. In 2007, 
there was a consensus among the factions of the ruling coalition, but its pow-
erbase was rather limited. The outcome was an outburst of violence in the 
aftermath of the elections. The ICC indictments resulted in a rearrangement 
of political forces, but still along ethnic lines.
After the introduction of political pluralism, political elites remained divided 
along ethnic and regional lines. In a number of cases, the introduction of a 
multiparty system formalized and intensified the competition between the 
different factions. There is no lack of examples: the 1992 and 1997 elections 
in Kenya, the opening up of the political system in the Congo and Rwanda, 
or the 1980 elections in Uganda. In brief, the reintroduction of multiparty 
democracy did not contribute to a greater cohesion among the political elite 
but rather the opposite. At the same time it has to be recognized that frag-
mentation of the political elite was already an issue during times when there 
was no multiparty system in place. The increased competition among the 
elite in Uganda in the final days of Obote II or in the Congo after Mobutu 
disappeared from the political stage had little to do with political pluralism 
or elections. The same applies to the disintegration of Ethiopia under the re-
gime of Mengistu. 
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In Rwanda multiparty elections did not have any impact on the political set-
tlement and powerbase of the regime. In as far as there appeared to be a 
declining powerbase, it had little to do with the elections in 2006 and 2011. 
In Ethiopia something similar happened. After coming to power in 1991, the 
EPRDF was in a strong position vis-à-vis the political elites outside the coa-
lition as well as potential opponents within the coalition.  The integration of 
a part of local elites into the regime, the internal divisions of the opposition, 
and the repressive policies exercised by the regime no doubt added to the 
weakness of the excluded elites. The tight organization of the EPRDF im-
posed a strong discipline among its members. Within this context, elections 
served as legitimizing exercises for the existing political set-up. After the 
electoral scare in 2005, measures were taken to avoid this façade of electoral 
legitimacy from being jeopardized again.  
7.7 Economic transformation and political settlement 
Africa has witnessed substantial economic growth in the last ten to fifteen 
years. That was also the case in the five countries under review. However, it 
has also been pointed out that this economic growth was primarily based on 
rising world market prices for natural resources and more effective process-
ing and export of primary goods. 
Without economic transformation this economic growth cannot be sus-
tained.70 In the five countries limited progress was made in changing the 
economic structure and enhancing the technological level of the economy. 
Opinions differ about the question of where the policy focus should be dur-
ing the initial stages of this transformation.71 But is clear that an economic 
take-off, in the sense of structural changes in the economy, has not taken 
place as of yet. A comparison with countries outside of Africa, which under-
70 See, for example, the conclusions of the African Center for Economic Transformation in 
“Growing rapidly-transforming slowly”; the Economic Commission for Africa, “Making the 
most of Africa’s commodities: industrializing for growth, jobs and economic transformation,” in 
A. Noman, K. Botchwey, H.Stein, and J. Stiglitz (eds.), Good growth and governance in Africa. 
Rethinking development strategies; D. Rodrik, The future of economic convergence.
71 The research project Tracking Development draws the conclusion that a combination of 
macroeconomic stability, economic freedom, in particular, for small farmers and enterpre-
neurs, and substantial financial government support to the countryside was a precondition for 
the economic take-off of a number of Southeast-Asian countries (D. Henley, Asia-Africa devel-
opment divergence: a question of intent [Leiden, 2010]).
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went a process of transformation at an earlier stage, shows that Africa is still 
at the beginning of this process. 
Of the five countries, political conditions have possibly been created in Ethi-
opia and Rwanda that can pave the way towards a structural change of their 
economies. However, the economic transformation index of the African 
Center for Economic Transformation, which compares African countries to 
each other, shows that also these countries are still lagging behind. It has to 
be noted that, although a political settlement conducive to economic trans-
formation seems to be present in these two countries, the recent history of 
the countries still has a big impact on the start and tempo of such a develop-
ment. In particular, the disruptive effects of the violent conflict these coun-
tries went through are still very much present.
Experiences in Asia, among other regions, show that an active role of govern-
ment in bringing about structural changes in the economy is of crucial im-
portance. It requires a government that is prepared to make the substantial 
investments needed for economic transformation and also capable of main-
taining these policies for a considerable period of time. A necessary but not 
sufficient precondition is a ruling coalition that has enough support from the 
political elites and perseverance to be able to implement these policies.
The introduction of multiparty democracy, according to a Western template, 
did not contribute in the five countries to any such political settlement. It ap-
pears that the opposite might have happened. The stagnation of the Kenyan 
economy already started before the reintroduction of political pluralism. But 
multiparty politics did not bring about a positive change. Moreover, election 
years turned out to be bad for the economy. Noteworthy, though, is that, after 
the 2002, elections the economy continued to grow in spite of an intensifica-
tion of competitive clientelism after the disintegration of the NARC coalition. 
Since the NRM came to power in 1986, Uganda has experienced political 
stability, continuous growth (although slowing down in recent years), and 
a reduction in poverty. After the introduction of a multiparty system, the 
NRM still managed to maintain the support of a major part of the national 
and local elites, using patronage as an important tool. The related costs did 
not sit well (from a developmental perspective) with an efficient allocation of 
the still scarce resources. After the relatively successful elections in 2006, the 
Congo entered a period of macroeconomic stability, some economic recov-
ery, and, initially, also political stability. A partial departure from the policies 
geared towards macroeconomic stability in 2005 coincided with the prepara-
tions for the elections in 2006. 
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The lack of political pluralism in Ethiopia and Rwanda could well have con-
tributed to a political climate that made substantial investments to boost the 
modernization of the economy possible. The mixture of the determination of 
an autocratic regime and a policy focused consistently on socioeconomic de-
velopment might have not resulted in democratic legitimacy but has created 
a certain level of support by the population, based on the provision of peace 
and security, improved public services, and economic progress.72 It seems 
that, in these countries, at least the political foundation was laid for econom-
ic transformation. 
72 See also P. Collier, War, guns and votes: democracy in dangerous places (New York, 
2010).
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8 Conclusions
8.1 No positive contribution of multiparty democracy 
The central question in this study is whether the introduction or reintro-
duction of a multiparty system and corresponding elections in a number of 
African countries in the 1990s contributed to political settlements that are 
conducive to economic development and transformation. 
Most members of the Western donor community emphasize the normative 
and legitimacy aspects of “good governance.” The advancement of a multipar-
ty system is an important dimension of their governance agenda. Although 
multiparty politics and elections are not identical with “good governance” or 
democracy, they constitute central and crucial elements, and therefore an 
inseparable part of this agenda.
A number of studies establish a relationship between “good governance” and 
economic development in general. The authors of Why nations fail? point 
out the importance of inclusive political institutions for (economic) develop-
ment. The economic growth of a number of African cheetahs in recent years 
is partly attributed to the introduction of more open and democratic political 
systems.73 In addition, statistical studies in particular show an important cor-
relation between economic growth and political “good governance.”
However, (seen from the perspective of the typology of Khan) the conclusion 
here can be drawn that the introduction/reintroduction of a multiparty sys-
tem and corresponding elections did not particularly help the establishment 
of political coalitions that were prepared to initiate a long-term developmen-
tal agenda and were capable of enforcing the implementation of such poli-
cies. In Rwanda and Ethiopia, there appeared to be a potential developmen-
tal coalition, although those in power kept the political system under tight 
73 D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson, Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity and poverty 
(New York, 2012); S. Radelet, Emerging Africa: how 17 countries are leading the way (Washing-
ton, 2010).
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control. The weakness of the factions excluded from power and the strong 
hierarchical organization of the ruling coalition in both countries enabled 
them to implement such an agenda. Competitive clientelism, albeit in varying 
degrees, was the main feature of the political settlements in Kenya and the 
Congo. The relative strength of the excluded factions, as well as the limited 
authority over its own supporters, resulted most of the time in opportunistic, 
short-term policies by the ruling coalition and a limited implementation ca-
pacity. It is obvious that the negative consequences of this were much bigger 
in the Congo than in Kenya. The structure of the ruling coalition in Uganda 
evolved into a weak dominant party, whereby forces within and not so much 
outside the ruling party constituted the most important threat to political 
stability.
On the basis of the five country cases and the identified common lines and 
patterns, as described in the previous chapter, the following trends related to 
the introduction/reintroduction of multiparty politics in Africa can be iden-
tified that contributed to the above state of affairs. 
Trend 1
Continuation of the neo-patrimonial nature of the political process 
A lot changed as a consequence of the introduction of a multiparty system 
in the five countries. Political leaders had to try harder to stay in or come to 
power. At the same time, much remained the same. Multiparty democra-
cy offered a new framework, but the nature of the political process in itself 
did not change fundamentally. Choices by political actors within this context 
were not so much influenced by motives, based on programmatic or ideo-
logical convictions, as they were by (equally politically rational) considera-
tions that were focused on direct reciprocity with their supporters. Given the 
increased competition among the political elite to win votes, the introduc-
tion of a multiparty system resulted in an intensification of these practices 
in contrast to what was intended. In other words, it was much more the re-
lationship between patrons and their (potential) “clients,” which determined 
to a large extent the functioning of the new political system than between 
politically conscious citizens. Elections turned out to be exercises, whereby 
political Big Men tried to get access to the available government and other 
resources for themselves and their supporters. In a number of cases the coa-
lition in charge manipulated the reintroduction of multiparty politics in such 
a way that continuation of their power could be secured. At election time, ac-
countability was taken literally. Generosity by a candidate yielded more votes 
than asking support for political programs formulated in general terms. This 
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did not mean, as was shown in the country cases, that there were no other 
considerations in play, which could lead in part to other outcomes. 
Political parties operated roughly along the same lines. They were often per-
sonal in nature, based on an informal and patronage-based relationship be-
tween leaders and supporters. In most cases, ethnic and regional origin in 
practice constituted a more important point of reference than ideological 
or programmatic differences. Exceptions to a certain extent were the ruling 
parties in Rwanda and Ethiopia.
Trend 2
Intensified divisions among the political elites 
After the introduction of multiparty democracy, political elites remained di-
vided along ethnic and regional lines. The new political system formalized 
and intensified the competition between ethnic groups. Electoral politics re-
sulted in a stronger emphasis on existing differences between political elites 
(and the population). As political freedoms improved and elections became 
more free and fair, the divisions between the political elites and the focus on 
short-term political success increased. To be fair, during the period when 
multiparty politics were absent, the political elites were also often divided as 
well. In Rwanda and Ethiopia this was much less the case. Multiparty elec-
tions in these countries scarcely had any impact on the political cohesion of 
the ruling elite. In as far there were divisions among the ruling elite, these 
were not related to elections.
Trend 3
Political manipulation of ethnicity remains a serious problem 
African societies are pervaded by ethnicity. It constitutes an import refer-
ence frame for most Africans. Ethnic arithmetic is a skill, which every Afri-
can politician possesses. The legacy of colonialism determined partly how, 
after independence, ethnicity was used and abused for purposes of political 
competition. Moreover, after the reintroduction of a multiparty system, eth-
nic identity, in whatever shape or form, remained an essential mobilization 
tool for politicians. Many political leaders made use of ethnicity to decide 
multiparty elections to their advantage and secure their political position. 
Quite often they turned ethnic distinctions into antagonistic contradictions. 
Violence around elections usually had a strong ethnic connotation. In short, 
multiparty elections often contributed to an increased emphasis on ethnic 
differences in order to gain political advantage. Moral ethnicity was defeated 
by political tribalism.
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Trend 4
The use of violence for political purposes continued
Election results determined who would get access to government resources. 
Taking into account the nature of politics in these countries, this access was 
of crucial importance for political leaders in order to maintain or expand 
their power. Therefore, it came as no surprise that the introduction of multi-
party politics would often go hand-in-hand with violence. Political violence 
especially occurred when the ruling party or coalition was unsure about the 
outcome of elections. When the political dominance of the ruling party was 
evident, the chance of election violence diminished. Political violence was of 
course not the prerogative of a multiparty democracy. Civil war and its im-
plications for the political process are an integral part of the recent history 
of four of the five countries (the exception is Kenya). However, the introduc-
tion/reintroduction of a multiparty system and corresponding elections cer-
tainly did not put a stop to political violence.
Trend 5
Political corruption depended on the nature of specific elections 
The misuse of public means for political purposes did not decrease after the 
introduction of multiparty democracy in Kenya, Uganda, and the Congo. The 
rivalry between competing factions intensified in order to come to power, 
but even more so to remain in power. To win the support of voters, favors had 
to be distributed on a large scale or promises to that effect had to be made. 
For this a lot of money was needed. This was hardly the case in Rwanda and 
Ethiopia, where the outcome of elections was a forgone conclusion, given the 
dominant position of the ruling coalition. 
The trends outlined here of course cannot exclusively be traced back to the 
reintroduction of a multiparty system in the 1990s. Still the conclusion can 
be drawn that the introduction of a pluralist political system did not put an 
end to these trends or change them in a positive direction. In some cases neg-
ative trends intensified. Sometimes they were defused by turning multipar-
ty politics de facto into irrelevant exercises. In any case, a pluralist political 
system and elections did not result in inclusive political institutions, which, 
according to Acemoglu and Robinson in their Why nations fail?, are a pre-
condition for economic development.74
74 D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson, Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity and poverty 
(New York, 2012).
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This complex and obstinate reality did not escape the international donor 
community either and resulted sometimes in a more pragmatic approach. At 
the same time, Western donors continued to consider multiparty democracy 
and elections as an important priority in their “good governance” agenda. 
The discrepancy between theory and practice is particlarly striking in coun-
tries in which the situation in terms of democratization on the ground does 
not correspond at all with the demands of the Western donor community, 
but which do have successful and efficient developmental policies. In other 
words, the political representative of a donor country faces two politically 
conflicting realities: the political situation at home, where often the need of 
a democracy according to a Western template is emphasized, and in the re-
cipient country, where visible and real developmental progress is made, but 
where the level of democracy is not in line at all with Western expectations. 
This has been the case in Rwanda and Ethiopia.
But first things first. Apart from personal and other (e.g. economic or secu-
rity) considerations, the political representative in question, if only out of 
self-interest, will prioritize the political reality at home over the complex re-
ality of the recipient country. Sometimes an effort is made to accommodate 
both: The recipient country will be lectured publicly about the democracy 
deficit, but at the same time the support will continue in spite of all the rhet-
oric. As head of the division of the ministry of Foreign Affairs dealing with, 
among others, the bilateral relations between the Netherlands and Rwanda, I 
had the privilege to witness this process up-close.75 
8.2 Intrinsic value?
Although the introduction of a political system according to the Western 
template did not contribute demonstrably to political conditions conducive 
for economic development, one could still argue that democracy in itself 
has an intrinsic value and therefore worthwhile pursuing.76 Advancement of 
“good governance,” and in particular democracy, could also be an objective in 
itself and for that reason should be supported. This is, however, more com-
75 From 2009 to 2013, I headed the Middle and Southern Africa division of the ministry of For-
eign Affairs. The critical comments and questions from parliament and civil society with regard 
to Rwanda focused primarily on the authoritarian nature of the Rwandan regime, in addition to 
its involvement in the Congo conflict.
76 See, for example, A. Sen, Development as freedom (New York, 2000); T. Carothers, “De-
mocracy assistance: political vs. developmental?” Journal of Democracy 20:1 (2009), 5–19; T. 
Carothers, “The elusive synthesis,” Journal of Democracy  21:4 (2010), 12–26.
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plicated than it seems. The tension between the requirements for sustained 
economic growth and modernization of the economy in developing coun-
tries, on the one hand, and “good governance” ideals, on the other, is not easy 
to reconcile. 
From the perspective of economic development, the trends, as described 
above, were bad news. The “good governance” agenda as pursued in Africa 
appeared to have become part of the problem. A fragmented political elite 
saw no other option than to implement a political agenda, which did not 
reach further than the next elections. To secure a positive election outcome 
and, as a result, political power, available means were used to commit (poten-
tial) supporters and neutralize opponents: tangible favors, ethnic prejudices, 
and violence.  Against the background of the divisions among the political 
elites as a consequence of the societal and political context in most African 
countries, political actors seemed to be more interested in the accumulation 
of resources for the purpose of patronage than for development. Multiparty 
democracy reinforced this type of politics instead of reducing it and con-
tributed to a political settlement that was not very helpful in creating the 
political preconditions for an economic take-off. The short-term political re-
quirements prevailed over a structural development agenda, if present at all. 
The subsequent elections in Kenya after the reintroduction of a multiparty 
democracy are a case in point. In practice these two, by themselves laudable 
objectives, were at odds with each other. 
In a number of cases, the introduction of a multiparty system did more harm 
than good. The preconditions present in more developed countries were sim-
ply not in place in many developing countries. What happened was not so 
much democratization but an increase in elections. The transfer of political 
institutions from Western developed countries to developing countries did 
not lead to the desired political, democratic changes and the supposed ef-
fects, such as accountability and legitimacy. Quite the opposite: If these insti-
tutions as a consequence of international or domestic pressure are imposed 
on developing countries without taking into account the nature of the po-
litical settlement between the relevant elite factions, they will perform even 
worse than the ones they have replaced. The emphasis by the West on multi-
party democracy Western style might have led to a situation in a number of 
developing countries where they lacked not only the capacity of an autocratic 
state to act in a resolute manner but also the accountability of a well func-
tioning democracy.
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8.3 What to do?
There are of course factors that are of major importance for successful eco-
nomic policies in developing countries but which can hardly be influenced 
(such as geographical factors, worldmarket prices, etc.). The conclusion that 
can be drawn on the basis of the previous chapters is that the insistence by 
the international donor community on a Western-type political settlement in 
the countries under review, as a precondition for or at least a contribution to 
sustained economic development, was not particularly successful. Therefore, 
the question should be raised as to which political constellation would be 
more conducive for sustainable (economic) development in these countries? 
The answer might be a type of political elite arrangement that is fundamen-
tally different from the one prescribed by the West. 
The distribution of political power among the national elites is of crucial im-
portance for a structural take-off of the economy. Given the nature of the 
politics in the countries studied, the manner in which the political settle-
ment is organized determines to a large extent the political costs of a policy 
focused on structural economic development and the effectiveness of its im-
plementation. The more firmly a ruling coalition is in the saddle vis-à-vis po-
litical opponents outside and within the coalition, the bigger the chance that 
a long-term horizon will be used in determining policies and the bigger the 
chance of being able to enforce these policies. Those in power do not have to 
worry about the result of the next elections and therefore do not have to use 
a substantial part of the available resources to secure the outcome of these 
elections. 
Such a political settlement offers the possibility to the powers-that-be to keep 
a check on the existing, often patronage-based political tensions and free re-
sources for investments, which will only pay off at a later date. In other words, 
the ruling coalition must have the power to be able to mobilize resources in 
a structural manner in support of economic growth and transformation, in-
stead of having to use them for short-term political gains.
A political settlement along these lines was an important component of the 
economic take-off in a number of Asian countries. Examples of this, albeit 
only for a relatively brief period, can also be found in Africa. Ivory Coast, 
Kenya, and Malawi initially achieved substantial socioeconomic progress on 
the basis of this type of settlement. However, this period of accelerated eco-
nomic growth could not be maintained and came to an end with the death or 
diminishing power of their political leaders. 
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Although most African countries, including the country cases in this study, 
witnessed a period of economic growth, the process of a tangible economic 
transformation leading to (economic) convergence with developed countries 
has not started yet. Of the five countries, possibly the political preconditions 
in Rwanda and Ethiopia have been created, which will allow them at a cer-
tain point in time to take this path. Only the future will show whether this 
is indeed the case. It is too early to express a definite opinion. At present, 
the economic development in both countries is still at the initial stage. In 
the Economic Transformation Index, both countries lag behind other African 
countries.
As, for example, the outcome of the research project Tracking Development, 
which carried out a historical comparison of the developmental path of four 
Southeast Asia countries and four African countries, shows, it was not the 
presence or absence in these countries of “good governance,” nor the accept-
ance of Western-type political institutions or meeting generally accepted lib-
eral-democratic standards, that determined the economic success of these 
Asian countries.77 Neither in the five African countries under review has the 
introduction of multiparty democracy, as an essential part of the “good gov-
ernance” agenda of the international donor community, been a very positive 
contribution. 
But that is not the whole story. A ruling coalition that is firmly in-charge will 
create stability and is therefore a necessary but not a sufficient precondition 
for a successful take-off. Such a political settlement will not automatically 
result in an agenda focused on long-term economic development. Although 
the NRM in Uganda, certainly after the 2011 elections, has been firmly pull-
ing the strings, it still considers it necessary to use a substantial part of gov-
ernment resources to consolidate its powerbase instead of making relevant 
economic investments. Under similar circumstances, the same applies to the 
Congo after the election victory in 2006. In short, there is more to it. In ad-
dition to the type of political settlement, much more emphasis should be put 
on the difference in policy choices and the way in which those policies are 
implemented. 
In answer to the question why those in power in Southeast Asia opted for 
policies focusing on long-term development, poverty reduction, and invest-
ment in rural areas, the relevant literature most of the time refers to the spe-
cific historical circumstances as they existed in those days in that part of the 
77 See for publications, www.institutions-africa.org.
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world. Reference is made to the common interests of the ruling political elite, 
which had to react to the threat of communist-led revolutionary movements 
especially in the countryside. This “systematic” threat forced the political 
elites to support a regime that was capable and willing to defend its interests. 
This also included addressing the needs of the poor rural population as an in-
tegral part of the developmental agenda. There are no indications that in the 
countries studied within the framework of this research, electoral democracy 
was able to generate a similar political pressure. 
In the opinion of former research leader of the project Tracking Development, 
David Henley, other factors of a more personal nature played an important 
role as well. He emphasizes the importance of the personal convictions of 
the leaders in a number of Southeast Asian countries. Partly on the basis of 
personal experiences (during the anti-colonial struggle) and nationalist con-
siderations, they appeared to be determined to contribute to the economic 
prosperity of the whole nation, the majority of which lived in the country-
side. He comes to the conclusion: “…The great divergence between African 
and South-East Asian development performance since 1960 does not result 
from differences in geographical or institutional endowments, but simply in 
the absence in most parts of Africa, and the presence of most parts in South-
East Asia, of a serious developmental intent on the part of national political 
leaders.”78 
In Kenya, Uganda, and the Congo this “systematic threat” from the rural ar-
eas did not exist, but it could be, to a certain extent, the case in Rwanda 
and Ethiopia. The policies of the Rwanda authorities seem to be partly based 
on the belief that rapid economic and social development is the only way to 
neutralize the potential threat to the present regime by the majority of poor 
Hutu peasants. This might also be the case in Ethiopia, where the majority 
of the rural population belongs to ethnic groups than the dominating party 
in the coalition, which was in charge in Addis Ababa. At the same time, as 
emphasized by Henley, the importance of personal convictions and choices 
of the political leadership in these countries (Kagame, Zenawi!) should not 
be underestimated. 
Apart from all kinds of considerations based on power politics, Ethiopia 
stands out because of the explicit ideological dimension of the regime, which 
was absent or much less present in the other countries. In Rwanda it took 
more than ten years for the RPF regime to opt for a development strategy, 
78 D. Henley, Asia-Africa development divergence: a question of intent (Leiden, 2010), XIII.
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where an increase in agricultural productivity and income for small (Hutu) 
farmers would become an important component. 
Still, political leaders, even if they are cast in the right mould, cannot surpass 
themselves. In the history of a country, there are also many deeply rooted so-
cial and economic factors, which also have an impact on the political system 
and the economic development of that country. These can be positive as well 
as negative, but usually they cannot be changed easily or rapidly.
In the country chapters, examples of this can be found, not only specific po-
litical characteristics, perceptions among the population about political pow-
er, or ethnic fragmentation but also, for instance (which is outside the scope 
of this study), the value placed on entrepreneurship in a society.79 The out-
come of the interdependence between agency and path dependency cannot 
be summarized in general formulations; it is the result of country specific 
circumstances, as described in the country cases. 
From an economic development perspective, the reintroduction of multipar-
ty democracy in the 1990s in Africa has been anything but successful, but it 
has become gradually part and parcel of the political system of African coun-
tries. In addition, under specific historical circumstances, the introduction of 
a multiparty system and corresponding elections did contribute to political 
stability, one of the preconditions for economic development. The 2002 elec-
tions in Kenya guaranteed an orderly transfer of power by a bankrupt regime, 
which had lost the support of the majority of the people. After years of civil 
war, the 2006 elections in the Congo provided clarity about the actual bal-
ance of power in the country. The 2011 elections in Uganda confirmed Mu-
seveni’s position of power as being recognized by the majority of the people. 
Moreover, although frequently disappointed about the impact, many Afri-
cans continue to have confidence in multiparty democracy as the best polit-
ical system for securing a better future. The ideal of democracy, “good gov-
ernance,” or at least less corruption exert, just like in other parts of the world, 
a real attraction for the population in Africa. At the same time, it is not to 
be expected that the Western donor community will soon stop pressing for 
a political system in line with their own experiences. Partly because of the 
79 Kenya might be an interesting case. The political settlement is characterized by a number 
of negative trends in terms of economic development. Still, there are indications that point in 
the direction of partial economic transformation. It is too early to tell whether this is indeed 
the case. 
Koper ASC.indd   202 28-11-18   16:26
526893-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 3-12-2018 PDF page: 203
203
still substantial aid dependency, countries especially in sub-Saharan Africa 
will continue to be confronted with the wishes, preferences, and demands 
of Western donor countries in this area. Therefore, the question becomes 
relevant as to how a “good governance” agenda, which takes into account the 
context as described in this study, should look. 
8.4 The Ten Commandments for crafting a sensible “good 
 governance” policy 
The country cases show that it is rather doubtful whether the reintroduction 
of a multiparty democracy and corresponding elections created the right po-
litical conditions or provided the necessary incentives to African political 
elites to enable structural economic development. Even if it is true that reg-
ular elections lead to more civil and political liberties, the question still re-
mains as to what the significance of this is.
As stated several times, multiparty politics are not identical to “good govern-
ance.” Still they form an integral part of this concept. Promoting multiparty 
democracy, and free-and-fair elections are one of the most crucial compo-
nents of the “good governance” agenda of the traditional donor community. 
On the basis of the findings of this study, an effort will be made in this chapter 
to formulate a number of more general, realistic policy recommendations as 
regards “good governance.” 
Africa distinguishes itself from modern Western societies in two important 
respects: a relative low level of development not comparable with that of the 
West and Africa is “different,” that is, African and not Western. This has im-
portant consequences for the content and the application of “good govern-
ance” policies and, in particular, for the sequence of economic and political 
reforms. The level of development of a society has implications for the soci-
etal context in which the business of politics is done.80
For a “good governance” agenda to be relevant for African countries and for 
it to contribute to sustained economic development, it needs to take into 
account the specific developmental phase of these countries. The term good 
enough governance, coined by the American political scientist Merilee Grin-
80 See, for instance, R. Inglehart and C. Welzl, The human development sequence. Moderniza-
tion, cultural change and democracy (Cambridge, 2005).
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dle, is highly relevant in this context.81 What is meant here is that it is not 
necessary or possible to tackle all the problems in the area of “good govern-
ance” at the same time as the institutions and capacity in question are the 
result of specific historical developments as well. Often, in and of itself, laud-
able efforts to promote “good governance” result in lists of governance issues 
that need to be resolved, without paying much attention to what should be 
done first in order to have a better chance to achieve other governance objec-
tives later. In determining the sequence, timing, and type of intervention, one 
should first explicitly take into account the specific circumstances in a coun-
try (for example, limited financial resources, and the available knowledge, 
expertise, and organizational capacity) and the specific target to be achieved. 
According to Grindle, good enough governance should focus primarily on the 
minimal conditions needed for political and economic development. What 
those conditions are depends on the specific characteristics and available ca-
pacity in a country. 
But that is not all. On the basis of the study of the country cases, and the 
lines and patterns identified, the conclusion has to be drawn that a “good 
governance” agenda that wants to be relevant should not focus on the ad-
vancement of democracy or the fight against authoritarian regimes. Much 
more important is the presence of and the support for a regime that has the 
determination and the capacity to implement a long-term economic devel-
opment agenda and free up the resources necessary for that purpose. Apart 
from the right policy choices and implementation, political leadership that 
has a solid powerbase and a genuine developmental ambition constitutes an 
essential condition. 
It is time for the international donor community to stop pressing for a “good 
governance” agenda, which scarcely had the desired effect in developing 
countries and, in a number of cases, even resulted in the opposite of what 
was trying to be achieved. The debate about the relevance of “good govern-
ance” for the development of Africa should be framed along different lines, 
resulting in an approach in tune with the African reality. It will have to be an 
approach that does not highlight the legitimacy aspects of governance on the 
basis of a Western template and its supposedly salutary effects but that con-
tributes to the establishment of political conditions necessary for economic 
development: No good governance but a developmental governance agenda. 
It is of course not possible here to come up with a ready-made answer to the 
81 M. Grindle, “Good enough governance revisited,” Development Policy Review 29:1 (2011), 
199–222.
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question of what this new approach should entail. However, based on the 
country cases and the relevant literature, a number of suggestions can be 
formulated as to which “commandments” should figure in such an agenda.
Thou shalt review thy policy assumptions 
What can the international donor community do? To be frank, not much. 
Outsiders should be modest. The domestic political process might well be a 
decisive factor in determining the future of a developing country, but donor 
countries are not in a position to act as drivers of change with regard to gov-
ernance issues and should not have the ambition to do so. Developing coun-
tries, just as Western countries in the past, will have to find their own way. 
The (political) reorganization of patronage networks, so they can no longer 
block development, is obviously not a task for outsiders. 
What the international donor community can do is to critically confront 
once again a number of its own policy assumptions with regard to “good 
governance,” in general, and the presumed necessity of a pluralist political 
system, in particular, in terms of the African reality. The effectiveness of a 
Western-type democracy depends on economic and social conditions, which 
in any case were not (yet) present in the five countries studied. To actively 
promote such a political system and to make the provision of aid conditional 
on fulfilling this demand, for example, is based on a misunderstanding of and 
runs contrary to the political and social reality of those countries: wrong di-
agnosis, wrong prescription. 
Thou shalt take account of the special character of African states 
Another type of analysis is required. The prevailing model of the state on the 
African continent is a patrimonial one. This system permeates all levels of so-
ciety, up to the highest political echelons. Many important decisions taken by 
government are influenced by it. A clearer understanding of these pervasive 
client-patron relationships and their impact on the functioning of multiparty 
systems is crucial for formulating a sensible strategy. An analysis will become 
more relevant to the extent to which this reality behind the façade is taken 
into account. It means that it is not the pays légal, the formal political struc-
ture on which the Western donor community mainly focuses, that should 
be taken as a point of departure but the pays réel, where real political power 
is exercised. A proper understanding of the situation on the ground should 
matter more than the exigencies of the political climate in Western donor 
countries. In many cases, this approach requires us to adjust our expecta-
tions and associated ambitions.
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Thou shalt value effectiveness over moral indignation 
Lack of “good governance” does not necessarily have to be an obstacle to struc-
tural economic development and poverty reduction. In and of themselves, 
commendable demands (as formulated by the international donor communi-
ty) are not preconditions for developing countries to move ahead. It is often 
simply impossible for developing countries to meet these demands. Moreover, 
they draw attention away from governance reforms that are feasible and can 
make a difference. Many African countries are ill equipped to carry out many 
of the government tasks considered essential from a Western point of view. 
What is needed is a healthy dose of opportunism. Build on what is already 
working or could work. Whatever you do, don’t try to reinvent the wheel.
Thou shalt engage in a different political dialogue 
The implication is that a relevant political dialogue with African leaders will 
primarily have to deal with the manner in which they manage the political 
process in their countries so that it does not undercut measures that need 
to be taken in support of economic development. Relevant questions in this 
context: Are stimulation of economic growth, in particular of agriculture, 
free entrepreneurship, and raising (national) productivity part and parcel of 
the rules of the game of the policies of the government? Are serious efforts 
made to manage political tensions and maintain a minimum of political sta-
bility? To press for political reforms with the objective of dismantling the 
prevailing patronage system might even be counter-productive. In a number 
of cases, this type of reform will result in limiting the capacity of the state to 
counteract excesses, all while this political practice still continues. 
Neo-patrimonialism in itself does not have to be an obstacle to development. 
The nature of the settlement between political elites is much more important 
in this respect. It is therefore advisable not to judge the quality of the political 
decision-making process, based on the appearances of Western democracy 
or the lack thereof, but on the achieved (economic) results. What is impor-
tant In terms of (economic) development is less the manner in which a gov-
ernment is established than what it achieves: It does not matter whether a cat 
is black or white, as long as it catches mice.
Thou shalt emphasize economic reforms 
“Good governance” follows economic development and not the other way 
around. Taking into account the low level of economic transformation of 
most of the African economies, economic reforms are more important than 
political ones. It will be impossible to sustain “good governance” reforms, if 
these are not accompanied by economic growth. Too much emphasis on po-
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litical pluralism will drive these countries into a situation where they lack not 
only the capacity of an autocratic state to to act in a resolute manner but also 
the accountability of a well-functioning democracy. 
The removal of specific impediments to economic development should have 
priority over the implementation of general governance reforms. Discus-
sions, for example, about the need for substantial government investments in 
agriculture and rural areas should take precedence over lecturing on the im-
portance of “good governance” and democracy. Given the perception among 
African leaders that policy advice by the international donor community of-
ten has a neo-colonial connotation, such advice should be part of more gen-
eral support for building the capacity of policy-developing institutions.
Thou shalt prioritize inclusivity over elections
Taking into consideration the widespread support among the population for 
a pluralist political system, multiparty elections are and will remain a reality 
in Africa. Sequencing (first economic followed by political reforms) might 
perhaps have the best chance of success in terms of structural economic de-
velopment, but this is not a realistic option (any longer). In as far as outsiders 
can influence events, their efforts should focus as much as possible on miti-
gating the negative consequences of elections. 
More important than the outcome of elections is the need to hold together 
what are often deeply divided societies. The various segments of the pop-
ulation must feel that they are represented and not excluded by the state. 
Political inclusivity among the elites often constitutes a more important 
condition for political stability and therefore economic development than 
a Western-type democracy and all its trappings. The politics of accommo-
dation in the Netherlands operated partly along similar lines. Whether they 
are conducted fairly or not, elections that can be used to legitimize a winner 
takes all approach are, in Africa, all too often a recipe for misery and there-
fore do not deserve our support.
Thou shalt not mix and match agendas 
Although the magnitude of a country’s (often interrelated) needs and prob-
lems is often enormous, policymakers will have to limit themselves to the 
most urgent reforms on account of the rudimentary capacity and the excep-
tionally weak institutional environment in African states. The donor com-
munity (including the Netherlands) must not overburden African countries 
with a laundry list of requests and demands. A broad governance agenda 
rarely deserves priority as part of a growth strategy. Some reforms are more 
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necessary than others, and some countries can shoulder a greater burden 
than others. Consequently, rigorous prioritizing is essential. Biting of more 
than these countries can chew can be counterproductive, because it diverts 
resources from the implementation of measures that are possible.
Thou shalt not make matters worse 
Should there be a regime that achieves tangible results regarding poverty 
reduction and creates the right conditions for economic development, it is 
advisable to refrain from external pressure to bring the political settlement 
in line with the requirements of the fashionable “good governance” agenda. 
Rwanda and Ethiopia fit in this category. External pressure to change their 
admittedly authoritarian style of governing might well undermine the do-
mestic political stability based on this type of political settlement, and invol-
untarily contribute to the undermining of the economic progress made and 
even result in the outbreak of violence between different population groups. 
In countries governed by competent regimes focused on economic develop-
ment and transformation, demands to increase political participation rapidly 
could easily lead to a drastic redistribution for the purpose of short-term pa-
tronage with detrimental effects on long-term economic development. 
Thou shalt appreciate ethnicity for what it is 
African societies are pervaded by ethnicity. It constitutes an import frame 
of reference for most Africans. Ethnic arithmetic is a skill that every African 
politician possesses. Many political leaders make use of ethnicity to decide 
multiparty elections to their advantage and secure their political position. 
Western donor countries would be well advised to take this into account and 
accept this as a political fact. What needs to be done is to help mitigate the 
increased ethnic animosities as a consequence of the introduction of mul-
tiparty democracy. Considering the implications of the intrumentalization 
of ethnicity for the political stability of a country and the well-being of its 
population, the Western “good governance” agenda should be of secondary 
importance. Within this context, reconciliation prevails over justice. 
Thou shalt have different expectations
The international community (including Western civil society) could do with 
a healthy dose of realism and should adjust their expectations: smaller steps, 
a longer time scale, and a better understanding of the historical, political, and 
the sociocultural context. The developmental process of African countries will 
be an African process and will not take place per se on the basis of our Western 
templates. We are dealing here with long-term socioeconomic developments 
that cannot be cut off just for institutional Western-style reforms. 
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Summary “Does democracy help Africa?”
Western donor countries consider a proper functioning multiparty democ-
racy as one of the most import conditions for achieving more legitimate gov-
ernance, and subsequently economic development and reduction of poverty 
in their partner countries. Support for free-and-fair elections is an integral 
part of the “good governance” agenda of the traditional donor community. 
The central question in this study is whether the introduction/reintroduction 
of a multiparty system and corresponding elections in a number of African 
countries in the 1990s contributed to political settlements that are conducive 
to economic development and transformation. A comparative historical ap-
proach has been applied to shed light on the research question. Within this 
context, the reaction of the political elites, in particular, to the challenges of a 
multiparty democracy has been investigated. Since the proof of the pudding 
is in the eating, a major part of the study focuses on five country cases in 
sub-Sahara Africa, that is, Kenya, Uganda, the Congo, Rwanda, and Ethiopia. 
Based on these country studies and studying the relevant literature, a number 
of common trends and conclusions have been formulated.
Although the abovementioned countries, like elsewhere in Africa, have wit-
nessed substantial economic growth, it is clear that a transformation of their 
economies has not taken place yet. They are just at the beginning of this pro-
cess. Without a structural change, this level of economic growth will not be 
sustainable. In an effort to try to understand how multiparty democracy in-
fluenced the different types of cooperation among the political elites, and 
its implications for economic transformation, the typology on political ar-
rangements in developing countries, formulated by Mushtaq Khan, has been 
applied. 
Seen from the perspective of this typology and based on the findings of the 
country-specific research, the conclusion can be drawn that the introduc-
tion/reintroduction of a multiparty system and elections, as such, did not 
result in ruling coalitions that were capable of applying a long-term agenda 
conducive to economic development and transformation, or of implement-
ing these policies for that matter. Political settlements in Kenya and the Con-
go, albeit at different levels, fell in the period under review in the category of 
competitive clientelism. The relative power of the excluded factions and the 
limited authority over lower-level supporters created a situation in which the 
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emphasis was on short-term politics, along with a limited capability as far 
as enforcing policies is concerned. It is evident that the consequences were 
far more serious in the Congo than in Kenya. The structure of the ruling co-
alition in Uganda developed over time into the reality of a weak dominant 
party. The stability of this political settlement was not so much threatened by 
excluded factions as it was by political forces within the party itself. In Ethi-
opia and Rwanda, countries in which the political process was firmly under 
control of the ruling coalitions, the political settlement does seem to have 
the characteristics of a potential developmental coalition. The weakness of 
the excluded factions as well as the strong hierarchical nature of the ruling 
coalition in both countries has created a political environment conducive to 
implementing a long-term development agenda.
The following trends related to the introduction/reintroduction of multipar-
ty democracy and elections in the abovementioned countries, could be iden-
tified:
 ■ Continuation of the neo-patrimonial nature of the political process
Multiparty democracy offered a new framework, but the nature of the politi-
cal process in itself did not fundamentally change. Choices by political actors 
within this context were not so much influenced by motives based on program-
matic or ideological convictions as they were by (in itself politically rational) 
considerations that were focused on direct reciprocity with their supporters. 
Exceptions to a certain extent were the ruling parties in Rwanda and Ethiopia.
 ■ Intensified divisions among the political elites
Electoral politics after the introduction/reintroduction of multiparty democ-
racy resulted in a stronger emphasis on existing differences between politi-
cal elites (and the population). As political freedoms improved and elections 
became more free and fair, the divisions between the political elites and the 
focus on short-term political success intensified. In Rwanda and Ethiopia, 
this was not the case. Multiparty elections in these countries scarcely had any 
impact on the political cohesion of the ruling elite.
 ■ Political manipulation of ethnicity remains a serious problem
African societies are pervaded by ethnicity. Many political leaders have made 
use of ethnicity to decide multiparty elections to their advantage and secure 
their political position. Violence around elections usually had a strong ethnic 
connotation. In short, multiparty elections often contributed to an increased 
emphasis on ethnic distinctions in order to gain political advantage. Moral 
ethnicity was defeated by political tribalism.
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 ■ The use of violence for political purposes continued
Political violence occurred in particular when the ruling party or coalition 
was unsure about the outcome of elections. When the political dominance of 
the ruling party was evident, the chance of election violence diminished. Po-
litical violence was of course not the prerogative of a multiparty democracy. 
However, the introduction/reintroduction of a multiparty system and corre-
sponding elections certainly did not put a stop to political violence.
 ■ Political corruption depended on the nature of specific elections
The misuse of public means for political purposes did not decrease after the 
introduction/reintroduction of multiparty democracy in Kenya, Uganda, and 
the Congo. In order to win the support of voters, favors had to be distribut-
ed on a large scale or promises to that effect had to be made. For this, a lot 
of money was needed. This was not really the case in Rwanda and Ethiopia, 
where the outcome of elections was a forgone conclusion given the dominant 
position of the ruling coalition. 
This complex reality did not escape the international donor community ei-
ther and has resulted in a more pragmatic approach in a number of cases. 
At the same time, Western donors have continued to consider multiparty 
democracy and elections as an important priority in their “good governance” 
agenda. Partly because of the still existant and substantial aid relationship, 
developing countries, in particular in sub-Sahara Africa, were confronted 
with the “good governance” demands and conditions of Western donors.
On the basis of the findings of this study, it appears, however, that it is not 
so much the acceptance of Western-type political institutions or compliance 
with generally endorsed liberal-democratic standards that determine the 
possibilities for developing countries to achieve economic transformation 
and substantial poverty reduction, as it is the nature of the political settle-
ment among the political elites. This conclusion should have consequences 
for the policy of Western donors with regard to “good governance.” A “good 
governance” agenda that is relevant for developing countries should not fo-
cus on the advancement of democracy or challenging authoritarian regimes. 
Much more important is encouraging the presence of a ruling coalition that 
is willing and capable of giving shape and substance to a long-term agenda 
necessary for economic transformation and of mobilizing the necessary re-
sources. It is for this reason that African countries with a political leadership 
that have a solid powerbase and a genuine developmental ambition deserve 
generous and long-term support from the international donor community.
Koper ASC.indd   211 28-11-18   16:26
526893-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 3-12-2018 PDF page: 212
212
Abbreviations
ACET  African Center for Economic Transformation
ADLF  Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération 
du Congo
AMP  Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle
ANDM  Amhara National Democratic Movement
CDR  Coalition pour la Défense de la République
CNDP  Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple
CUD  Coalition for Unity and Democracy
DP  Democratic Party
EFFORT  Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray
EIASC  Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council
EPRDF  Ethiopia People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
FARDC  Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du 
 Congo
FDC  Forum for Democratic Change
FDLR  Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
FORD  Forum for the Restoration of Democracy
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GEMA  Gikuyu Embu Meru Association
GTP  Growth and Transformation Plan
ICC  International Criminal Court
HIPC  Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
KADU  Kenya African Democratic Union
KAMATUSA  Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, Samburu
KANU  Kenya Africa National Union
KPU  Kenya People’s Union
LAO  Limited Access Order
LDP  Liberal Democratic Party
LRA  Lord’s Resistance Army
M23  Mouvement du 23-Mars
MDR  Mouvement Démocratique Républicain
MLC  Mouvement de Libération du Congo
MPR  Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution
MRND  Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie 
et le Developpement
NARC  National Rainbow Coalition
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NDP  National Democratic Party
NRA  National Resistance Army
NRM  National Resistance Movement
ODM  Orange Democratic Movement
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
 Development
OLF  Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF   Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPDO  Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation
PARMEHUTU  Parti du Mouvement et de l’Émancipation Hutu
PNU  Party of National Unity
PSD  Parti Social Démocrate
RCD  Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
RENACO  Regroupement des Nationalistes Congolais
RPA  Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF  Rwandan Patriotic Front
SEPDM  Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic Front
TPLF  Tigray People’s Liberation Front
UEDF  United Ethiopian Democratic Forces
UNAR  Union National Rwandais
UPC  Uganda People’s Congress
UPDF  Uganda People’s Defense Forces
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Western donor countries consider a proper functioning multiparty democracy as one of the 
most import conditions for achieving more legitimate governance and subsequently economic development and reduction 
of poverty in their partner countries. Support to free and fair elections is an integral part of the ‘good governance’ agenda 
of the traditional donor community. 
On the basis of the findings of this study, it appears however that it is not so much the acceptance of Western type political 
institutions or compliance with generally endorsed liberal-democratic standards that determine the possibilities for 
developing countries to achieve economic transformation and substantial poverty reduction, but rather the nature of the 
political settlement among the political elites. 
Martin Koper is historian. He has been working at the Netherlands ministry of Foreign Affairs for almost three decades. His 
postings abroad include Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Rwanda.
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